); see also King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427 , 428 (1) (531 SE2d 350 ) (2000) (unanimously denying appellee’s motion to dismiss appeal pursuant to Rubin, because the order being appealed from (the grant of an injunction to enjoin appellant from violating city’s zoning ordinance) did not involve the review of the decision of a local administrative agency); Harrell v. Little Pup Dev. & Constr., 269 Ga. 143 , 144 (1) (498 SE2d 251 ) (1998) (citing Rubin and unanimously concluding that direct appeal was *641 proper; case did not involve superior court review of an administrative decision where appellants brought action for injunctive relief to enforce rezoning conditions imposed against neighboring landowner and “did not join their action for injunctive relief with any appeal from an adverse administrative decision”). Moreover, but for the issuance of a dissent, Outdoor West would be an unpublished order without precedential value.

Bright-line rules are favored, but "we cannot consider the applicability of the application requirement in zoning cases apart from its statutory basis." Harrell v. Little Pup Dev. Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 144 (1) ( 498 S.E.2d 251) (1998). Appellants did not file an appeal to the superior court seeking review of the Board's administrative decision to rezone the adjoining property.

OS Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 724 (1) ( 482 S.E.2d 295) (1997). See Harrell v. Little Pup Dev., 269 Ga. 143, 144 (1) ( 498 S.E.2d 251) (1998). Where a zoning case does not involve superior court review of an administrative decision, the trial court's order does not come within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) and no application for appeal need be filed. Harrell, supra, 269 Ga. at 144 (1).

Dunlap v. City of Atlanta, 272 Ga. 523, 524 ( 531 SE2d 702) (2000); Strohecker v. Gwinnett County Police Dept., 182 Ga.App. 853, 854 (2) ( 357 SE2d 305) (1987). Compare Harrell v. Little Pup Development Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 144 (1) ( 498 SE2d 251) (1998); Offutt v. Earp, 200 Ga. App. 74 (1) ( 406 SE2d 571) (1991). Therefore, although the trial court's order "was appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) [(7)], [Appellant] was nevertheless required to obtain permission to file the appeal, and could not circumvent the discretionary application requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35.

But see Taliaferro County v. Complex Environmental, S03A0856 (dismissed 3/28/03) (Carley, J., dissenting) (dismissing the direct appeal because an application to appeal was required where party brought mandamus seeking to require issuance of verification letter).Harrell v. Little Pup Development Construction, 269 Ga. 143, 144 ( 498 S.E.2d 251) (1998).Long, 268 Ga. at 480.

They were only neighboring landowners who did not participate in any manner in the administrative proceeding which resulted in the rezoning. See Harrell v. Little Pup Development Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 144(1) ( 498 S.E.2d 251) (1998). I agree that the actual participants in an administrative proceeding should not be allowed to utilize mandamus or other legal procedures to obtain a subsequent direct appeal when the substance of the action in superior court is the review of an administrative decision.

In the zoning context, there can be no administrative decision until the property owner begins the administrative process by applying for a rezoning. See Harrell v. Little Pup Development Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 144 (1) ( 498 S.E.2d 251) (1998);Powell v. City of Snellville, 266 Ga. 315, 316 ( 467 S.E.2d 540) (1996); Village Centers v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177, 178 (2) ( 281 S.E.2d 522) (1981). Likewise, there is no administrative pension decision until the Board of Trustees is asked to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the 1978 Pension Plan Act, "to reconcile conflicts therein, if any shall exist," or "to provide for the equitable disposition of any matter not specifically covered by this act."

However, the trial court did not cite either the Georgia constitutional right to freedom of speech and press, or any case law applying that right. Since the trial court did not distinctly pass on the state constitutional issue, this Court should not address that issue on appeal. Harrell v. Little Pup Development Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 145(2) ( 498 S.E.2d 251) (1998). 2.

O S Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 724(1) ( 482 S.E.2d 295) (1997); Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425 ( 383 S.E.2d 123) (1989). In my opinion, this case is not controlled by Trend or O S Advertising, but by Harrell v. Little Pup Dev. Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 144(1) ( 498 S.E.2d 251) (1998). I believe that Harrell compels that we consider Outdoor West's direct appeal on its merits.

3. It does not appear that the defendants have otherwise challenged the merits of the trial court's decision on appeal. To the extent that the defendants' reference to OCGA § 24-4-27 and equitable estoppel in their appellate brief infers an argument that the County is estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinance, we note that, as a general rule, "equitable estoppel cannot interfere with the County's governmental zoning function."Harrell v. Little Pup Dev. c., 269 Ga. 143, 144-145 (2) ( 498 SE2d 251) (1998). The defendants also appear to assert that their compliance with other, unspecified local regulations and ordinances entitled them to install and use the tank.