Opinion
1:22-cv-00204-ADA-HBK (PC)
05-04-2023
DEVONTE B. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. E. SILVA, ET AL., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS CASE FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD (Doc. No. 1)
This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and Eastern District of California Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022).
HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. No. 1). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss the Complaint under § 1915A for failure to state a claim.
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). He also simultaneously filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. No. 2). The District Judge denied Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. No. 13). Plaintiff later filed a second Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (Doc. No. 24), and the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations,1 recommending dismissal. (Doc. No. 28).
The undersigned then screened the Complaint, finding it failed to state any cognizable claim. (Doc. No. 27 at 1). Plaintiff was given three options to exercise within twenty-one (21) days from November 14, 2022: (1) file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”); (2) file a notice that he intends to stand on his initial complaint subject to the undersigned recommending the district court dismiss for reasons stated in the November 14, 2022 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action, without prejudice, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet been served. (Id. at 9-10). In response, on April 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Intent to Stand on his Complaint. (Doc. No. 29). He states, “Plaintiff Devonte B. Harris elects to proceed on the complaint the Magistrate Judge purported find [sic] fails to state a claim and refer it to the district judge.” (Id. at 1).
B. Summary of Operative Pleading
In the Complaint, Plaintiff names five defendants: E. Silva, A. Pederson, FNU Matta, J. Cerda, and Ken Clark. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-3). Plaintiff is an inmate at California State Prison -Corcoran (“CSP Corcoran”). Plaintiff states that on September 15, 2013, “several guards” entered his cell and assaulted him. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff filed an excessive force complaint and Defendant Pederson interviewed him. (Id.). He states that “one of the guards falsified a RVR[,]” Defendant Silva found him guilty of it, and an associate warden later overturned it. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff does not elaborate on the significance of this incident.
The Court refers to the claim numbers ascribed by Plaintiff to the incidents and uses the pages numbers on the FAC as opposed to the page numbers that appear on the Court's CM/ECF system.
Plaintiff then states that on November 2, 2021 an unnamed guard assaulted him and he filed an excessive force complaint. (Id. at 6). On January 5, 2022, a specialist from Internal Affairs interviewed him about his complaint, after speaking briefly with Defendant Cerda. (Id. at 6). On January 20, 2022, Correctional Counselor Sanchez-Madrigal approached Plaintiff and asked if he would be open to a transfer to general population at another prison. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff told her he “needed time to think about it.” (Id.). She agreed to come back to him for an answer the next day. (Id.). At that point, “[Plaintiff] realized retaliation motivated this transfer.” (Id.). The next day, Plaintiff told the counselor he was not interested and “[s]he appeared to drop the idea.” (Id. at 8). On January 24, Sanchez-Madrigal approached Plaintiffs cell and informed him that “the Associate Director decided to suspend [Plaintiff's] SHU term over [his] objection.” (Id.)
On January 27, 2022, the Institutional Classification Committee at CSP Corcoran met and “executed this predetermined plan to suspend my SHU term and refer me for transfer.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that these decisions were made knowing that transferring him poses an increased risk to his safety and that of others. (Id. at 11-12). He states that placing him in general population presents a heightened risk to his safety and the safety of others because he is a convicted sex offender, which creates “antagonism” between him and other inmates, and he tends to resort to violence when this occurs. (Id. at 11). He also states that he faces a heightened risk when placed in Short-Term Restricted Housing because he “decompensate[s] in the sensory deprivation environment cells of STRH” and previously attempted suicide when placed there. (Id. at 12).
Plaintiff additionally alleges due process and Eighth Amendment violations based on the ICC denying him a “genuine opportunity to be heard” at his hearing and wrongly recommending that he be referred for transfer. (Id.).
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds the Complaint fails to state any claim and recommends the District Judge dismiss the case.
ANALYSIS AND APPLICABLE LAW
A. Screening Requirement and Rule 8
A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).
At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). A court does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Rules permit a complaint to include all related claims against a party and permit joinder of all defendants alleged to be liable for the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” where “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) and 20(a)(2) (emphasis added). But the Rules prohibit conglomeration of unrelated claims against unrelated defendants in a single lawsuit. A litigant must file unrelated claims in separate lawsuits.
If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges' role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed ....” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010).
B. Duplicative Claims
Duplicative lawsuits filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis are subject to dismissal as either frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1993); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988). A complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims may be considered abusive and dismissed under § 1915. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1021. “Dismissal of the duplicative lawsuit, more so than the issuance of a stay or the enjoinment of proceedings, promotes judicial economy and the comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Adams v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).
“[I]n assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (citations omitted). “Plaintiffs generally have no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” Id. at 688 (internal quotations and citations omitted). If the causes of action and relief sought are the same and involve the same parties or their privies, the duplicative lawsuit may be dismissed with prejudice. Adams, 487 F.3d at 688.