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Harris v. Scott

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
Jul 26, 2016
Case No. 1:15-cv-550 (W.D. Mich. Jul. 26, 2016)

Opinion

Case No. 1:15-cv-550

07-26-2016

WILLIE J. HARRIS, # 292201, Plaintiff, v. AMY SCOTT, et al., Defendants.


Honorable Paul L. Maloney REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is an inmate at the Baragra Correctional Facility. (ECF No. 25, 29, PageID.158, 213-14). Plaintiff's complaint arises out of conditions of his confinement in March and May 2015 at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF). The defendants are Corrections Officer Amy Scott and Counselor Nakita Haynes.

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on August 31, 2015. (ECF No. 6). He states that he sent a kite (informal complaint) to Counselor Haynes about unspecified "issues" that he intended to raise at a warden's forum meeting as an ICF Unit 5 representative. He alleges that Officer Scott violated his First Amendment rights on March 12, 2015, because she knew of plaintiff's kite to Ms. Haynes, and Scott purportedly threatened to have plaintiff transferred out of Unit 5 if he brought up his "expected retaliation" concerns at the warden's forum meeting. (Id. at PageID.47, 49)

Plaintiff alleges that on May 7, 2015, defendant Haynes retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights by filing a misconduct charge against him for insolence. Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct charge was false and made in retaliation for a kite (informal complaint) that plaintiff sent to Haynes inquiring whether she planned to ignore every issue that he brought to her attention as a Unit 5 warden's forum representative. (Id. at PageID.50). He alleges that Counselor Haynes also retaliated against him for the same activity on May 10, 2015, by transferring him to ICF's Unit 3, which he alleges housed mostly security threat group (STG) and mentally ill prisoners. (Id.). Plaintiff sues defendants in their individual capacities and he seeks an award of damages. (Id. at PageID.45, 48).

All other claims have been dismissed. (ECF No. 7-9).

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff opposes defendants' motion. (ECF No. 19, 20). For the reasons set forth herein, I recommend that defendants' motion for summary judgment be denied.

Applicable Standards

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2010). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether 'the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Moses v. Providence Hosp. Med. Centers, Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 578 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Pluck v. BP Oil Pipeline Co., 640 F.3d 671, 676 (6th Cir. 2011).

When the party without the burden of proof seeks summary judgment, that party bears the initial burden of pointing out to the district court an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, but need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials "negating" the opponent's claim. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the movant shows that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," the nonmoving party has the burden of coming forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To sustain this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 496 (6th Cir. 2009). The motion for summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1990); see Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp., 676 F.3d 521, 533 (6th Cir. 2012). "A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient; 'there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].'" Dominguez v. Correctional Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252); see LaQuinta Corp. v. Heartland Properties LLC, 603 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2010).

A moving party with the burden of proof faces a "substantially higher hurdle." Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002); Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). The moving party without the burden of proof needs only show that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial. "But where the moving party has the burden -- the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense -- his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. SCHWARZER, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized that the party with the burden of proof faces "a substantially higher hurdle" and "'must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.'" Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 2000)); see Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2012); Cockrel, 270 F.2d at 1056. Accordingly, a summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion "is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).

B. Standards Applicable to the Affirmative Defense of Failure to Exhaust Remedies

Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). A prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 734. "This requirement is a strong one. To further the purposes behind the PLRA, exhaustion is required even if the prisoner subjectively believes the remedy is not available, even when the state cannot grant the particular relief requested, and even where the prisoner[ ] believes the procedure to be ineffectual or futile." Napier v. Laurel County, Ky, 636 F.3d 218, 222 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In Jones v. Bock, the Supreme Court held that "exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and prisoners are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." 549 U.S. at 216. The burden is on defendants to show that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reiterated that "no unexhausted claim may be considered." 549 U.S. at 220. The Court held that when a prisoner complaint contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the lower courts should not dismiss the entire "mixed" complaint, but are required to dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed to address only the exhausted claims. 549 U.S. at 219-24.

In order to exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural rules established by state law. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218-19. In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), the Supreme Court held that the PLRA exhaustion requirement "requires proper exhaustion." 548 U.S. at 93. "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules." Id. at 90; see Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, when a prisoner's grievance is rejected by the prison as untimely because it was not filed within the prescribed period, the prisoner's claim is not "properly exhausted" for purposes of filing a section 1983 action in federal court. 548 U.S. at 90-93; Siggers v. Campbell, 652 F.3d 681, 692 (6th Cir. 2011); see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The procedural bar does not apply where the State declines to enforce its own procedural rules. See Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324-25 (6th Cir. 2010).

MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective July 9, 2007) sets forth the applicable grievance procedures. In Sullivan v. Kasajaru, 316 F. App'x 469, 470 (6th Cir. 2009), the Sixth Circuit held that this policy directive "explicitly required [the prisoner] to name each person against whom he grieved," and it affirmed the district court's dismissal of a prisoner's claim for failure to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies. Id. at 470.

A copy of the policy directive is found in the record. See ECF No. 18-2, PageID.120-27.

