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finding that because the plaintiff's claim for breach of the settlement agreement was sufficiently related to his claim for retaliation the district court could assume jurisdiction over both claims
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Civil No. 02-1066 ADM/AJB
June 28, 2002
Ronald Hanson, pro se.
Reid Carron, Esq., and Holly Robbins, Esq., Faegre Benson, L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The above-entitled matter came before the undersigned United States District Judge on June 3, 2002, pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Request for a More Detailed Answer [Doc. No. 3]. Based upon the Court's review of the record and the parties' memorandum in support of, and in opposition to, the Motions, Plaintiff's Motions are denied.
II. BACKGROUND
On or about November 23, 2001, Ronald Hanson ("Plaintiff") filed a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that his employers had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Plaintiff and his employers, First Student, Inc., and Jeff Pearson (collectively "Defendants"), subsequently participated in a mediation program facilitated by the EEOC, which resulted in a settlement agreement signed by both parties in January, 2002. Defs. Notice of Removal Ex. B-4. A letter dated April 15, 2002, from the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, informed Plaintiff of his "right to sue" his employers in a civil action. Defs. Notice of Removal Ex. C.
On May 1, 2002, Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendants in Minnesota District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Hennepin County. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges breach of the settlement agreement, reiterates his Title VII Discrimination claims, and, mistakenly invoking the authority of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106, includes a new allegation of Retaliation, purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Plaintiff is seeking reinstatement of employment along with back pay, specific performance of the settlement agreement and an award of $36,400 in damages.
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Request For Remand [Doc. No. 5] incorrectly states Ramsey rather than Hennepin County, but the error is of no significance to the ruling.
Presumably, Plaintiff is referring to subsection (d) of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106, which states: "A complainant may amend a complaint at any time prior to the conclusion of the investigation to include issues or claims like or related to those raised in the complaint. After requesting a hearing, a complainant may file a motion with the administrative judge to amend a complaint to include issues or claims like or related to those raised in the complaint." In this case, the EEOC stopped processing the Complaint; Plaintiff's present action is a civil one, not an administrative proceeding, making this regulation inapplicable.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), Defendants filed a timely Motion of Removal [Doc. No. 1] to United States District Court, District of Minnesota, asserting original federal jurisdiction. On June 3, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand and A Request for a More Detailed Answer [Doc. No. 3].
On June 11, 2002, Defendants submitted a Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's Request For Remand [Doc. No. 5].
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The United States District Courts have original jurisdiction for all actions "arising under" the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Any civil action commenced in state court of which the United States District Courts have original jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant to the appropriate federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). After a case has been removed, a plaintiff may make a timely motion to remand a case to state court based on any defect in the removal process. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). If there is no subject matter jurisdiction, the district court must remand the action.
On a motion to remand, the party who originally sought the removal has the burden of proving its appropriateness. Jil McCorkindale v. American Home Assurance Co./A.I.C., 909 F. Supp. 646, 650 (N.D.Iowa 1995). Any doubts about the propriety of federal jurisdiction are resolved "in favor of remand." Id. at 650. In determining whether a removal was proper, the district court must only consider the "the plaintiff's pleading, which controls." Griffin v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 812 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D.N.C. 1993) (quoting American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1950)).
B. Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff's original complaint is imprecise and vague. It does, however, rely on federal law to establish a cause of action. Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating and retaliating against him. Plaintiff frames his allegations by referring to federal law:
As a result, the plaintiff [sic] charge of Discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended et al initially established has not been resolved and the plaintiff reserves the right pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § $ 614.106 [sic] to amend the original complaint to include the new charge of Retaliation dated 3/29/02.
Defs. Notice of Removal Ex. A (Complaint). Federal law provides the foundation for Plaintiff's claim.
By invoking Title VII and the Code of Federal Regulations, Plaintiff asserts a federal cause of action, thereby rendering federal subject matter jurisdiction proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "As a general matter, an action arises under federal law if federal law creates the cause of action." In re 17,325 Liters of Liquor, 918 F. Supp. 51, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-809 (1986)). Plaintiff plainly seeks a remedy created by a federal cause of action.
Plaintiff also alleges breach of the settlement agreement, which, on its face, contains no obvious federal element. This Court, however, may exercise pendent jurisdiction over any related state law claim if (1) there is a substantial federal claim; and (2) the state and federal claims derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
On Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, he refers to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., sec 2, to frame his breach of settlement claim, introducing another federal question. However, in determining whether removal was proper, the court must only consider the original complaint at the time removal was filed. Griffin, 812 F. Supp. 616.
In this instance, Plaintiff's two claims, breach of settlement agreement and retaliation, are closely related; they involve events surrounding Plaintiff's mediation with Defendants and his subsequent termination. It is preferable to resolve these issues in the same forum at the same time, for they do constitute "one 'case' for jurisdictional purposes." United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725. Plaintiff's belief that his contract claim is more important than his retaliation claim has no bearing on whether or not federal jurisdiction exists.
C. Plaintiff's Request for a More Detailed Answer
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' Answer is "rambling, vague and unclear," and requests that their Answer be re-filed. Mot. to Remand at 2. This request is baseless, because Defendants clearly articulate their answers and affirmative defenses, conforming to the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 3] is DENIED, and
2. Plaintiff's Request for a More Detailed Answer [Doc. No. 3] is DENIED.