Opinion
No. 05-01-00459-CR.
Opinion Issued March 25, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F00-48776-SH. AFFIRMED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Victor Jay Hall appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine in an amount of less than one gram. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, appellant pled guilty and the trial court assessed punishment at two years' confinement and a $2500 fine. With the permission of the trial court, appellant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized without a warrant. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the reviewing court should give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court's fact findings are based upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The same deference is afforded the trial court's rulings on "application of law to fact" questions, also known as "mixed questions of law and fact," if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. When the facts are undisputed, the appellate court may review the trial court's ruling de novo. See id. Where, as here, the trial court did not make any explicit fact findings in support of its ruling, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assumes the court "made implicit findings of fact supported in the record that buttress its conclusion." Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). An officer may lawfully stop and reasonably detain a person for a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Appellant was stopped for running a red light in the presence of Dallas police officer Tony Castleberg. The police officer was authorized to arrest appellant for the traffic violation. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 542.301, 543.001, 544.007(d) (Vernon 1999). See also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2002). Appellant was arrested and the cocaine seized without a warrant. The general rule is that warrantless searches and seizures are per se illegal with certain specific exceptions. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One exception is that evidence in plain view may be seized without a warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). An officer may rely on the "plain view" doctrine if he had a right to be where he was at the time he observed the incriminating evidence. Ebarb v. State, 598 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Castleberg testified he stopped appellant for running a red light in his presence. When he approached the window of the car, the driver was moving around inside the car and failed to lower the driver's side window. Castleberg knocked on the window and asked appellant to exit the car. After appellant exited the vehicle, Castleberg observed a clear plastic bag containing a white powdery substance on the center console of the car. From previous experience, Castleberg suspected the substance was drugs. He testified the bag containing the substance later identified as cocaine was in plain view. Castleberg confiscated the cocaine and placed appellant under arrest. Because Castleberg stopped appellant for committing an offense in his presence, the officer had a right to be where he was when he observed the cocaine in plain view. Therefore, Castleberg may rely on the "plain view" doctrine to support his seizure of the cocaine without a warrant. Thus, his seizure of the cocaine was not in violation of the rights of appellant. Giving appropriate deference to the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that ruling, we hold the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.