Opinion
DOCKET NUMBER 2021 CA 0844
02-25-2022
Brittany HARRIS v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF COMMUNITY AND TECHNICAL COLLEGES
G. Karl Bernard New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Brittany Harris Jeff Landry Attorney General and Darrell J. Saltamachia Special Assistant Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee The Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges
G. Karl Bernard New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Brittany Harris
Jeff Landry Attorney General and Darrell J. Saltamachia Special Assistant Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee The Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges
BEFORE: McDONALD, LANIER, WOLFE, JJ.
McDONALD, J. Brittany Harris, a Baton Rouge Community College (BRCC) student, appeals a judgment dismissing her petition for damages alleging detrimental reliance against the Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges (the Board). After review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are taken from the allegations of Ms. Harris's February 3, 2020 petition and from the evidence introduced by the Board in support of its exception of prescription. See La. C.C.P. art. 931 ; Sanders v. Petrin, LLC, 19-1625 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/24/20), 309 So.3d 388, 390.
On the morning of March 20, 2018, Ms. Harris was late for a scheduled Chemistry exam as she drove on to the BRCC campus. BRCC Police Officer Joy Callahan was directing traffic at a crosswalk and stopped Ms. Harris to allow pedestrians to cross the street. After one pedestrian crossed, and as more were approaching, Ms. Harris abruptly veered around Officer Callahan, who was standing in the crosswalk waiting for the approaching pedestrians. Officer Callahan left her post, got into her BRCC Police vehicle, and followed Ms. Harris into a nearby parking lot, where she directed Ms. Harris to produce her driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Ms. Harris did not comply, walked away from Officer Callahan, and entered the building where she was going to take the exam.
Officer Callahan immediately reported Ms. Harris's actions to BRCC Police Sergeant Christopher Milligan, and the two officers then reviewed video footage documenting Ms. Harris's disregard of Officer Callahan's directions at the crosswalk and in the parking lot. When Ms. Harris exited the classroom after finishing her exam, Sgt. Milligan was waiting for her with two other officers. Sgt. Milligan allowed Ms. Harris to explain her earlier actions, told her she was being issued a citation, and escorted her to the BRCC Police headquarters for that purpose. Upon arrival at the BRCC Police squad room, Sgt. Milligan advised Ms. Harris of her Miranda rights. She became very upset, began to yell and curse, and then thrice attempted to leave the squad room, even though Sgt. Milligan told her she was not free to leave. Sgt. Milligan then attempted to handcuff Ms. Harris, but she refused to cooperate and was combative. Officer Callahan arrived and assisted Sgt. Milligan in detaining and handcuffing Ms. Harris. A third officer, Officer Gabrielle Collins, also arrived to assist. BRCC Dispatcher Elizabeth Montgomery witnessed the entire encounter between Sgt. Milligan and Ms. Harris and noted that, until the backup officers arrived, Ms. Harris "never stopped resisting, cussing, fighting, screaming, etc." Although Ms. Harris continued to yell and curse at the three officers, she ultimately agreed to sign the misdemeanor summons Sgt. Milligan issued to her for resisting an officer, a violation of La. R.S. 14:108, and for disregarding a traffic sign, a violation of La. R.S. 32:123.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (outlining procedural safeguards that must be satisfied before a custodial interrogation takes place).
On March 20, 2019, Ms. Harris filed a petition for damages against Sgt. Milligan, Officers Callahan and Collins, the Board, and other defendants, alleging the officers had committed the torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment against her on the day she was issued the misdemeanor summons. After some of the defendants filed an exception of insufficiency of service of process and citation, Ms. Harris filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss her tort suit; the trial court dismissed Ms. Harris's claims against the exceptors by judgment signed on November 18, 2019.
In addition to Sgt. Milligan and the Board, Ms. Harris's March 20, 2019 petition also named the following as defendants: The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, The Board of Supervisors of Southern University, the Baton Rouge Community College Management Council, BRCC Police Officer Joy Callahan, and BRCC Police Officer Gabrielle Z. Collins. The November 18, 2019 judgment dismissed Ms. Harris's claims against the Board, the Baton Rouge Community College Management Council, Sgt. Milligan, Officer Callahan, and Officer Collins. The record does not indicate the status of her claims against the remaining named defendants and those claims are not at issue here.
