Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 19-0423 FC
06-30-2020
In re the Matter of: APRIL SHEREE HARDEMAN-CROSSAN, Petitioner/Appellant, v. GRAHAM WILLIAM CROSSAN, Respondent/Appellee.
APPEARANCES April Sheree Hardeman-Crossan, Phoenix Petitioner/Appellant Graham William Crossan, Scottsdale Respondent/Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2011-052645 FC2011-042663
The Honorable Alison Bachus, Judge
AFFIRMED
APPEARANCES April Sheree Hardeman-Crossan, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant Graham William Crossan, Scottsdale
Respondent/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. HOWE, Judge:
¶1 April Hardeman-Crossan ("Mother") appeals the family court's legal decision-making and parenting time order. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In 2012, the family court dissolved Mother's marriage to Graham Crossan ("Father") and awarded sole legal custody over the parties' children, W.C. and T.C., to Father and joint physical custody to both Father and Mother. In September 2016, Mother and Father had a verbal disagreement during a parenting-time exchange. At some point during the argument, Mother allegedly drove her car toward Father and struck him with the car's side-view mirror. T.C. witnessed the entire incident and had to run out of the way to avoid being hit. Mother was later charged with one count of misdemeanor assault against Father and one count of endangerment against T.C.
¶3 Shortly thereafter, in January 2017, Father petitioned to modify legal decision-making and parenting time, requesting sole legal decision-making authority and parenting time because of Mother's criminal charges. During the September 2017 hearing on the petition, the court reviewed a video-taped recording of the September 2016 incident and also noted that Mother was convicted in June 2017 of endangerment. The court affirmed Father's sole legal decision-making authority, designated him as the children's primary residential parent, and reduced Mother's parenting time to "alternating weekends, from 6:30 Friday to 6:30 p.m. on Sunday." The court also ordered, among other things, that the parties remain in their respective cars during parenting-time exchanges and not communicate about any substantive issues.
¶4 In April 2018, Father again petitioned the family court to modify parenting time, requesting that Mother be permitted to exercise parenting time only one Sunday per month. Mother then filed a competing petition for modification, requesting sole legal decision-making authority and that Father be awarded reasonable parenting time. At a July 2018 evidentiary hearing on the petitions, the court heard testimony from witnesses and received exhibits, including a report from a Court-Appointed Advisor ("CAA"). The CAA reported that she attempted to visit Mother, but Mother would not provide the CAA her address, despite repeated requests. She also reported that Mother was cited for "Hit and Run" and that she "would not cooperate in arranging meetings" with Department of Child Safety case workers. Her report further noted that the children had improved their performance in school while in Father's care and that Father provided the children with a "clean, spacious, and wholesome" home environment. In July 2018, the family court affirmed Father's legal decision-making authority and reduced Mother's parenting time to "every other Sunday, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m." Mother timely appealed.
Father did not file an answering brief. Accordingly, we consider this appeal based on the record and the opening brief alone. --------
DISCUSSION
¶5 Mother challenges the legal decision-making and parenting time order, which we review for abuse of discretion. See Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4 (App. 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court misapplies the law in reaching its decision or when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the court's decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 19 (App. 2009).
¶6 In determining legal decision-making and parenting time, the court must make its determination in accordance with the best interests of the children, considering all factors enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-403(A). Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 18 (2003). If the issues of legal decision-making or parenting time are contested, the court must make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the children. A.R.S. § 25-403(B).
¶7 Mother did not provide a trial transcript. As an appellant, Mother "is responsible for making certain the record on appeal contains all transcripts or other documents necessary for [this Court] to consider the issues raised on appeal." Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995). Without a transcript, we must presume that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings and conclusions. See id. Furthermore, the record shows that the court considered all the factors relevant to the children's best interests and that the evidence summarized above, including the CAA report and other exhibits, support the court's modification order. As a result, the family court did not abuse its discretion or misapply the law in modifying Mother's parenting time.
¶8 Mother nevertheless contends that the family court abused its discretion by exhibiting bias throughout the proceeding. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that a judge is impartial and free of bias or prejudice. State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 247 (1987). Mother presented no evidence of the court's bias or prejudice. As such, this argument fails.
¶9 Mother next argues that the court erred by not reviewing all the evidence that she had submitted. Her argument fails, however, because we presume the court fully considered the relevant evidence in reaching its decision, and Mother presents nothing to overcome that presumption. See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, 410 ¶ 21 (App. 2011).
¶10 Mother also argues that Father lied and misconstrued information throughout the proceeding. Although Mother tries to discredit Father's testimony, the trial court, not this court, determines the credibility of witnesses. See Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155 ¶ 18 (App. 2015). The family court found Father's testimony credible and in absence of a transcript, we defer to the family court's finding. This argument therefore fails.
¶11 Mother asserts that CAA's report "shows a one-sided investigation." The record reflects, however, that Mother would not allow herself to be interviewed by the CAA. She cannot now complain that the report was one-sided.
¶12 Mother also maintains that she was not provided a chance to rebut any claims within the CAA's report. But the record shows that she was emailed a copy of the report on July 13, 2018, and that the first day of trial was on July 16, 2018. Accordingly, Mother was given time to review the document and prepare for trial. She was also accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the CAA during trial. This argument therefore fails.
¶13 Finally, Mother maintains that Father "verbally attacked" her and thereby violated the court's September 2017 order. But Mother does not show how that issue was properly raised with the family court and does not appeal that order. Moreover, the time to appeal the September 2017 order had passed. See ARCAP 9(a) ("To appeal a judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal under Rule 8 no later than 30 days after entry of the judgment from the appeal is taken."). This Court's jurisdiction extends only to Mother's appeal of the July 2018 legal decision-making and parenting time order.
CONCLUSION
¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.