Summary
noting that although there is no published Second Circuit authority on point, unpublished opinions exist
Summary of this case from Easterling v. ConnecticutOpinion
02 Civ. 3257 (GEL)
August 13, 2002
Jeffrey Harris, pro se, for Plaintiff.
Nicholas P. Chrysanthem, McManus, Collura Richter, P.C., New York, N.Y. for Defendant United Federation of Teachers.
OPINION AND ORDER
Jeffrey Harris, a former New York City public school teacher, brings this suit against his union, the United Federation of Teachers ("UFT"), charging that the UFT breached its duty of fair representation by various derelictions in its handling of the grievance procedure that resulted in his dismissal. The UFT moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion will be granted. Consequently, Harris's motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Though the caption of the case also names the "American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO" as a defendant, the substantive allegations of the complaint contain no reference to that entity.
Suits against unions for breaching a duty of fair representation may be brought in the federal courts under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. But as the UFT correctly argues (D. Mem. at 3-4), the LMRA does not apply to employees of "any State or political subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (definition of "employer"); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (definition of "employee") and 152(5) (definition of "labor organization") (both incorporating by reference definition of "employer" in § 152(2)). Public school boards such as the New York City Board of Education, which employed Harris, are political subdivisions of the State. Police Dep't of Chicano v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n. 9 (1972). For these reasons, this Court has repeatedly held that the LMRA's jurisdictional grant does not permit fair representation suits by New York City teachers against the UFT. See, e.g., Corredor v. UFT, 96 Civ. 428 (LMM), 1997 WL 122877, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1997), aff'd, 162 F.3d 1147, 1998 WL 639403 (2d Cir. 1998); Sampson v. UFT, 89 Civ. 5357 (JFK), 1990 WL 48048, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1990).
There is apparently no published Second Circuit authority directly on point for the proposition that § 301 does not confer jurisdiction over fair representation suits against public employee unions. In the "unpublished" opinion in Corredor, which of course is published to the world on both the Lexis and Westlaw services, the Court expressly decides the point, citing Mosley and approving Judge McKenna's reasoning in the district court opinion. Yet the Second Circuit continues to adhere to its technological-outdated rule prohibiting parties from citing such decisions, Local Rule § 0.23, thus pretending that this decision never happened and that it remains free to decide an identical case in the opposite manner because it remains unbound by this precedent. This Court nevertheless finds the opinion of a distinguished Second Circuit panel highly persuasive, at least as worthy of citation as law review student notes, and eminently predictive of how the Court would in fact decide a future case such as this one.
Harris does not question the UFT's argument on this score, but replies, without elaboration, that subject matter jurisdiction may be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337. (Harris Aff. at 1.) This statute provides that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies." 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a). But the duty of fair representation under federal law is a "statutory obligation," Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953) that arises "under the National Labor Relations Act," id. at 338, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), which establishes the authority and, implicitly, the duties, of exclusive collective bargaining representatives. This substantive provision is also governed by the definitional exclusion of governmental employees in §§ 152(2) and 152(3). Thus, any duty of fair representation owed by the UFT to Harris does not arise under an Act of Congress, and § 1337 has no application.
Even if some duty under a federal statute could be contrived, there is authority for the proposition that the specific exclusion of fair representation suits under § 301 of the LMRA trumps the more general jurisdictional provision in § 1337. Sampson v. UFT, 1990 WL 48048 at *2.
Since State employees such as Harris are not covered by the federal labor laws, Harris's rights against his union, including any duty of fair representation, depend entirely on state law. See N.Y. Civ. Serv. L. §§ 200-214 (the so-called "Taylor Law"), especially § 209-a(2) (defining "[i]mproper employee organization practices" as including breach of "duty of fair representation"). Accordingly, federal jurisdiction over his claim is lacking.
The UFT also argues that Harris' claim is time-barred under state law. (Def. Mem. 4-5.) Since this argument presents a question solely of state law, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter in any event, there is no occasion to address it here.
CONCLUSION
The complaint is dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.SO ORDERED