Opinion
No. 3779.
Decided April 5, 1949.
The requirement that unemployment compensation claimants report and file claims periodically are basic in the administration of the Unemployment Compensation Act (R. L., c. 218, s. 3). The decision of the Superior Court in a trial de novo as provided in the Unemployment Compensation Act is entitled to equal if not greater weight than is accorded the decision of the administrative agency appealed from. So also, the Superior Court in a trial de novo has the same power, to accomplish substantial justice by waiving or extending the unemployment compensation regulations pertaining to reporting and filing of claims, that resides in the first instance with the administrative agency providing the exercise of this power does not impair the overall effective administration of the Act.
APPEAL, to the Superior Court from a "decision of fact" (R. L., c. 218, s. 5, par. G) of the Appeal Tribunal of the Unemployment Division of the Bureau of Labor denying plaintiffs' future unemployment compensation benefits. The Superior Court reversed the decision of the appeal tribunal and granted the plaintiffs their unemployment compensation benefits. This is the same case reported in 94 N.H. 48 (where the facts are stated) and 94 N.H. 338. The defendant's bill of exceptions allowed by Lampron, J., relates to the following portion of the decision: "The Court finds and rules that because of the rulings of the Division declaring appellants disqualified and then unavailable for work their reporting in accordance with regulations would have been a useless gesture on their part and they should not be disqualified from receiving compensation because of such failure to report."
It was agreed that the case of Josephine S. Hallahan determines the rights of all other appellants in the present proceeding and "the eventual rights of the claimants would only remain a matter of mathematical computation in each individual case." For this reason the plaintiffs will be referred to hereafter as the plaintiff. Additional facts are stated in the opinion.
Wyman, Starr, Booth, Wadleigh Langdell (Mr. Booth orally), for the plaintiff.
F. Maurice LaForce (by brief and orally), for the defendant.
Four years ago the plaintiff was unemployed. After reporting to and filing claims for benefits with the defendant, her case slumped forward until it has completed the entire gamut of possible administrative and judicial review. This has involved a total of nine hearings or arguments or both before the defendant, the Superior Court and this court. Omitting the details her case proceeded as follows:
(1) Examiner of Unemployment Division — ineligible for present and future benefits.
(2) Appeal Tribunal of Unemployment Division — eligible for present but not future benefits.
(3) Supreme Court ( 94 N.H. 48) — not eligible as a matter of law for future benefits but is a question of fact to be decided by defendant or Superior Court.
(4) Superior Court — Question whether plaintiff entitled to jury trial transferred without ruling.
(5) Supreme Court ( 94 N.H. 338) — not entitled to jury trial.
(6) Supreme Court (rehearing 94 N.H. 341) — entitled to trial by Superior Court on right to future benefits and previous transfer (3) does not constitute a waiver of election of the right of appeal to the Superior Court.
(7) Superior Court — Trial de novo reverses Appeal Tribunal (2), entitled to future benefits.
(8) Superior Court — Defendant waives exceptions to court's decision except that part quoted above in statement of facts.
(9) Supreme Court — present case on appeal from (8).
When the plaintiff's case was finally tried de novo by the Superior Court pursuant to statute (R. L., c. 218, s. 5, par. G), it was found she was not disqualified from receiving benefits because of refusal to accept the substitute type of work offered her and was not unavailable for work. In other words the plaintiff's original position was affirmed and that of the defendant rejected. The defendant has waived exceptions to this part of the decision of the Superior Court which has the effect of conceding that it could properly be found that the plaintiff was right and the defendant was wrong. This victory for the plaintiff soon appeared hollow since the defendant now claims that plaintiff's failure to continue to report, file claims and be rejected for future benefits makes her ineligible to receive them.
As a general proposition there can be little doubt that the requirements of reporting and filing are basic in the administration of the unemployment compensation law. R. L., c. 218, s. 3. See Matter of Goldstein, 267 N.Y. App. Div. 482, reversed in 293 N.Y. 927. The regulations promulgated by the defendant implement these requirements but also provide that the time for filing may be extended and the dates of reporting may be retroactive if the defendant finds sufficient grounds therefor. Although the defendant made no extension or retroactive application of the regulations in favor of the plaintiff, the Superior Court hearing the facts de novo has excused them in the circumstances of this particular case as being unnecessary. This accomplished substantial justice to the plaintiff under the circumstances without causing confusion in the general administration of the statute. The Superior Court did not say that an appeal automatically suspended the operation of the statute but did say that it should be suspended for this plaintiff on the facts of this case.
Defendant contends that the Superior Court had no power to waive any requirement of the statute or regulations under any circumstances "regardless of the fact that there have appeared to be iniquities present." This court has shown no lack of deference to the actions of administrative agencies, including the defendant, when directed to do so by the Legislature. Hewett v. Riley, 94 N.H. 460. This is amply demonstrated by the previous rulings in this proceeding in which the legal positions advanced by the defendant have been sustained for the most part. Since the Unemployment Compensation Act provided for a trial de novo in the Superior Court, its decision is entitled to equal if not greater weight than is accorded the decision of the defendant administrative agency. Accordingly the Superior Court has the same power to accomplish substantial justice by waiving or extending the regulations that resides in the first instance in the defendant providing the exercise of this power does not impair the overall effective administration of the Act.
Since the decision of the Superior Court metes out justice to the plaintiff without impairing the effective administration of the Act by the defendant, it is affirmed. We cannot say as a matter of law that the Superior Court has exceeded its revisory powers or has abused its discretion by allowing the plaintiff in effect to have the benefit of retroactive filings and reports.
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.