Opinion
2d Civil No. B219461 Super. Ct. No. A015536 2d Civil No. B229043 Super. Ct. No. P080220
12-08-2011
Adoption of BONNIE HAMILTON-MUSTAFA. BONNIE HAMILTON-MUSTAFA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DIDI HIRSCH COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER, Defendant and Respondent.
Law Offices of Allan F. Grossman, Allan F. Grossman for Appellant. Morrison & Foerster LLP, Miriam A. Vogel, Joseph L. Wyatt, Jr., Janie F. Schulman, Adeola Adeseun for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Ventura County)
Gerald Goldstein was 78 years of age when he and appellant, Bonnie Hamilton-Mustafa, a married woman 22 years his junior, agreed that he would adopt her. The trial court found, inter alia, as a "matter of fact that Mr. Goldstein did not understand the legal or practical effect of adopting an adult." The petition was denied. Three days after the ruling, Mr. Goldstein died. Seven months later, Hamilton-Mustafa sought a declaration that she was "equitably adopted" by Mr. Goldstein. Relying on our Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Ford she sought the corpus of a trust in which Mr. Goldstein held a life estate and which had been created to protect him from his psychological and intellectual impairments. Hamilton-Mustafa claimed that as his equitably adopted daughter she was entitled to the trust assets. A different judge ruled that, as a matter of law, Estate of Ford applies to foster children. Since Hamilton-Mustafa never held that status, it followed that she could not seek equitable adoption. We affirm.
(In re Estate of Ford (2004) 32 Cal.4th 160.)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1980, Goldstein's mother and step-father, both of whom were psychiatrists, amended their family trust (the Trust) to ensure that Goldstein's needs would be met as he aged "in view of [Goldstein's] previously diagnosed total mental disability." The Trust instructs the trustee to pay from the Trust sufficient amounts of principal and income as may be allowed without affecting [Goldstein's] eligibility under any welfare program and to permit Goldstein to reside on the Trust's real property without paying rent during his lifetime.
The Trust provides that, upon Goldstein's death, the remainder of the Trust property was to go to his children, but in the event he died without children, the remainder is to be distributed to the predecessor of respondent Didi Hirsch Community Mental Health Center (Didi Hirsch). Goldstein never married, had no children, and spent the last decades of his life engaged in hoarding behavior. He died on August 10, 2009, at the age of 79, from kidney failure.
Appellant Bonnie Hamilton-Mustafa befriended Gerald Goldstein in the mid-1980's. Hamilton-Mustafa and her husband moved into Goldstein's mobile home and, for 10 years, lived with Goldstein, without paying rent.
Hamilton-Mustafa learned in 2006 that Goldstein was the beneficiary of the Trust. The genesis of this lawsuit is a provision in the Trust which states: "As used in this instrument, the terms 'child,' . . . 'grandchild,' . . . and 'issue' shall include adopted children." On January 9, 2007, Hamilton-Mustafa, then 57 years old, allegedly entered into an agreement with Goldstein in which they agreed to "assume toward each other the legal relation of parent and child, and . . . be subject to the duties and responsibilities of that relationship." On the same day, Hamilton-Mustafa filed a petition for approval of the alleged adoption agreement.
The trial court initiated an investigation to determine whether Goldstein had the mental capacity to adopt. The investigator's report included an assessment by Goldstein's physician that Goldstein did not understand the adoption process but was willing to go along with it. The investigator noted that Goldstein was a hoarder whose mobile home was a cluttered tinderbox with a rat problem. Still unsure of Goldstein's mental capacity, the court ordered him to appear in court.
Goldstein testified at the hearing on the adoption agreement held on May 28, 2009. Judge Kellegrew observed that Mr. Goldstein "had profound cognitive deficits." The court further found that: "Mr. Goldstein did not understand the legal or practical effect of adopting an adult. Mr. Goldstein did not know what city he lives in. Mr. Goldstein was uncertain if or how he owned his home. Mr. Goldstein regarded adopting Ms. Mustafa as a courtesy. He didn't know why he wanted to adopt Ms. Mustafa other than a generalized feeling of affection. The Court finds, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Goldstein lacks the ability to take on the responsibility of adopting another individual. . . . Mr. Goldstein's lack of awareness of the nature and situation of his property would disqualify him from making a will under the California Probate Code. . . . Mr. Goldstein's lack of awareness of his property indicates his incapacity to make a contract because he lacks the necessary alertness, attention, and information processing to do so. . . . Mr. Goldstein has a deficit in mental functions that precludes him from forming a contract under Probate Code § 811."