On February 3, 2020, Ms. Harris filed a second petition for damages, naming the Board as the sole defendant, and alleging she detrimentally relied upon a promise made by Sgt. Milligan on March 20, 2018, which caused her damages. She further alleged the Board was responsible for her detrimental reliance damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Board responded with exceptions of prescription and no cause of action, as well as a motion for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on the matter, at which the Board introduced Ms. Harris's first and second petitions; her motion to dismiss the first petition; the dismissal judgment; two written statements by Ms. Harris describing the March 20th incident; Sgt. Milligan's affidavit describing the March 20th incident, with an attached copy of his incident report; Officer Callahan's affidavit describing the March 20th incident, with attached copies of her incident report and the misdemeanor summons issued to Ms. Harris; and, Dispatcher Montgomery's affidavit, with an attached drawing of relevant BRCC Police offices and video footage of the March 20th incident. Ms. Harris introduced no evidence at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, without reasons, the trial court orally granted the Board's exception of prescription and motion for summary judgment and pretermitted the Board's exception of no cause of action. On February 19, 2021, the trial court signed a judgment memorializing its oral ruling and dismissing Ms. Harris's petition with prejudice.
Ms. Harris appeals from the adverse judgment contending the trial court erred by refusing to apply a ten-year prescriptive period to her detrimental reliance suit. She also claims summary judgment was premature, because the parties had not engaged in discovery before the Board filed its motion for summary judgment.
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
The Board filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Harris's appeal as to the summary judgment claiming Ms. Harris abandoned her appeal of that issue by failing to brief it. In support of its motion, the Board references URCA Rule 2-12.4B(4) , which allows an appellate court to consider as abandoned any assignment of error that has not been briefed. Notably, URCA Rule 2-12.4B(4) allows this court to disregard an unbriefed assignment of error, but it does not, as the Board requests, allow this court to dismiss an appeal due to an unbriefed assignment of error. Nevertheless, because we affirm the trial court's judgment based on prescription, we need not address the summary judgment or Ms. Harris's alleged failure to brief the issue. We deny the Board's motion to dismiss as moot.
Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4 pertinently provides:
A. The brief of the appellant shall contain, under appropriate headings and in the order indicated ... assignments of alleged errors[.]
....
B. (4) All assignments of error and issues for review must be briefed. The court may consider as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review which has not been briefed.
DISCUSSION
In her first assignment of error, Ms. Harris contends the trial court erred in granting the Board's exception of prescription, because the cause of action she alleges in her second suit is a detrimental reliance claim subject to ten-year prescription. She urges that different causes of action, having different prescriptive periods, may arise from the same set of facts. In opposition, the Board argues Ms. Harris's second suit alleges the same tort claims alleged in her first suit, and her characterization of the second suit as a detrimental reliance suit is merely an attempt to circumvent the one-year prescription applicable to tort claims.
Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of inaction for a period of time. La. C.C. art. 3447. All personal actions are generally subject to liberative prescription of ten years, unless otherwise provided by legislation. See La. C.C. art. 3499 ; DePhillips v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 19-01496 (La. 7/9/20), 340 So.3d 817, 821–22. A detrimental reliance action is a personal action subject to the general ten-year prescription. Masita v. Maumoulides, 20-0952 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/15/21), 341 So.3d 11, 24–26. Delictual actions, however, are subject to liberative prescription of one year, running from the day injury or damage is sustained. La. C.C. art. 3492.
Cf. State v. Murphy Cormier General Contractors, Inc., 15-111 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/3/15), 170 So.3d 370, 380, wherein the Third Circuit characterized a detrimental reliance claim as a contractual obligation subject to ten-year prescription; Ames v. Ohle, 11-1540 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/12), 97 So.3d 386, 393, wherein the Fourth Circuit determined that a detrimental reliance claim can be subject to ten-year prescription or one-year prescription, because it is the nature of an action, rather than its label, that governs the applicable prescriptive period.
