Opinion
No. 05-06-00578-CV
Opinion Filed June 29, 2007.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. cc-05-05564-C.
Before Justices BRIDGES, FITZGERALD, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal, Michael S. Harris, M.D. challenges the trial court's denial of his second motion to dismiss medical malpractice claims by appellee Shirley Jones. In a single issue, Harris argues that Jones failed to satisfy the requirements of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act. The factual nature of this case, as well as its procedural history, pleadings, and evidence are known to the parties. Therefore, we do not recount these matters. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
At the outset, Jones argues the trial court's ruling was not appealable and that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. We disagree. See Cayton v. Moore, 2007 WL 172069 *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (concluding Court has jurisdiction when trial court's order, in part, denies request for dismissal).
Harris argues Jones's claims should be dismissed because she served an inadequate expert report. The trial court must determine whether the proffered report represents a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory definition of an expert report. Am. Transitional Care Centers of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 2001). An adequate report presents "a fair summary of the expert's opinions about the applicable standard of care, the manner in which the care failed to meet that standard, and the causal relationship between that failure and the claimed injury." Id. We review the trial court's conclusions about the challenged report for an abuse of discretion. Id.
In this case, Harris challenged the report by Dr. Robert Mason on all three required elements, but we need address only one. We conclude the Mason report does not address the element of proximate cause in any fashion. The statutory definition of expert report requires the expert to describe the causal relationship between the alleged failure of the doctor to meet the applicable standard of care, and the injury, harm, or damages claimed. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 74.351(r)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2006). The Mason report fails to draw any connection between the alleged negligence (i.e., Harris's failure to examine Jones before her surgery) and the injuries Jones alleges. Because the Mason report omits one of the statute's required elements, it is inadequate. Thus, the trial court had no discretion but to dismiss Jones's claims against Harris. See id. § 74.351(b)(2).
We reverse the trial court's order denying Harris's second motion to dismiss. We remand this cause to the trial court for entry of a judgment dismissing Jones's claims against Harris and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and court costs to Harris. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(b) (1), (2).