Opinion
No. C5-96-851.
Filed October 15, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Isanti County, File No. F7-94-50334.
Mary J. Norton-Larson, (for Respondent)
David R. Spear, (for Appellant)
Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Harten, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)
Unpublished Opinion
Appellant-mother challenges the district court's award of sole physical and legal custody of the parties' child to respondent-father. We affirm.
Facts
The marriage of appellant-mother Juanita Lofkvist, f/k/a Juanita Hansen, and respondent-father, Terrence Hansen, was dissolved in or before 1989.
The record does not reveal the date of dissolution.
Thereafter, in October 1989, the parties reunited and had a child in 1990. When the parties separated in April 1994, mother retained custody of the parties' child.
Respondent commenced this parentage proceeding in August 1994. In January 1995, the parties stipulated that respondent is the father of the child. The district court adjudicated paternity as stipulated. The parties also stipulated to the entry of a temporary child custody order awarding temporary joint legal custody and temporary physical custody to mother. The temporary order also required that the parties cooperate in the preparation of a custody study. The subsequent custody study recommended that sole legal and physical custody of the child be awarded to father. In August 1995, a two-day custody hearing was held. In January 1996, the district court awarded father sole legal and physical custody and awarded mother visitation. Mother appeals.
Decision 1. Exclusion of Evidence
Mother challenges the district court's refusal to admit into evidence an independent custody report and the oral testimony of the expert witness who prepared it. We will not disturb a district court's decision to exclude evidence unless the exclusion resulted from an erroneous view of the law or constituted an abuse of discretion. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Minn. 1990). Moreover, whether an improper evidentiary ruling entitles a party to a new trial depends on "the complaining party's ability to demonstrate prejudicial error." Id.
In addition to the stipulated custody report, mother attempted to introduce an independent custody report that was not agreed to by the parties.
Here, the excluded report and proposed testimony concerned psychological evaluations of the child that had been conducted without the father's knowledge or consent. The report did not compare and contrast the attributes of both parents in formulating custodial conclusions and recommendations. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the report and any associated testimony. See Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding custody report made without mother's knowledge or consent and did not address necessary statutory factors); Minn. Stat. ___.17, (1994) (enumerating statutory factors which must be considered in making custody determination).
Mother also argues that the district court erred by disallowing evidence of medical records concerning treatment that she received following alleged incidents of spousal abuse. The district court found these documents irrelevant because they related to incidents that occurred before the birth of the child. Given this finding, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these records as irrelevant. Finally, Mother claims that the district court erred when it refused to receive into evidence police reports concerning allegations of past spousal abuse. The record, however, shows that mother never specifically offered this evidence. Therefore, we need not address this issue. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (appellate courts address only issues presented and decided by district court). Nevertheless, even had this evidence been offered, it lacked relevance on the same basis as did the medical records.
2. Custody Determination
Mother argues that the district court's almost verbatim adoption of father's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is evidence that the district court did not render an independent decision. Verbatim adoption of a party's proposed findings and conclusions is not reversible error per se, but it does raise a question of whether the district court independently evaluated each party's testimony and evidence. Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn.App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
Here, the district court made minor alterations to father's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, thereby demonstrating that it must have critically evaluated the proposed documents. Moreover, the evidence supports the findings and conclusions as made. We cannot say that the district court abdicated its responsibility to evaluate independently all the evidence presented.
Mother argues that the district court's four-month delay in rendering a decision requires reversal because the court did not have adequate recall of the facts.
The record indicates that the hearing ended on August 29, 1995 and the district court signed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment on January 19, 1996. The record does not show how much post-trial time the attorneys were allowed to submit their proposals, but both attorneys submitted materials on or about September 22, 1995.
Generally, all matters submitted to a judge for decision are to be decided within 90 days. Minn.Stat. ___.27, (1994). Failure to comply with the 90-day limitation, however, does not necessarily affect the validity of the court's findings or order. The limitation serves to monitor timely judicial administration. Section 546.27 does not provide a litigant with a private cause of action. See Merchants Miners State Bank v. Spal Enter., 391 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn.App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Sept. 22, 1986).
Mother also claims that the district court impermissibly relied on the court ordered custody study. Here, both parties were allowed to cross-examine the custody evaluator concerning the substance of her report. The study was admitted into evidence and the evaluator testified as to its contents. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad fact-finding discretion by considering this evidence. See Scheibe v. Scheibe, 308 Minn. 449, 450, 241 N.W.2d 100, 101 (1976) (court may rely on a custody evaluation if parties have opportunity to cross-examine the author of the evaluation).
3. Physical Custody
Custody decisions are discretionary with the district court; our review is limited to determining "whether the [district] court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law." Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). Findings of fact made by the district court must be sustained unless clearly erroneous. Id. When awarding custody, the district court must consider the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. ___.17, subd. 3. A child's best interests are defined as all relevant factors, including those listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1. After careful review of mother's claims and the district court's findings, we conclude that the district court considered all relevant best interests factors. The findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. See Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01 (findings of fact not set aside unless clearly erroneous). We conclude that the award of sole physical custody to father was not an abuse of discretion.
4. Legal custody
Joint legal custody is presumed to be in a child's best interests provided the parties can cooperate regarding their child. Wopata v. Wopata, 498 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn.App. 1993). After making findings on the statutory joint legal custody factors, the district court determined that joint legal custody was inappropriate because the parties could not cooperate regarding their child. Because the evidence supports the district court's findings, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding father sole legal custody.
5. Motion to Strike
Father moved to strike certain documents in the appendix to mother's brief. We agree that these documents are not part of the record. Accordingly, we grant father's motion to strike the improperly included materials from mother's brief and appendix. See Mitterhauser v. Mitterhauser, 399 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn.App. 1987) (court cannot base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal and must be stricken). We decline to impose sanctions.
Affirmed.