The applicable prescriptive period depends on the nature of the cause of action. Roger v. Dufrene, 613 So.2d 947, 948 (La. 1993). A court is not bound to accept a plaintiff's characterization of the nature of her cause of action if such is unsupported by the factual allegations. Thomas v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 05-0392 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/06), 934 So.2d 753, 757 ; Ames v. Ohle, 11-1540 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/12), 97 So.3d 386, 393. As Ms. Harris's second suit was filed almost two years after her encounter with Sgt. Milligan, the proper characterization of the nature of her cause of action is essential to determine if it is prescribed. DePhillips, 340 So.3d at 822–23.
Detrimental Reliance
Ms. Harris claims her second suit alleges a detrimental reliance claim against the Board based on a "promise" Sgt. Milligan made to her on March 20, 2018.
Ms. Harris did not name Sgt. Milligan as a defendant in the second suit, and she alleges the Board is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for Sgt. Milligan's acts. The premise of respondeat superior liability (a/k/a "vicarious liability) allows for an employer to be liable for its employee's tortious or delictual acts. La. C.C. art. 2320 ; Richard v. Hall, 03-1488 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So.2d 131, 137. Thus, we question the applicability of respondeat superior liability to a detrimental reliance claim against an employee. Because we determine Ms. Harris's cause of action is delictual, and is not a detrimental reliance claim, we need not answer this question.
The theory of detrimental reliance is codified at La. C.C. art. 1967, which pertinently provides, "A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying." A party claiming detrimental reliance must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of the reliance. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 04-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 59. Stated another way, a party must prove that: (1) the defendant made a promise to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew or should have known that the promise would induce the plaintiff to rely on it to his detriment; (3) the plaintiff relied on the promise to his detriment; (4) the plaintiff was reasonable in relying on the promise; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the reliance. Masita, 341 So.3d at 24–26. The doctrine of detrimental reliance is not favored in Louisiana law, and all claims must be examined strictly and carefully. La. Office of Risk Management v. Richard, 13-0890 (La. 10/15/13), 125 So.3d 398, 402 ; Dos Santos v. Beimere Limited Ptrshp., 17-0283 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/17), 2017 WL 4082287, *5.
In analyzing a detrimental reliance claim, this court has defined a "promise" as follows:
A promise is a declaration which binds the person who makes it, either in conscience or law, to do a specific thing, which then gives to the other person a right to expect or claim the performance of that thing. Another definition of a promise is that it is an offer which is definite and certain and which the promisor intends to be binding. A promise must be clear and unambiguous in order to be enforceable. The mere expression of an intention is not a promise. (Original emphasis omitted; shown emphasis added.)
Masita, 341 So.3d at 26, quoting Wooley v. Lucksinger, 06-1167 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1228, 1239 ; accord Saba v. Emerson, 16-0317 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/31/16), 2016 WL 6427697, *7.
In the second suit, Ms. Harris alleges that Sgt. Milligan "assured" her when he confronted her outside of her classroom that the sole purpose for following him to the BRCC Police Department was for the issuance of a traffic citation. She further alleges that her "voluntary compliance and agreement to follow Sgt. Milligan to the BRCC Police Department Offices was founded upon ... Sgt. Milligan's promise that walking to the office was necessary for the issuance of [the] traffic citation." She then alleges that the Board is liable for the damages resulting from her reliance on Sgt. Milligan's "promise." Although vague, these allegations seem to imply that Sgt. Milligan "promised" that, if Ms. Harris came to the police office, the only action he would take would be to issue her a traffic citation, regardless of whether her subsequent uncooperative and combative conduct would warrant his further action of forcibly detaining and restraining her, and additionally citing her for resisting an officer. When examined strictly and carefully, these scant allegations do not allege a cause of action for detrimental reliance, as they do not state a clear and unambiguous promise by Sgt. Milligan, reasonable reliance by Ms. Harris, nor how her reasonable reliance on any promise caused her damage. Kitziger v. Mire, 19-87 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/24/19), 280 So.3d 302, 308 (finding vague and conclusory allegations insufficient to state a detrimental reliance cause of action); also see Masita, 341 So.3d at 26–27. Contrary to showing Sgt. Milligan making a promise to