First, the court must apply South Carolina's Long Arm Statute. If the statute is satisfied, then the court must consider the "minimum contacts" requirement of due process. Hammond v. Butler,Means, Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796 (1990). cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990).
Appellant moved to be dismissed based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that respondent made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by satisfying the two-part test enunciated by this Court in Hammond v. Butler, Means,Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796 (1990). Appellant appeals on the following grounds:
Consequently, because neither the complaint nor any other evidence in the record on appeal indicates injury to ALC from Celle's alleged torts, Mariculture has failed to bring its complaint within the scope of the long-arm statute. Second, Grant's contacts with South Carolina also do not support personal jurisdiction over Celle. As support for its claim to the contrary, Mariculture refers us to Hammond v.Butler, Means, Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796 (1990). In Hammond, the Supreme Court held that, "[i]n certain instances, an out-of-state defendant may be subject to jurisdiction under a long-arm statute on the theory that his co-conspirator conducted activities in a particular state pursuant to the conspiracy."
"To meet this burden, . . . [Degesch Chile] must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by the pleadings and affidavits." Id. at 739-40 (citing Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796, 798, cert. denied sub nom., Kramer v. Hammond, 498 U.S. 952, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990)).But see infra p. 8 and note 9 (Due to recent case law, this court modifies some of the language in footnote 2 of Lake Shore, as explained in footnote 9 of this order.).
The Fourth Circuit recognizes the โtheory of obtaining personal jurisdiction by the showing of a conspiracy.โ Lolavar v. de Santibanes, 430 F.3d 221, 229 (4th Cir. 2005). Under this theory, โa conspirator not present in the forum State will, nevertheless, be adjudged to have had a personal presence in the forum State by means of adequate minimum contacts of the other conspirators therein.โ Id.; accord Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins & Browne, 388 S.E.2d 796, 798 (S.C. 1990) (โ[An] out-of-state defendant may be subject to jurisdiction under a long-arm statute on the theory that his coconspirator conducted activities in a particular state pursuant to the conspiracy.โ)
Moreover, even if Comart were a necessary defendant in the suit against Lane, the South Carolina Supreme Court has extended jurisdiction over an out of state conspirator based on the conduct of his coconspirators. Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 463, 388 S.E.2d 796 (1990) ("[A]n out-of-state defendant may be subject to jurisdiction under a long arm statute on the theory that his co-conspirators conducted activities in a particular state pursuant to the conspiracy."). Thus, Comart would likely be subject to suit in South Carolina.
er, 635 F. Supp. 15, 17-18 (E.D.Pa. 1985); Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.Colo. 1983); National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305, 313 n. 7 (N.D.Ga. 1980) (noting that the 5th Circuit seems to agree with decisions indicating that must show a connection between acts of conspirator who was in the jurisdiction with the conspirator who was absent); Gemini Enterprises, Inc. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 565 (M.D.N.C. 1979); McLauglin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 529-530 (D.Md. 1977); Ghazoul v. International Management Services, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.C.D.C. 1973); Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 975 (D.Vt. 1972); Geo-Culture, Inc. v. Siam Investment Management S.A., 936 P.2d 1063 (Or. 1996);Instituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng. Co., 449 A.2d 210 (Del. 1982); Wilcox v. Stout, 637 So.2d 335 (Fla.App. 1994);Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins Brown, 388 S.E.2d 796 (S.C.),cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952 (1990). As these cases explain, the theory is that due process is not offended by the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a individual when the plaintiff can allege more than just that there was a conspiracy; the plaintiff must allege that there were substantial acts committed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy of which the nonresident conspirator was aware or should have been aware.
1980); Martin v. Ju-Li Corp., 332 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 1983); Anderson v. Heartland Oil Gas, Inc., 249 Kan. 458, 819 P.2d 1192 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1946, 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992); Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276 (Minn. 1982); CPC Intern. Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 514 N.E.2d 116 (1987); Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990). This Court further notes that federal cases have held that jurisdiction under Ch. 48.193(1)(b) is not limited to a situation where an act in Florida caused an injury in Florida but also. . . ., reached the situation where a foreign tortious act caused injury in Florida.
As further support for its determination that the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over Santarlasci, the court finds it would be proper to exercise jurisdiction based on Springs's allegations of conspiracy between Gasson and Santarlasci. "In certain instances, an out-of-state defendant may be subject to jurisdiction under a long-arm statute on the theory that his co-conspirator conducted activities in a particular state pursuant to the conspiracy." Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796, 798, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990). Springs has alleged facts sufficient to support jurisdiction over Santarlasci pursuant to the conspiracy with Gasson.
Although Defendant argues that it does not maintain a physical presence in South Carolina, "jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter South Carolina." Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990). The undisputed facts provide this court ample basis to conclude that Defendant's activities have subjected it to jurisdiction under ยง 36-2-803(1)(a), (b), (g), and (h).