Opinion
2:21-cv-01036-JD-MGB
06-09-2020
Cameron Jamond Hallman, #26547-058, Petitioner, v. Warden of FCI Williamsburg, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Cameron Jamond Hallman (“Petitioner”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge has reviewed the petition and submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution, Williamsburg (“FCI Williamsburg”) in South Carolina. On June 19, 2018, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 1); Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Counts 2 and 4); and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 3 and 5). (See United States v. Hallman, Criminal Case No. 3:18-cr-00201-MOC-DCK-1, Dkt. No. 1.) At the time of the robberies, Petitioner was on supervised release from a prior Hobbs Act robbery conviction, for which he was sentenced to 114 months' imprisonment and released on December 15, 2017. (Crim. No. 201, Dkt. No. 35 at 1.)
A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites). The undersigned therefore takes judicial notice of the records filed in Petitioner's underlying criminal case in reaching the recommendation herein.
On July 24, 2018, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Counts 1-4 pursuant to a written plea agreement and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. (Crim. No. 201, Dkt. Nos. 12, 70.) The plea agreement effectively dismissed the second count of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, which would have subjected Petitioner to an additional mandatory 25-year sentence. (Crim. No. 201, Dkt. No. 35 at 1.) On December 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing health concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Crim. No. 201, Dkt. No. 26.) The district court denied Petitioner's motion on January 25, 2021. (Crim. No. 201, Dkt. No. 35.)
It is against this procedural background that Petitioner now attempts to bring this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his “sentence must be vacated for resentencing” because Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6-8; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 11, claiming that “his sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed as a fundamental defect.”)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Petitioner's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply any or all of these rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, the Respondent must respond. Id. Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
It is well-established that a federal prisoner may only seek collateral review of his conviction and sentence through 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010). Once the prisoner has filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion, he may not pursue additional collateral review except under narrow circumstances. One such avenue is through the § 2255 savings clause, which allows the prisoner to file a § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus if it “appears that the remedy by [a § 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). However, “the remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion.” In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that a procedural impediment to § 2255 relief, such as the statute of limitations or the rule against successive petitions, does not render § 2255 review “inadequate” or “ineffective”).
The Fourth Circuit held in In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000), that a petitioner must satisfy the following criteria in order to demonstrate that a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction:
(1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.226 F.3d at 333-34. The Fourth Circuit later established a similar set of criteria in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018), to determine whether a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's sentence:
(1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.886 F.3d at 429. Because the savings clause requirements are jurisdictional, the court cannot entertain a petition that does not satisfy each of the aforementioned elements. See, e.g., Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 426 (explaining that the savings clause requirements are jurisdictional and may not be waived); see also Rice, 617 F.3d at 807. In evaluating said elements, the court must “look to the substantive law of the circuit where a defendant was convicted.” Hahn v. Mosley, 931 F.3d 295, 301 (4th Cir. 2019). The applicable “procedural law, ” however, is that of the district court's home circuit. Id. Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, so the undersigned considers the substantive law of the Fourth Circuit in assessing Petitioner's claim that § 2255 is now inadequate and/or ineffective to challenge his detainment.
The undersigned notes that under the question requiring explanation as to why § 2255 is ineffective or inadequate to challenge the prisoner's conviction or sentence, Petitioner seems to reference a savings clause test employed by the Sixth Circuit. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) See Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307-08 (6th Cir. 2012). However, as stated above, this Court must apply the substantive law of the Fourth Circuit in assessing Petitioner's claims. The undersigned therefore relies on the elements set forth in In re Jones and Wheeler.
The undersigned finds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the instant petition because Petitioner cannot show that § 2255 is inadequate to test the legality of his conviction or sentence under In re Jones and Wheeler. Indeed, both tests require a showing that the settled substantive law changed “subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion.” In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34; Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429. However, as Petitioner expressly acknowledges in his petition, he never filed a motion to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the first instance. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4; see generally Crim. No. 201.) Accordingly, Petitioner cannot satisfy the second prong under In re Jones or Wheeler and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over his petition. See Rice, 617 F.3d at 807 (explaining that a § 2241 habeas petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where petitioner fails to satisfy each element of the In re Jones test); Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 426 (noting that petitioner must satisfy each element under Wheeler in order to confer jurisdiction on the § 2241 court); see also Gomez-Vazquez v. Dobbs, No. 5:20-cv-00169-HMH-KDW, 2020 WL 958456, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2020) (summarily dismissing § 2241 petition where prisoner did not file a prior § 2255 motion as required to invoke the savings clause), adopted, 2020 WL 951081 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2020); Rogers v. Barnes, No. 4:20-cv-01540-RBH, 2020 WL 3790475, at *2 (D.S.C. July 7, 2020) (same).
Petitioner does not clearly or consistently articulate whether he intends to challenge his conviction, sentence, or both. Under “Request for Relief, ” the petition explicitly demands that Petitioner's sentence “be vacated for resentencing, ” (Dkt. No. 1 at 8), and the accompanying memorandum applies the Wheeler test in an attempt to invoke the savings clause exception (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 8-9, 26). At the same time, however, Petitioner's filings also include sporadic references to his § 924(c) conviction, suggesting that this conviction should likewise be “dismissed” based on United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2, 11, 19.) The undersigned therefore considers both categories under the savings clause in an abundance of caution and in light of Petitioner's pro se status.
To the extent Petitioner contends that his § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective because his time to file a § 2255 motion has expired, the undersigned reiterates that this argument is without merit. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34 (explaining that § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual is unable to obtain relief under that provision); In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5 (finding that a procedural impediment to § 2255 relief, such as the statute of limitations, does not render § 2255 review “inadequate” or “ineffective”).
CONCLUSION
The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).