Summary
considering the lack of trustworthiness in the offered testimony and the testimony's contradiction with the substantial amount of evidence showing appellant's guilt in holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting testimony
Summary of this case from MOLE v. STATEOpinion
No. 05-04-01313-CR
Opinion Issued July 22, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 86th District Court, Kaufman County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 21417. Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and FITZGERALD.
OPINION
Richard Hall appeals his murder conviction. A jury convicted appellant and sentenced him to life confinement and a $10,000 fine. In a single issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by excluding evidence allegedly showing the murder was committed by someone other than appellant, denying appellant due process of law under the U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Ricky Holloway's body was discovered under blankets on a reclining chair in his home on November 5, 2002. After not hearing from her father in over a week, his daughter visited Holloway's home, made the discovery, and called police. Forney police officer Michael Sheffield responded to the call. The day before, Sheffield had been on patrol in a trailer park in Forney and had received a complaint that appellant was driving without a license in the park. Sheffield had spoken with appellant, who said the truck belonged to his boss. Sheffield let appellant go with a warning not to operate the truck on public property. Later on the day Holloway's body was discovered, Sheffield again encountered the truck, ran the license plate, and discovered there was a possible homicide of the owner of the car. Sheffield notified the Kaufman County sheriff's office, and appellant was subsequently arrested. After being arrested, appellant gave a statement admitting to shooting Holloway. Two Kaufman County sheriffs were present at the time appellant gave his statement and signed it. The State introduced appellant's statement into evidence, and the statement shows it was initialed by appellant next to the paragraphs indicating he was aware of his rights but was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving those rights. Each page of the statement bears appellant's signature at the bottom. In his statement, appellant admitted he borrowed a friend's bicycle and went to Holloway's home "to find out how come he did not want me to work for him anymore." Holloway was not home. Appellant broke in and, while he was inside, Holloway came inside and went to sleep. Appellant tried to sneak out the front door, but Holloway woke up and jumped up out of his recliner. Appellant grabbed a shotgun lying next to the recliner and shot Holloway in the neck. The bicycle was discovered at Holloway's home. Appellant also admitted he took the Holloway's truck and came back a few days later with a friend to retrieve a television from the Holloway's house. In his testimony at trial, appellant denied making the written statement and denied killing Holloway. Appellant's friend, J.Y., testified appellant told him that his boss had given him a television, and he wanted J.Y. to keep the television until appellant got an apartment. J.Y. went with appellant to Holloway's house at night and stayed in the truck while appellant pulled Holloway's television to the doorway. J.Y. noticed a bad smell at the house "[l]ike some kind of dead animal maybe." Appellant and J.Y. loaded the television into the back of the truck, and appellant locked the door before they left. J.Y. also testified he had seen a shotgun in the back of the truck appellant was driving. J.Y. asked whose shotgun it was, and appellant said his boss had given it to him. Police picked up the television from J.Y.'s house when they arrested him. After appellant denied making the statement admitting his guilt, he called two witnesses to testify concerning an individual they claimed had murdered Holloway. The witnesses were two women who live in the same house, one of whom testified she was in love with appellant. Outside the presence of the jury, the first witness claimed her ex-husband told her he had killed Holloway. She stated that her ex-husband made threats against Holloway, admitted to her that he had killed him, and then threatened to harm her if she talked to police. The second witness, a seventeen-year-old girl, claimed the same individual told her that he had killed Holloway with a shotgun, and that he "wrapped [the witness] in covers" and told her he had done the same thing to Holloway. After listening to the testimony, the judge decided to exclude the testimony of these two witnesses because of a lack of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." The standard for appellate review of a trial court's decision to exclude a hearsay statement under the Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24) is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Cunningham v. State, 877 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). The trial court can consider evidence which might undermine the reliability of the statements, as well as evidence which might corroborate its trustworthiness. Id. Whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate trustworthiness lies within the discretion of the trial court. Id. In Cunningham, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Court of Appeals in considering 1) the independent evidence of the statement's trustworthiness and 2) evidence of the veracity of the declarant. Id. at 312. The Court of Criminal Appeals has enumerated some of the possible factors which may be considered in evaluating corroborating circumstances for purposes of Rule 803(24), including: whether the declarant was so situated that he may have committed the crime; whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused; the timing of the declaration and its spontaneity; the party to whom the declaration was made; and the existence of independent corroborating facts. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). The relationship between the declarant and the party to whom the statement was made has also been held to be a factor for consideration. Id. In the present case, the trial court did not allow the jury to hear two witness' testimony that another individual told them he had committed the murder. One of the witnesses testified she was in love with appellant. Moreover, this same witness was attempting to implicate her ex-husband as the true guilty party. She also admitted she was provided details of the killing by her son prior to her testimony, and her ex-husband had not volunteered information about the murder. The second witness testified she had also been told by the first witness' ex-husband that he had killed Holloway. She testified the alleged killer attacked because Holloway was going to attack him. However, the evidence in the State's exhibits and the autopsy report showed no evidence of any struggle. Nor was the victim "wrapped" in blankets as she described. Appellant points to Alonzo v. State, where the court held the trial court erred in excluding evidence tending to show the murder was committed by someone other than the defendant. Alonzo v. State, 67 S.W.3d 346 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001). However, the evidence in Alonzo included testimony by a witness who claims to have been an eyewitness to the killing by someone other than the defendant. Id. at 356. In the present case, the evidence concerns hearsay, not someone who was actually present at the time of the murder. In Alonzo, the trustworthiness of the witness was also evidenced by his knowledge of details that only an eyewitness might know, while the testimony of the two witnesses in the present case was in conflict with evidence concerning the killing, and substantial evidence indicated appellant's guilt. Appellant's first witness admitted to learning the details of Holloway's murder from her son. Considering the lack of trustworthiness in the offered testimony, appellant's signed confession, and the testimony's contradictions with the substantial amount of evidence showing appellant's guilt, we are unable to find the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing the jury to hear the two witness' testimony. See Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313. We overrule appellant's single issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.