Opinion
No. CV05-400314
November 2, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The pro se plaintiff's amended complaint seeks to bring causes of action based on an alleged violation of his right to practice religion under the United States Constitution, the Connecticut Constitution, the Connecticut General Statutes and the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. He also contends that the defendants retaliated against him for filing a civil complaint against them, again in violation of Connecticut State Statutes, and that the defendants breached a contract between them and the plaintiff, also allegedly in violation of Connecticut Statutes.
The amended complaint suggests, although it does not make this absolutely clear, that the defendants are officials of an entity known as the Walter Brooks Halfway House. The plaintiff alleges that in response to his request that he be permitted to attend Friday evening Muslim services, he was denied permission to do so. The plaintiff further alleges that he filed a civil complaint against the defendant Massarri, who in turn retaliated against him by discharging him from the halfway house and causing him to be sent back to prison. He also claims that he has lost employment opportunities as a result of these events.
The defendants have now moved to strike the amended complaint in its entirety. They contend that the first and second causes of action fail to allege sufficient facts to set forth the requisite state action to support the plaintiff's constitutional claims. They claim that the cause of action grounded in the alleged violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act must be stricken because that act has been held to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. They seek to have the fourth count dismissed on the basis that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for "retaliation," and they also seek to strike the fifth count because the plaintiff has failed to allege any factual basis for a claim of breach of contract. Additionally, and independent of the claims they make with regard to the sufficiency of the allegations for each of the plaintiff's counts, they seek to strike the claim for relief for punitive damages on the basis of their contention that the plaintiff has failed to allege any causes of action which would entitle him to punitive damages.
The plaintiff uses the phrase "cause of action" instead of "count." For ease of understanding, the court will here refer to the plaintiff's five numbered "causes of action" as "counts."
The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Connecticut Practice Book § 10-39. When considering a motion to strike, "all well pleaded facts and those necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292 (2004). The court must take the facts as they are alleged in the complaint and construe them in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff. Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 358, 366 (2003).
Although the plaintiff urges the court to read the amended complaint as implying that the defendants Massarri and Kimbro are state employees and that their actions with respect to the plaintiff were undertaken in performance of their official duties, the complaint in fact is devoid of any such specific allegations. The court recognizes that it is obligated to take into account the fact that the plaintiff is pursuing this matter pro se, and that it therefore should afford him some latitude in his pleadings. It is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants, and, when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties, to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party. Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Kluczinsky, 171 Conn. 516, 519-20, 370 A.2d 1306 (1976); Oakland Heights Mobile Park, Inc. v. Simon, 36 Conn.App. 432, 436, 651 A.2d 281 (1994). Nevertheless, the rules of practice cannot be ignored completely. Schaffer v. Schaffer, 187 Conn. 224, 227-28 n. 3, 445 A.2d 589 (1982); Zanoni v. Hudon, 42 Conn.App. 70, 77, 678 A.2d 12 (1996) ("[a]lthough we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law"). Nevertheless, the court is not empowered to assume the existence of facts which have not been properly pled. Because causes of action for deprivation of a fundamental right under both the Connecticut and United States Constitutions require a threshold showing of state action, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. Crystal Mall Associates, L.P., 270 Conn. 261, 281-82, 852 A.2d 659 (2004), the absence of such a showing renders the plaintiff's constitutional claims as contained in counts one and two insufficient as a matter of law in that they have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The motion to strike is therefore granted as to the first two counts.
The plaintiff bases his third claim on an alleged violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. That legislation, however, was declared invalid by the United States Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997). Since the statute is invalid, it is axiomatic that the plaintiff cannot pursue a cause of action which is based on that statute. The motion to strike is therefore granted with regard to the third count.
The plaintiff's fourth count seeks damages based on a claim of "retaliation," but neither of the plaintiff nor the defendants have been able to point the court to a recognized cause of action grounded in retaliation, other than, perhaps, retaliatory discharge in the workers' compensation context, General Statutes § 31-290a, or under the "whistle blower" statute, General Statutes § 31-51m. As there has been no allegation of an employer-employee relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff here, that cannot be the theory under which this claim is being pursued, and in the absence of any other basis for such a cause of action, the count too is legally insufficient as a matter of law and must be stricken.
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the defendants breached a contract with him "in violation of Connecticut General Statutes." No factual basis for the existence of any particular contract between the parties has been alleged, nor has the plaintiff specified any statute from which the court could determine that he has sufficiently alleged a statutory breach of contract claim. This count must therefore be stricken as well.
In addition, the defendants seek to have stricken the plaintiff's prayer for relief for punitive damages. Although that claim is currently rendered moot by the fact that all five underlying counts are to be stricken, as this is an issue which could arise again should the plaintiff re-plead, the court will address it now. A plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages unless he has pled and set forth facts that would support a finding that a defendant's actions were wanton, wilful or malicious. Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 77, 485 A.2d 1304 (1995). There are no such allegations in the present complaint.
For all the above reasons, all five counts of the plaintiff's complaint are stricken, as is the claim for relief for punitive damages.