Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2467-CM
April 26, 2000
B. Van Cleave, Overland Park, KS, for plaintiff.
Lynn W. Hursh, Jill Allison Morris, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Kansas City, MO, for defendant.
Daniel K. O'Toole, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, St. Louis, MO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Victor Hall is an employee of defendant United Parcel Service (UPS). Defendant Gary Watkins was plaintiff's immediate supervisor during the events pertinent to this action. Plaintiff alleges that defendants UPS and Watkins discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination (KAAD), Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1001 et seq. Plaintiff also claims that defendants violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and that defendants caused his alleged false arrest at the UPS facility in 1998.
This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss counts I, III, and IV of plaintiffs first amended complaint as those counts allege claims against defendant Watkins (Doc. 12). Counts I, m, and IV regard only those claims under Title VII and KAAD. As set forth in more detail below, defendants' motion is granted.
I. Motion to Dismiss Standards
Dismissal of a cause of action for failure to state a claim is appropriate only where it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals. Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, Maher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff. Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff has asserted discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims against both his employer, defendant UPS, and his then immediate supervisor, defendant Watkins. As an initial matter, plaintiff contends that defendants' motion to dismiss is untimely. Plaintiff filed an original complaint, to which defendants responded by filing an answer. In their answer, defendants asserted that plaintiff had failed to state a claim because there is no individual liability for the discrimination claims. Plaintiff later filed a first amended complaint, to which the defendants responded by filing the motion at issue. Thus having preserved the Rule 12(b)(6) defense in their answer, the defendants' motion to dismiss is properly before this court. See Williamson v. Bernalillo County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 96-2229, 1997 WL 139761, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 1997).
The defendants argue that defendant Watkins cannot be held individually liable under Title VII or KAAD because he is not an employer within the meaning of those statutes. The court agrees. Pursuant to the law in this Circuit, those claims against defendant Watkins are dismissed.
The Tenth Circuit has stated that suits against individuals are inappropriate under Title VII. See Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993)). Specifically, the court in Haynes held that individual supervisors cannot be held personally liable as an employer's agent and that recovery is permitted only against the employers. See id. at 899 ("The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act."). Similarly, a plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action against individual supervisors under KAAD. See White v. Midwest Office Technology, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (D. Kan. 1997).
Plaintiff further argues that defendant Watkins should not be dismissed because defendant Watkins claimed to own a considerable amount of stock in UPS, was in an ownership position, and "could do whatever he wanted." Plaintiff asserts that, as a result, defendant Watkins became an "employer" for purposes of Title VII. The court rejects plaintiffs contention. Plaintiff provides no authority or reasoning to support the proposition that defendant Watkins's purported stock ownership renders him individually liable under Title VII. Indeed, the case law supports the opposite conclusion. See Sullivan v. Presstronics Inc., No. 99-7436, 1997 WL 327126, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1997) (dismissing Title VII claim against an owner of a small, closely held business stating that there is no owner exception to the rule that supervisors cannot be liable under Title VII); Manns v. The Leather Shop Inc., 960 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D.V.I. 1997) (stating fact that supervisor was sole owner and retained control of operations and decisions did not render liability in individual capacity under Title VII). Nor does plaintiffs affidavit demonstrate the existence of employer-like power in defendant Watkins.See Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the court finds defendant Watkins cannot be considered an employer for purposes of Title VII. Defendant Watkins, a supervisor named in his individual capacity, is therefore dismissed from those counts pertaining to Title VII and KAAD. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendants' motion to dismiss counts I, III, and IV as those counts allege claims against individual defendant Gary Watkins is granted (Doc. 12).
Defendants did not move to dismiss plaintiffs claim against defendant Watkins under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. However, § 1981 affords no greater substantive protection than Title VII. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583-84 n. 24, (1984). Accordingly, the same principle under Title VII of dismissing individual supervisors holds true for claims brought under § 1981. See Palmer v. Sprint/United Midwest Management Servs. Co., No. Civ. A. 96-2503-GTV, 1997 WL 383065, at *1 (D. Kan. June 18, 1997). The court, however, declines to take any action with respect to the § 1981 claim without a proper motion before it.