" Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 701 ( 89 S.E. 753, LRA 1917A 306). As to Garrett v. Royal Bros. Co., 225 Ga. 533 ( 170 S.E.2d 294), see Hardin v. Reynolds, 189, Ga. 589, 591 ( 6 S.E.2d 913); Rivers v. Cole Corp., 209 Ga. 406, 408 ( 73 S.E.2d 196). The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's summary judgment on the question of liability.
though it be based upon a valuable consideration ( Dickson v. Citizens Bank Trust Co., 184 Ga. 398, 191 S.E. 379; Smith v. Wellborn, 75 Ga. 799 (8); Dwight v. Acme Lumber c. Co., 189 Ga. 473, 6 S.E.2d 586; Cunningham v. Avakian, 192 Ga. 391, 15 S.E.2d 493), and while the fact that a suit is pending against a creditor at the time a deed is executed is a circumstance which the trior of issues of fact is at liberty to consider in determining whether the grantee takes with or without notice of such intent, or reasonable ground to suspect the same ( Peck v. Land, 2 Ga. 1; Godfrey v. City of Cochran, 208 Ga. 149, 65 S.E.2d 605) — the pendency of a suit is only a circumstance, and actual knowledge of the pendency of a suit by the grantee is not in and of itself conclusive in law or in fact upon the grantee as to notice or reasonable ground to suspect the fraudulent intent of the grantor. Colquitt v. Thomas, 8 Ga. 258. See also Burkhalter v. Glennville Bank, 184 Ga. 147 ( 190 S.E. 644); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589 ( 6 S.E.2d 913). ( b) It being conceded by counsel for Mrs. Faver that disputed issues with respect to this matter have been resolved against her, except the undisputed fact of actual knowledge on the part of Jackson of the pendency of the suit against Selman at the time of the conveyance by him, under the ruling above made the trial judge did not err in overruling this exception by Mrs. Faver to the auditor's report and in declining to enter judgment for Mrs. Faver on her motion therefor.
ollock, Dudley's Ga. Dec., Part 1 (1842) p. 33. It also follows the unanimous rulings of this court in Tarver v. Rankin, 3 Ga. 210; Brown v. Ayer, 24 Ga. 288; Tyler Cotton Press Co. v. Chevalier, 56 Ga. 494; Hamilton Co. v. Stewart, 105 Ga. 300 ( 31 S.E. 184), s. c. 108 Ga. 472 ( 34 S.E. 123); Jenkins v. National Mutual B. L. Assn., 111 Ga. 732 ( 36 S.E. 945); and Redmond Co. v. Atlanta Birmingham Air-Line Ry., 129 Ga. 133 ( 58 S.E. 874); and, since the decision by the majority in Sylvania Electric Products v. Electrical Wholesalers, supra, is in conflict with those cited cases which are older and have not been overruled or materially modified, we must follow them, as they have the force and effect of a statute and are binding upon us. Ga. L. 1858, p. 74; Lucas v. Lucas, 30 Ga. 191 (76 Am. D. 642); Calhoun v. Cawley, 104 Ga. 335, 344 ( 30 S.E. 773); Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 626 ( 74 S.E. 245); Hagan v. Asa G. Candler Inc., 189 Ga. 250, 258 ( 5 S.E.2d 739, 126 A.L.R. 108); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589 ( 6 S.E.2d 913); Fuqua v. Hadden, 190 Ga. 361 ( 9 S.E.2d 243). We, therefore, fully adopt Mr. Justice Duckworth's dissenting opinion as our ruling in the instant case; and, accordingly, hold, as was there in effect said, that, if a creditor remits a sum of money to his debtor, though less than the amount actually due, with the understanding, either express or implied, that it is in satisfaction of his debtor's claim, and the latter accepts and retains it, accord and satisfaction of the demand results therefrom, and the balance, insofar as our law is concerned, may not thereafter be recovered by the creditor in an action instituted for that purpose (Chicago Ry. Co. v. Clark, 178 U.S. 353, 366, 20 Sup. Ct. 924, 44 L.ed. 1099); and this is true under our law whether the debtor's claim or demand be liquidated or unliquidated, disputed or undisputed.
Act of 1858 (Ga. L. 1858, p. 74); Lucas v. Lucas, 30 Ga. 191, 202 (76 Am. D. 642); Calhoun v. Cawley, 104 Ga. 335, 344 ( 30 S.E. 773); Hagan v. Asa G. Candler Inc., 189 Ga. 250, 258 ( 5 S.E.2d 739, 126 A.L.R. 108). In case of a conflict in such decisions, the older decision is the law and is binding and controlling upon all the courts of this State. Calhoun v. Cawley, supra; Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 626 ( 74 S.E. 245); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589 ( 6 S.E.2d 913); Fuqua v. Hadden, 190 Ga. 361 ( 9 S.E.2d 243). The constitution (Code, § 2-3009) provides that the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding as precedents upon the Court of Appeals.
“[A] purchaser seeking the benefit and protection of the statute must prove three things: (1) that he acted in good faith; (2) that he paid a valuable consideration; and (3), in cases involving realty, that he has been in possession for four years.” Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589, 592(1), 6 S.E.2d 913 (1940). The fact that a purchaser had knowledge of [a] judgment against his vendor does not constitute the purchaser a wrong-doer; he is, notwithstanding this knowledge alone, a bona fide purchaser.
"[A] purchaser seeking the benefit and protection of the statute must prove three things: (1) that he acted in good faith; (2) that he paid a valuable consideration; and (3), in cases involving realty, that he has been in possession for four years."Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589, 592 (1) (6 SE2d 913) (1940). The fact that a purchaser had knowledge of [a] judgment against his vendor does not constitute the purchaser a wrong-doer; he is, notwithstanding this knowledge alone, a bona fide purchaser.
Consequently, we do not reach the enumerations regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of contract and the admissibility of certain evidence. See Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589, 592 (2) ( 6 S.E.2d 913) (1940). Judgment reversed. Carley, P. J., and Judge Arnold Shulman concur.
The oldest unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts, including the Supreme Court. Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589, 591 ( 6 S.E.2d 913). We note here that the White case was not rendered by a full bench (4-3); and it has been followed by Dept. of Transportation v. Doss, 238 Ga. 480, supra, also a 4 to 3 decision.
In Trotzier v. McElroy, 182 Ga. 719, 725 ( 186 S.E. 817), it was held by the Supreme Court in a full-bench decision, that once a pensioner became, as a matter of right, entitled to a pension under such act, it was a vested right which could not be taken away, but that the pension was due only where "the contingency provided for has occurred before a change in the charter, ordinance, or statute under authority of which the pension was to be paid." This court has not overlooked the decision of the Supreme Court in Bender v. Anglin, 207 Ga. 108 ( 60 S.E.2d 756), in which two Justices dissented, but is bound by the older full-bench decision in Trotzier v. McElroy, supra, for as Justice Duckworth said, speaking for the Supreme Court in Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 589, 591 ( 6 S.E.2d 913), "Under the rules of construction the oldest unanimous decision of this court is binding on all courts, including the Supreme Court." In the present case the agreed stipulation of fact shows without dispute that the act of 1935, supra, was enacted prior to the time the contingency provided for (the death of Mrs. Burks' husband) occurred, and therefore, this court is bound to hold, under the decision of the Supreme Court in Trotzier v. McElroy, 182 Ga. 719, supra, that the petitioner is not entitled to the adjustment in her pension contended for and that the trial court did not err in affirming the decision of the board of trustees denying such adjustment.