Ms. Harris, the record indicates that his subject actions were a professional and restrained fulfillment of his job duties in dealing with a defiant student. Sgt. Milligan was a "peace officer," whose duties included making arrests, preventing and detecting crime, and enforcing penal and traffic laws. See La. R.S. 40:2402(3)(a). When Sgt. Milligan confronted Ms. Harris outside of her classroom, he was performing his official duty of enforcing penal and traffic laws. Officer Callahan had reported to him that Ms. Harris had disregarded her directions at both the crosswalk and in the BRCC parking lot. Further, Sgt. Milligan had viewed the video footage documenting Ms. Harris's actions and confirming Officer Callahan's report. At that time, Sgt. Milligan had the authority to detain or arrest Ms. Harris without a warrant, because he had reasonable cause to believe that she had committed a traffic offense. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 213A(3). In turn, Ms. Harris had a duty to peaceably submit to Sgt. Milligan and to comply with his direction. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 220. Thus, when Sgt. Milligan confronted Ms. Harris outside of her classroom, told her she was being issued a traffic citation, and escorted her to the BRCC Police headquarters, he was not making a binding declaration to do any specific thing, much less "promising" her anything in a "clear and unambiguous" manner. Rather, he was merely expressing his intention to perform his lawful duties of issuing her a citation for her violation of the law. Accord Louisiana Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n 1993, Inc. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 11-1580 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/12), 2012 WL 4928680, *3, and Wooley, 961 So.2d at 1239 (both cases finding that a state agency's actions and declarations in following, applying, and executing its statutory powers were not "promises" for La. C.C. art. 1967 detrimental reliance purposes).
Ms. Harris's own written statements, made directly after the March 20, 2018 incident, confirm that Sgt. Milligan was performing his duties; notably absent from her statements is any reference to Sgt. Milligan making any promise to her. In a March 20, 2018 handwritten statement, Ms. Harris wrote:
On 3/20/18, ... I approached the crosswalk on Community College [Drive.] I stopped. The officer on duty proceeded to walk into the intersection, as to prevent me from passing. I waited for the pedestrian to completely cross. [The officer] still stood in the crosswalk. I went around her, as I was already late and nobody was coming. While in class[,] the officer and three others waited outside my class. When I was finished taking my test, I walked out. Officer Milligan walked with me to his office. He asked me to sign a summons. I said, "no b/c I don't agree, but [I'll] still take it so I can take care of it[.]" He told me he would arrest me if I did not....
In a later typed statement, Ms. Harris wrote:
When I finished my exam, I immediately went to the ... officers who were ... waiting .... They asked me to explain what happened at the crosswalk. Upon doing so, they told me I was wrong. I apologized for my poor judgment, and told them it wouldn't happen again. Officer Milligan said I was going to get a ticket. The two male officers and Officer Milligan began to walk me to the police office .... Mr. Milligan told the two officers to "go ahead" and said, "I'll handle this[."]
We have examined Ms. Harris's allegations and the relevant evidence strictly, carefully, and mindful that Louisiana law disfavors the doctrine of detrimental reliance. La. Office of Risk Management, 125 So.3d at 402. Finding no clear and unambiguous promise in the above, we are not bound to accept Ms. Harris's characterization of the nature of her cause of action as one for detrimental reliance. See Thomas, 934 So.2d at 757 ; Ames, 97 So.3d at 393.
Assault, Battery, and False Imprisonment
Rather, the factual allegations of Ms. Harris's second petition reveal that the true nature of her cause of action is indeed delictual and subject to one-year prescription. The focus of her petition is not on any promise by Sgt. Milligan, but instead, on his reaction to her later uncooperative behavior. Ms. Harris alleges that Sgt. Milligan's demeanor dramatically and inexplicably became "threatening" once they were alone in the squad room and such caused her to fear for her safety. She alleges Sgt. Milligan blocked her path to an exit door and forcefully told her, "You're not going anywhere." She further alleges that Sgt. Milligan "deliberately prolonged her detention and placed her in further apprehension of bodily harm." She asserts that he began "manhandling" her in an attempt to subdue her, that he "physically overwhelmed" her, forcibly bent her over a filing cabinet, and violently twisted her arm behind her back. She claims that, after Officer Callahan arrived and after she was handcuffed, Sgt. Milligan (incorrectly identified as Officer Callahan) "closed the door to the office and began aggressively interrogating and berating [her], and that such "may have been his intention from the moment he confronted her in the hallway outside her classroom."