The trial court added that Mr. Goldstein did not know what would happen to the remaining assets when the Trust ended. When asked about his reasons for wanting to adopt Hamilton-Mustafa, Goldstein replied that it "seemed congenial" to do so and described her as a "dependable friend." Judge Kellegrew noted that he had met Mr. Goldstein in the course of prior proceedings, and at that time had observed behavior that caused him to have concerns about Goldstein's cognitive ability. The petition for adoption was denied.
Shortly after Mr. Goldstein died, Hamilton-Mustafa filed a petition to determine entitlement to distribution of the assets of the Trust. The petition alleged that Hamilton-Mustafa was Mr. Goldstein's adopted daughter under the doctrine of "equitable adoption" and his sole beneficiary and heir. (In re Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th 160.) Following extensive briefing, Judge Glen Reiser found, "[a]s a matter of law" that Hamilton-Mustafa was not Goldstein's equitably adopted daughter and denied the petition. The court explained: "[W]ithout even getting into the equities of the situation, and without even getting into the language of the testamentary instrument in which Mr. Goldstein's mental disabilities are expressed, it seems to me that on its face, as a matter of law, you can't fit [a] 57-year-old married [woman] into this foster child doctrine."
Hamilton-Mustafa filed appeals from both the order denying her adoption petition and the subsequent order denying her petition for equitable adoption. At Hamilton-Mustafa's request, we consolidated the appeals. In her opening brief, Hamilton-Mustafa informed the court that she is not pursuing her appeal of the order denying the adoption petition.
At the hearing on the petition seeking the equitable adoption, Hamilton-Mustafa's attorney was asked by Judge Reiser if the stay of the appeal from the earlier trial on the petition to adopt was not "a strategic decision on your part because if there is a final judgment in the adoption, that would be res judicata on capacity [to adopt]." In his reply, counsel for appellant conceded as much.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Burden of Proof
In order to take as an equitably adopted child from the alleged adopting parent's intestate estate, the claimant must prove the decedent's intent to adopt by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 172.) Whether an equitable adoption has occurred is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 173.)
The Equitable Adoption Doctrine
Equitable adoption is a judicially created doctrine which "allows a person who was accepted and treated as a natural or adopted child, and as to whom adoption typically was promised or contemplated but never performed, to share in inheritance of the foster parents' property." (In re Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 165; Prob. Code, § 6455.)
"[I]n California the doctrine of equitable adoption is a relatively narrow one, applying only to those who '"'though having filled the place of a natural born child, through inadvertence or fault [have] not been legally adopted,'" [where] the evidence establishes an intent to adopt.' (Estate of Furia [2002] 103 Cal.App.4th [1], 5.) In addition to a statement or act by the decedent unequivocally evincing the decedent's intent to adopt, the claimant must show the decedent acted consistently with that intent by forming with the claimant a close and enduring familial relationship. That is, in addition to a contract or other direct evidence of the intent to adopt, the evidence must show 'objective conduct indicating mutual recognition of an adoptive parent and child relationship to such an extent that in equity and good conscience an adoption should be deemed to have taken place.'" (In re Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 171-172, fn. omitted.)
"While a California equitable adoption claimant need not prove all the elements of an enforceable contract to adopt . . . the claimant must demonstrate the existence of some direct expression, on the decedent's part, of an intent to adopt the claimant. The intent may be shown, of course, by proof of an unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt. But it may also be demonstrated by proof of other acts or statements directly showing that the decedent intended the child to be, or to be treated as, a legally adopted child, such as an invalid or unconsummated attempt to adopt, the decedent's statement of his or her intent to adopt the child, or the decedent's representation to the claimant or to the community at large that the claimant was the decedent's natural or legally adopted child." (In re Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 171.)
