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Harrilal v. Harrilal

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 2, 1987
128 A.D.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)

Opinion

March 2, 1987

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Abrams, J.).


Ordered that the order entered August 21, 1986 is affirmed, and the order dated November 5, 1986 is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, properly granted the plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence even though it failed to conduct a hearing. The plaintiff's allegations of violent threats and conduct on the part of the defendant which were corroborated by the affidavit of the parties' adult son, Albert, sufficiently established the need for such an order to protect the safety of persons and property. This is particularly so in light of the fact that the defendant did not directly deny or contradict these allegations (see, King v King, 109 A.D.2d 779; De Millio v. De Millio, 106 A.D.2d 424). While the court should have stated its reasons for awarding the plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [f], [g]; cf., Stern v. Stern, 106 A.D.2d 631, 632), this did not constitute reversible error in view of the fact that the record adequately supports the court's decision (see, Day v. Day, 112 A.D.2d 972, 973; Damiano v. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d 132, 134).

Similarly, the Supreme Court's failure to state its reasons for awarding the plaintiff custody of the four minor children, an order of protection, counsel fees and weekly child support of $200 did not constitute reversible error. The record is sufficient to permit appellate review of the order (see, Day v Day, supra; Damiano v. Damiano, supra). In any event, it is well settled that the proper vehicle for correcting alleged inequities in a pendente lite order is a speedy trial (Isham v. Isham, 123 A.D.2d 742; Sassano v. Sassano, 112 A.D.2d 1034, 1035).

The court could not, without the mutual consent of the parties, order the sale of the marital residence (see, Kahn v. Kahn, 43 N.Y.2d 203, 210; Brady v. Brady, 101 A.D.2d 797, 799, affd 64 N.Y.2d 339). In this case, the parties agreed to the sale, but the defendant specifically stated that he would object to any sale arrangement under which a substantial portion of his share of the proceeds would be deposited into an escrow account. Consequently, the court correctly refused to include such a condition in its order authorizing the sale of the marital residence. Thompson, J.P., Niehoff, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Harrilal v. Harrilal

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 2, 1987
128 A.D.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
Case details for

Harrilal v. Harrilal

Case Details

Full title:VIOLET HARRILAL, Respondent-Appellant, v. DALBERT HARRILAL…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Mar 2, 1987

Citations

128 A.D.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)

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