Opinion
No. 14-06-00124-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed March 22, 2007.
On Appeal from the 56th District Court Galveston County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 04-CV1116.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FOWLER and EDELMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, William Francis Harris, Sr. ("Harris"), brings this appeal following the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Aames Capital Corporation a/k/a Aames Capital Corp. ("Aames"). In his first issue, Harris argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment thereby denying his request for a jury trial. In his second issue, Harris contends that the trial court erred in failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In conjunction with its sale of certain real property located in Galveston County, Aames demanded that Harris execute a release of Harris' Mechanic's Lien Affidavit which had been filed on the property. When Harris refused, Aames brought this suit seeking: (1) damages from a cloud on Aames' title to the said property, (2) removal of Harris' Mechanic's Lien Affidavit, the source of the cloud on Aames' title, and (3) discharge of Aames' obligation on a surety bond it obtained to indemnify it against Harris' mechanic's lien. The trial court granted Aames' motion for summary judgment on its claims. Prior to the granting of summary judgment, Harris filed a request for a jury trial. Following the court's granting of summary judgment, Harris filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court denied.
II. ANALYSIS
In his first issue, Harris argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment without granting his motion for jury trial. Harris contends that, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, he has a mandatory right to a jury trial and that the trial court, by granting summary judgment, denied him this right. Harris bases his argument on the "shall" language of Rules 216 through 219. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 216-219. The "shall" language in those rules, however, mandates only that plaintiffs and trial courts follow certain ministerial pre-trial procedures. See, e.g. TEX. R. CIV. P. 216 ("No jury trial shall be had in any civil suit, unless a written request for a jury trial is filed with the clerk of the court. . . ."); 217 ("The deposit for a jury fee shall not be required when the party shall within the time for making such deposit, file with the clerk his affidavit to the effect that he is unable to make such deposit. . . ."). Nowhere do these provisions create a mandatory right to jury trial. Furthermore, if Harris' proposition were accepted, then a defendant could always avoid summary judgment, no matter how baseless his claims, by simply requesting a jury trial. Such a result would subvert the essential purpose of summary judgment — "to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses." Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (quoting City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n. 5 (Tex. 1979)). As a result, we find Harris' argument unpersuasive. We overrule his first issue.
In his second issue, Harris argues that the trial court erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is well-settled that, not only does a trial court not have to file findings of fact and conclusions of law when granting summary judgment, it is improper for the court to do so. IKB Industries (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. 1997) ( citing to Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994)); Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Hennig Prod. Co., 164 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Tex.App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Stangel v. Perkins, 87 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex.App.CDallas 2002, no pet.). Harris' contention is therefore without merit. We overrule his second issue.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.