At its core, the doctrine of equitable adoption turns on effectuating the expressed intent of the decedent to adopt when, through inadvertence or neglect, the adoption was not accomplished. Here, an effort was made to adopt. It failed, not through inadvertence or neglect, but because of a judicial determination that the putative parent lacked the capacity to understand and appreciate what he was doing. Nonetheless, appellant urges this court to hold that the expression of intent determined to be insufficient to effectuate an adoption during decedent's life can, upon his demise, achieve that result. We decline to do so.
The Equitable Adoption Claim Fails
Hamilton-Mustafa bases her claim of equitable adoption on the facts that (1) she and her husband lived with Goldstein for 10 years in his mobile home; (2) during that time, she cared for Goldstein, including driving him to appointments and, in the last year of his life, paying for his food and cleaning up the mobile home; and (3) Goldstein demonstrated his intent to adopt her by entering into an agreement to adopt in 2007 and joining her in filing a petition to adopt in 2007.
The trial court denied the claim of equitable adoption as a matter of law on the ground that "you can't fit [a] 57-year-old married [woman] into this foster child doctrine." We agree. The Ford opinion and all the decisions upon which it relies, unequivocally require that a parent -child relationship exist between the decedent and claimant. That relationship entails an agreement by the adopting party to "'. . . care for [her], support [her], educate [her], and treat [her] in all respects as if [she] were their child, but they never adopt [her]. . . .'" (In re Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 165-166.)
Even if the doctrine could apply to a middle-aged adult, there is no evidence that Goldstein ever acted in a parental role toward, or accepted parental responsibilities for, Hamilton-Mustafa. What the evidence does show is that Hamilton-Mustafa insinuated herself into Goldstein's life and home during the last decade of his life. The fact that she may have performed some tasks on his behalf during that time does not transform this relationship into something more. The parties have cited no case in which a court has found an equitable adoption occurred in circumstances involving a middle-aged adult and an elderly man. Hamilton-Mustafa has not sustained her burden of proving equitable adoption.
In Estate of Reid (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 185, the court found for purposes of inheritance tax that a formal adoption agreement entered into between a 20-year-old orphan and long-time friends of the orphan's parents established transferee status for the adoptee.
As we conclude that no equitable adoption occurred, we need not discuss Hamilton-Mustafa's additional arguments concerning interpretation of language of the Trust and construction of various irrelevant statutory provisions. (See In re Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 165 ["We . . . look to decisional law, rather than statute, for guidance on the equitable adoption doctrine's proper scope and application"].)
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CONCLUSION
Appellant sought to have Mr. Goldstein adopt her. Her claim was tried to conclusion and denied with specific adverse findings concerning Mr. Goldstein's lack of understanding of what he was doing, why he was doing it and the consequences of the adoption if granted. Within months of Mr. Goldstein's death appellant sought to have herself deemed "equitably adopted." In other words, having failed to be adopted by Mr. Goldstein in his lifetime, she sought adoption upon his death.
Ms. Hamilton-Mustafa appealed the judgment of the trial of the adoption agreement. She apparently did so to avoid the legal consequences flowing from the findings and orders of that trial. (See fn. 2, ante.) She has effectively abandoned that appeal. She also appealed from the judgment in the trial of the equitable adoption.
It appears that the purpose of this maneuvering was to forestall this court from considering Mr. Goldstein's intellectual shortcomings from which his parents, in creating the Trust, sought to protect him. Our opinion achieves their objective.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in case No. B219461 (the adoption agreement) and affirm the judgment in case No. B229043 (the equitable adoption petition). Costs are awarded to respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
PERREN, J. We concur:
GILBERT, P.J.
COFFEE, J.
Glen M. Reiser, Judge
Kent M. Kellegrew, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
Law Offices of Allan F. Grossman, Allan F. Grossman for Appellant.
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Miriam A. Vogel, Joseph L. Wyatt, Jr., Janie F. Schulman, Adeola Adeseun for Respondent.