Without commenting on the accuracy or completeness of Ms. Harris's allegations, we agree with the Board that Ms. Harris's above factual allegations are merely restatements of the torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment she alleged against Sgt. Milligan in her first suit. In the context of Louisiana delictual law, an assault takes place when the defendant intentionally places plaintiff in imminent apprehension of a harmful contact when the defendant has the apparent ability to carry out the threatened conduct at that time. 18 La. Civ. L. Treatise § 14.4, Civil Jury Instructions, (3d ed. October 2021 update). A battery is a harmful or offensive contact with a person resulting from an act intended to cause the plaintiff to suffer such a contact, under circumstances in which the defendant has no reason to think the plaintiff would consent to such a contact. Id. at § 14.5. And, false arrest or imprisonment occurs when the defendant intends to confine the plaintiff, his acts result in the plaintiff's confinement, and the plaintiff is conscious of the confinement or actually harmed by it. Id. at § 14.8. Finding in-depth analysis unnecessary, we easily conclude that Ms. Harris's allegations that Sgt. Milligan's threatening demeanor caused her to fear for her safety equate to allegations of the tort of assault. See Fournette v. Tran, 00-0805 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/11/01), 792 So.2d 870, 874. We also conclude that her allegations that Sgt. Milligan manhandled, physically overwhelmed, forcibly bent her over a file cabinet, and violently twisted her arm equate to allegations of the tort of battery. See Doe v. Breedlove, 04-0006 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/11/05), 906 So.2d 565, 572. Lastly, her allegations that Sgt. Milligan deliberately prolonged her detention, told her she was not free to leave, and handcuffed her equate to allegations of the tort of false imprisonment. See Herrera v. First Nat Ins. Co. of America, 15-1097 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 194 So.3d 807, 813.
Delictual Prescription
Being of a delictual nature, the above causes of action are subject to one-year prescription, running from the day injury or damage is sustained. La. C.C. art. 3492. The incident at issue occurred on March 20, 2018. Ms. Harris's first suit did not interrupt prescription because she voluntarily dismissed it. La. C.C. art. 3463B. Ms. Harris's second suit was filed on February 3, 2020 and is facially prescribed.
Although Ms. Harris fax-filed the second petition on December 17, 2019, that filing was ineffective as the original second petition was not physically filed within seven days of the fax-filing, as required by La. R.S. 13:850C. Ms. Harris filed the original second petition on February 3, 2020.
When a cause of action is prescribed on its face, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the running of prescription was suspended or interrupted in some manner. Thomas, 934 So.2d at 758. At the hearing on the prescription exception, the Board introduced ample evidence demonstrating that Sgt. Milligan made no promise to Ms. Harris so as to support a detrimental reliance claim entitling her to ten-year prescription. See La. C.C.P. art. 931. On the other hand, Ms. Harris offered no evidence to support the existence of the vague promise she alleged in her second petition. The trial court gave no reasons for judgment but apparently accepted the Board's evidence as factually accurate; on review, we find no manifest error in that determination. See Gallant Investments, Ltd. v. Illinois Cent R. Co., 08-1404 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09), 7 So.3d 12, 19.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 934 provides:
When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.
In the context of an objection of prescription, the jurisprudence has interpreted the above provision to mean that where a plaintiff's cause of action is prescribed on its face, and the plaintiff has the opportunity but fails to offer any evidence at the hearing of a peremptory exception that his claim was filed timely, he has failed to adequately establish that amendment of his petition might remove the grounds of the objection. Donley v. Hudson's Salvage, 10-1315 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/10), 2010 WL 5480438, *5 ; Thomas, 934 So.2d at 759. Ms. Harris failed to offer any evidence at the hearing. Thus, she was not entitled to amend her petition after the trial court granted the Board's prescription exception, and the trial court properly dismissed her petition.
In sum, we conclude Ms. Harris's second suit alleges the same torts alleged in her first suit. Based on the allegations and evidence, the trial court properly granted the Board's prescription exception, because Ms. Harris's first suit did not interrupt prescription, and her second suit was filed well after the applicable one-year prescriptive period.
CONCLUSION
We deny the Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical College's motion to dismiss the appeal. We affirm the February 19, 2021 judgment dismissing Brittany Harris's petition with prejudice. We assess appeal costs to Brittany Harris.
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Wolfe, J. dissents