Policy Directive 03.02.130 is not limited to the requirement that the individual being grieved be named in the Step I grievance. The following is an overview of the grievance process. Inmates must first attempt to resolve a problem within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his control. Id. at ¶ P. If the mandatory pre-grievance attempt at resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the grievance process and submit a completed grievance form within five business days of the attempted resolution. Id. The Policy Directive also provides the following directions for completing Step I grievance forms: "The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. Information provided is to be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be included." Id. at ¶ R (emphasis in original). Thus, where an individual is not named in the Step I grievance, or his or her involvement in the issue being grieved is not indicated, or the individual is mentioned for the first time during an appeal of a denial of a grievance, the claims against that individual are not properly exhausted. See Ketzner v. Williams, No. 4:06-cv-73, 2008 WL 4534020, at * 16 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2008) (collecting cases); accord Sullivan v. Kasajaru, 316 F. App'x at 470.

The inmate submits the grievance to a designated grievance coordinator who makes an initial determination whether it should be rejected under MDOC policy or assigns it to a respondent. P.D. 03.02.130 at ¶¶ W, X. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten business days after the response was due. Id. at ¶ BB. The respondent at Step II is designated by the policy. The Step II respondent is generally the warden or the warden's designee. Id. at ¶ DD. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III using the same appeal form. Id. at ¶ FF. The Step III appeal form must be sent to the Grievance and Appeals Section within ten business days after receiving the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days after the date the Step II response was due. Id. at ¶ FF. The Grievance and Appeals Section is the Step III respondent. Id. at ¶ GG. Time limitations shall be adhered to by the inmate and staff at all steps of the grievance process. Id. at ¶ S. "The total grievance process from the point of filing a Step I grievance to providing a Step III response shall generally be completed within 120 calendar days unless an extension has been approved in writing." Id.

Ordinarily, a prisoner must pursue appeals of his grievance through Step III of the administrative process. The Sixth Circuit has "clearly held that an inmate does not exhaust available administrative remedies when the inmate fails entirely to invoke the grievance procedure." Napier, 636 F.3d at 224. An argument that it would have been futile to file a grievance does not suffice. Assertions of futility do not excuse plaintiff from the exhaustion requirement. See Napier, 636 F.3d at 224; Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[A]n inmate cannot simply fail to file a grievance or abandon the process before completion and claim that he has exhausted his remedies or that it is futile for him to do so because his grievance is now time-barred under the regulations."); see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6 ("[W]e will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.").

Facts

The following facts are beyond genuine issue. Plaintiff is an inmate at the Baragra Correctional Facility. (ECF No. 25, 29, PageID.158, 213-14). Plaintiff's complaint arises out of conditions of his confinement in March and May 2015 at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF).

On June 1, 2015, plaintiff filed this lawsuit. (ECF No. 1). He filed his amended complaint on August 31, 2015. (ECF No. 6).

Discussion

Defendants have raised the affirmative defense that plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies against them as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Defendants' motion is perfunctory and the evidence that they submitted is inadequate to carry their burden on the affirmative defense.

Defendants did not submit affidavits or even copies of grievances and the related Step I, II, and III responses in support of their motion. Instead, the only evidence offered is a document generated on January 12, 2016, by a student assistant and labeled as a "MDOC Prisoner Step III Grievance Report." (ECF No. 18-3, PageID.130- 34). Defendants argue that the instances of alleged retaliation occurred in March and May 2015, and that the Grievance Report shows that plaintiff had not pursued any grievance through a Step III decision since 2013. (Defendants' Brief at 7, ECF No. 18, PageID.116).

Plaintiff responded by arguing that he did not have any "available" administrative remedy on his claims against defendants because he was on grievance restriction (ECF No. 19 at PageID.136-37) and plaintiff filed an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury (ECF No. 20 at PageID.146), asserting that he had requested and been denied the grievance forms necessary to exhaust his administrative remedies against defendants. Defendants presented no evidence regarding the availability of the MDOC's grievance process and they did not file a reply brief addressing plaintiff's arguments that the grievance process was not available on his claims against defendants. A prisoner need only exhaust "available" remedies. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1862 (2016). I find that defendants have not carried their burden on the affirmative defense.

28 U.S.C. § 1746. --------

Recommended Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) be denied. Dated: July 26, 2016

/s/ Phillip J. Green

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PARTIES

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. MICH. LCIVR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely and specific objections may constitute a waiver of any further right of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 2008). General objections do not suffice. See McClanahan v. Comm'r of Social Security, 474 F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 2006); Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2006).


Summaries of

Harris v. Scott

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
Jul 26, 2016
Case No. 1:15-cv-550 (W.D. Mich. Jul. 26, 2016)
Case details for

Harris v. Scott

Case Details

Full title:WILLIE J. HARRIS, # 292201, Plaintiff, v. AMY SCOTT, et al., Defendants.

Court:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Date published: Jul 26, 2016

Citations

Case No. 1:15-cv-550 (W.D. Mich. Jul. 26, 2016)

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