Opinion
No. 2-500 / 11-1249
09-19-2012
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MARCAY D. HANSEN AND MICHAEL E. HANSEN MARCAY D. HANSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MICHAEL E. HANSEN, Respondent-Appellee.
Scott L. Bandstra and Karmen Anderson of Bandstra Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant. Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney, Shindler & Anderson, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Randy V. Hefner, Judge.
Petitioner appeals the denial of her motion to modify the spousal support provision of her decree of dissolution of marriage. AFFIRMED.
Scott L. Bandstra and Karmen Anderson of Bandstra Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney, Shindler & Anderson, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ. VOGEL , P.J.
The marriage of Marcay D. Hansen and Michael E. Hansen was dissolved by stipulated decree on July 1, 2008. In addition to various marital assets, the decree awarded Marcay twenty-four months of spousal support in the amount of $800.00 per month. On July 2, 2010, only a few weeks before the expiration of the support period, Marcay sought modification of the decree. Pointing to her inability to obtain full-time employment due to her mental health issues, as well as the downturn in the economy, Marcay sought an indefinite continuation in support and an additional $200 per month to cover the cost of medical insurance. After a trial of the matter, the district court denied the modification request, and Marcay appeals.
The stipulation did not specify the nature of the spousal support, providing only that it would terminate upon the death of either party or Marcay's remarriage.
In conducting our de novo review, Iowa R. App. P. 6.907, we agree modification was not warranted. Marcay is not entitled to a modification of the support, as she has failed to demonstrate the requisite substantial and material change in circumstances. Iowa Code § 598.21C (2009); In re Marriage of Kupferschmidt, 705 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). If a change is to support modification, it cannot be within the contemplation of the trial court at the time the decree is entered. In re Marriage of Wessels, 542 N.W.2d 486, 489-90 (Iowa 1995). As correctly noted by the district court, the changes in Marcay's health were matters within the court's contemplation when the stipulated decree was approved. The extensive medical records provided show her mental health issues predate the decree and Marcay has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that her change is substantial and unanticipated. See In re Marriage of Full, 255 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Iowa 1977).
Iowa case law allows for rehabilitative alimony, that which is to support an economically dependent spouse through a limited period of education or retraining following the divorce, to be extended and made permanent in extreme situations. Wessels, 542 N.W.2d at 487-89 (citations omitted). It must be in rare situations, where the "later occurrences are so extreme in their nature as to render the initial understanding grossly unfair and therefore subject to change." Id. at 489. The evidence Marcay presented does not satisfy the high burden to prove her decline in mental health is "so extreme" to warrant permanent alimony. When Marcay's treating physician was asked if Marcay's mental health condition was different or worse since July 1, 2008, the doctor responded by saying, "I think it's different." She continued by explaining that Marcay's depression is more "day-to-day, " which interferes with her ability to find employment; on the positive side, her paranoia has decreased. We agree with the district court, that while Marcay continues to struggle with depression, there is not such a change in Marcay's mental health that would "demand that the original order cannot, in fairness and equity, continue to stand." Id. at 489.
Marcay also claims that when the decree was entered into in 2008 it was not anticipated that the economy and job market would deteriorate to such an extent. In determining whether a substantial change of circumstances has occurred, Iowa Code section 598.21C(1)(a) states the court shall consider "[c]hanges in the employment, earning capacity, income, or resources of a party." At the time the decree was entered, Marcay anticipated finding a job, but remained unemployed at the time of the modification trial. While we sympathize with Marcay's difficulties in securing employment, we cannot accept her argument that a general decline of the economy should warrant a modification. Unable to meet the high burden of showing a substantial change of circumstances we decline to modify the support award, and therefore affirm the district court's ruling.
AFFIRMED.