Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99CV-74-S
February 10, 1999
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint and petition for writ of habeas corpus. They also filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees. IT IS ORDERED that the application is GRANTED. This matter is before the Court for sua sponte review. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-609 (6th Cir. 1997).
Review of plaintiffs' papers reveals that they seek enforcement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. They seek an emergency injunction staying proceedings in a Tarrent County Texas Juvenile Court. Plaintiffs also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking removal of their five children from foster care in Texas for production in Kentucky. For the reasons that follow, this Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the disputes. We will address the claims in turn.
I .
First, plaintiffs seek "enforcement" of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. That statute covers full faith and credit given to child custody determinations. It provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State.28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
Plaintiffs contend that a conflict exists between determinations made by courts in two separate states — Kentucky and Texas — concerning their five minor children. They claim that Texas authorities have wrongfully placed their children in foster care, taken steps to terminate their parental rights, and are proceeding toward a goal of permanent adoption for all children.
In contrast, plaintiffs point to a decision entered by a Hardin County Kentucky Juvenile Court. The Kentucky Court determined that while Texas may have had emergency custody jurisdiction over the children, it should have communicated with Kentucky as the home state of the children before permanent decisions concerning custody were made. The Kentucky Court further concluded that Kentucky would be the appropriate forum for future jurisdiction to modify the custody decree regarding the children. The opinion called upon the judiciary in the state of Texas to communicate with the Kentucky Court to determine whether an agreement might be reached whereby Kentucky would assume modification jurisdiction over the child custody matter.
Clearly, a conflict exists between the courts of Texas and Kentucky. Due to this conflict, plaintiffs looked to § 1738A for resolution. Specifically, they filed the instant action in this Court.
The Supreme Court addressed whether the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, creates an implied cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decisions is valid in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). The Court noted that § 1738A imposes a duty on the States to enforce a child custody determination entered by a court of another State if the determination is consistent with the provisions of the Act. Id. at 175-76. It went on to observe that the legislative scheme suggests, and as Congress explicitly specified, one of the chief purposes of the Act is to "avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts." Id. at 177(citing Pub.L. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3569, § 7(c)(5), note following 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court opined that it must determine whether to infer a private cause of action from the federal statute. Id. at 179. In evaluating whether the statute created a private cause of action, the Court focused on Congress' intent in enacting the statute. See id. at 179-83. The Court concluded that § 1738A is an addendum to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Therefore, § 1738A is intended to have the same operative effect as the full faith and credit statute. Id. 183. Additionally, "unlike statutes that explicitly confer a right on a specified class of persons, the PKPA is a mandate directed to state courts to respect the custody decrees of sister States." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the Court determined that the legislative history of the PKPA provides "unusually clear indication that Congress did not intend the federal courts to play the enforcement role" urged by the petitioner. Id. at 183-84.
"The context, language, and history of the PKPA together make out a conclusive case against inferring a cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid." Id. at 187.
Should state courts prove as obstinate as petitioner predicts, Congress may choose to revisit the issue. But any more radical approach to the problem will have to await further legislative action; we `will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.'Id. at 187 (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981)).
For these reasons, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A does not create a private cause of action. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A does not provide a basis of federal question jurisdiction. The complaint, as it is based on this claim, will be DISMISSED by separate order.
II .
Plaintiffs also filed a document labeled "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Attachment." In the document, plaintiffs request issuance of a writ of habeas corpus "commanding that the children be brought immediat[e]ly before this court."
This Court notes that the plaintiffs' attempt to invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is misplaced. The Supreme Court, in Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services, 458 U.S. 502, 516 (1982), determined that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review state court judgments involuntarily terminating parental rights. See also Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1986). In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court observed that "the `custody' of foster or adoptive parents over a child is not the type of custody that traditionally has been challenged through federal habeas." Id. at 511(footnote omitted).
Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction does not apply to the case at bar. This Court is without jurisdiction to enter an order directing removal of the Harless children from foster care in Texas for the purpose of transporting the children to the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
III .
Plaintiffs further claim that their civil rights and the civil rights of their children have been violated by the defendants. They specifically claim violation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While plaintiffs do not identify the basis for asserting such a claim, this Court is compelled to give liberal construction to their pro se complaint. For this reason, the Court construes the allegations as asserting claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nevertheless, the claims must fail.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are `inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a judicial proceeding.'" District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Where a constitutional issue could have been reviewed on direct appeal by the state appellate courts, a litigant may not seek to reverse or modify the state court judgment by bringing a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d at 263; see also Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 1981) (Section 1983 should not be used as a vehicle to resolve a dispute involving visitation rights-privileges).
Plaintiffs essentially seek to undo the custody decision previously made by the Texas court. Therefore, the case fits squarely within the parameters of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibiting federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments.
Plaintiffs' recourse, if any, is to exhaust their appeals in the Texas State Court system. If the Texas appellate courts rule against plaintiffs, they may petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review of the unfavorable decision from the highest Texas State Court.
IV.
It is axiomatic that federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and their powers are enumerated in Article III of the Constitution. The complaint and accompanying documents fail to establish a basis of federal jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant dispute. See generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1330-1364. Accordingly, this matter will be DISMISSED by separate order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.