Opinion
June 6, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Nassau County, Claude Ogilvie, J.
Edward V. Garcia, Fernandina, and William A. Stanly, Jacksonville, for appellants.
J.W. PettyJohn and Bedell Bedell, Jacksonville, for appellees.
By the institution of quo warranto proceedings in the court below, the relators, appellees here, sought to oust the respondents, appellants here, from exercising the powers, duties, and franchises of a municipal corporation and the officers thereof within the territorial limits of the purported Town of Fernandina Beach. The validity of the incorporation of the town was attacked on two grounds: (1) that the incorporation did not comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 165, Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A., under which the town was incorporated, and (2) that the town is comprised of two separate non-contiguous tracts of land separated by a portion of Fort Clinch State Park, which is, of course, state-owned land.
By their answer, the respondents denied that they had failed to comply with the provisions of Chapter 165, and alleged in detail the steps which had been taken in incorporating under the provisions of said chapter. They denied further that the inclusion of state-owned lands within the corporate limits rendered the lands embraced within such boundaries non-contiguous and alleged, among others, that the state-owned land separating the privately owned land was a strip 1000 feet wide and 300 feet deep, dedicated and used for an ocean front park; that the inhabitants of the privately owned land to the north and south of the park used it as a common meeting ground; that the north and south tracts, together with the ocean front park, constituted a single, homogeneous and unified community of inhabitants which had, for many years prior to incorporation, been known as the village or town of Fernandina Beach.
The cause came on for hearing on the co-relators' demurrer to the respondents' answer and motion for the entry of judgment of ouster, and upon co-relators' motion to strike certain portions of the answer. The lower court entered a final judgment of ouster, on the ground that there was no authority to include state-owned land in the municipal boundaries and that the state-owned land thus separated the privately owned lands and rendered them non-contiguous. The lower court specifically found, however, that the incorporation had been in compliance with the procedural requirements for the organization of a municipal corporation under the provisions of Chapter 165, Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A. In this latter respect, the court was eminently correct, to which we will refer hereinafter.
The respondents have appealed from the final judgment of ouster, and relators have filed cross-assignments of error relating to the lower court's ruling on the question of compliance with the procedural requirements of Chapter 165.
There is no doubt that the lands included within the territorial limits of the Town of Fernandina Beach are, in fact, contiguous and subject to be included in a municipal corporation, as far as contiguity is concerned, if they were all privately owned. The real question, then, is whether or not the municipality could legally include within its corporate limits the state-owned land.
The appellees have cited no authority for their contention that state-owned lands cannot be included within municipal boundaries; and, indeed, our research has not revealed any case to support such contention. There is, however, some authority on the other side. Thus, in Day v. City of Salem, 65 Or. 114, 131 P. 1028, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1011, it was held that the inclusion of a state-owned asylum within municipal limits did not render non-contiguous other property included therein but extending beyond the asylum. And, by analogy, in City of Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 182 S.W.2d 695, 154 A.L.R. 1434, the authority of the city to extend its municipal boundaries to include a United States military reservation was upheld.
Numerous instances of the inclusion of lands owned by the state or the federal government within municipalities may be cited, such as post office property, state-owned inspection stations, state-owned university property, state office buildings and parks in connection therewith, and so on. There is nothing about the park land in question which would impede the Town of Fernandina Beach in the exercise of its municipal functions in the areas adjoining such park land on the north and south.
We hold, therefore, that state-owned lands may be included within the boundaries of a municipal corporation if such land, in other respects, has the requisite characteristics for inclusion in a municipal corporation.
In the instant case, it appears that the strip of state-owned land in question and the privately owned tracts to the north and south of it, comprise one single, unified, homogeneous community, which had long been known as the village of Fernandina Beach; that the strip of state-owned land, which is used as an ocean front park, is the natural meeting place of the inhabitants of the community and, rather than serving to separate the inhabitants of the north tract from those of the south tract, serves actually to bring them together.
Moreover, as a matter of practical fact, it is clear that municipal services may be more economically supplied to the inhabitants of both tracts by one single municipal organization, rather than by two separate municipal governments. Although it does not appear from the record, it can be conceived that two separate municipal organizations would not be economically feasible.
While the consideration of the following facts has not entered into our decision of this matter, it may be observed that the Town of Fernandina Beach is now the owner of the strip of land, formerly owned by the state, in question. Further, the Legislature of this state, by the enactment of Chapter 25826, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1949, impliedly recognized the right of the Town of Fernandina Beach to include state-owned land within its corporate limits. Although the charter set forth in said Act failed of adoption on referendum, it may still be said that there was a recognition of the right to include such lands in Section 1 of the Act, wherein it is stated that: "The inhabitants of the Town of Fernandina Beach, within the boundaries as now established, under the provisions of Chapter 165 of the Laws of the State of Florida, or as hereafter established in the manner provided by law, shall continue to be a body politic and corporate by the name of the `Town of Fernandina Beach' * * *"
The cases relied on by appellees, Ocean Beach Heights v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 302 U.S. 614, 58 S.Ct. 385, 82 L.Ed. 478; Mahood v. State ex rel. Davis, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90; and Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845, may be distinguished on their facts from the case at bar. All three of these cases were concerned with the attempted incorporation of a tract of land east of Biscayne Bay within the boundaries of the Town of Miami Shores, which was located west of Biscayne Bay. It was held in the Mahood case that the fact that the municipal boundaries included the expanse of the waters of Biscayne Bay between the two separate tracts of land so divided them that they did not constitute a united and contiguous tract, if, as a matter of fact, the two separate tracts constituted two separate villages or hamlets. It was held to be a question for the jury as to whether or not both tracts actually comprised the village of Miami Shores.
We have examined the record as to appellees' cross-assignment of error relating to compliance with the procedural requirements of Chapter 165. As heretofore indicated, the lower court was justified in its finding that the allegations of the respondents' answer were sufficient to show compliance with the provisions of the Act, and his finding is affirmed under the authority of State ex rel. Buford v. Town of Forest Park, 87 Fla. 477, 100 So. 735.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of ouster should be and it is hereby reversed.
Reversed.
ADAMS, C.J., and TERRELL and THOMAS, JJ., concur.