To the extent Plaintiffs assert an equal protection claim on appeal, they have waived the right to argue that claim because they failed to present it to the district court. See Hale v. Victor Chu , 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010). A. Right to vote

Second, Owens argues that he at least used a "therapeutic dose" and contends that Dr. Abbas's testimony was not based on the assumption that he used a full dose, but rather a "therapeutic dose." But Owens raises this argument for the first time on appeal, so we do not consider it. Hale v. Chu, 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010) ("A party waives the right to argue an issue on appeal if he fails to raise that issue before the trial court"). III. CONCLUSION

Second, Owens argues that he at least used a "therapeutic dose" and contends that Dr. Abbas’s testimony was not based on the assumption that he used a full dose, but rather a "therapeutic dose." But Owens raises this argument for the first time on appeal, so we do not consider it. Hale v. Chu , 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010) ("A party waives the right to argue an issue on appeal if he fails to raise that issue before the trial court").III. CONCLUSION

Finally, Coley raises several arguments that she waived because she did not raise them in the district court. See Hale v. Chu, 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010). (These are allegations that DCS told more lies to the state court, that DCS did not inform her of the right against self-incrimination, that her public defender did not provide her with adequate representation, and that DCS violated the Fourth Amendment by requiring her to sign forms and participate in state-mandated services.)

But Officer Brown conceded below that Taylor qualified for the prison mailbox rule, so he's waived any argument on appeal that Taylor did not qualify. See Hale v. Chu, 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir.2010) (“It is well-established that a party waives the right to argue an issue on appeal if he fails to raise that issue before the district court.”). In situations where the rule serves to give a court jurisdiction over a matter that would otherwise be time-barred, the court has an independent duty to ensure that the prisoner actually sent his mail when he says he did—the opposing party's waiver may not be enough.

But Officer Brown conceded below that Taylor qualified for the prison mailbox rule, so he's waived any argument on appeal that Taylor did not qualify. See Hale v. Chu, 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010) ("It is well-established that a party waives the right to argue an issue on appeal if he fails to raise that issue before the district court."). In situations where the rule serves to give a court jurisdiction over a matter that would otherwise be time-barred, the court has an independent duty to ensure that the prisoner actually sent his mail when he says he did—the opposing party's waiver may not be enough.

Leigh and Sturgeon have waived several of their other arguments—including charges of judicial bias, fraud committed on the court by the defendants, and a catchall argument under Rule 60(b)(6)—by not raising them in the district court. See Hale v. Victor Chu, 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010). The remainder of their arguments warrant no further discussion because they either improperly challenge the court's summary judgment order (such arguments should have been raised in a timely direct appeal, see Stoller v. Pure Fishing, Inc., 528 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2008)) or simply lack merit.

Hale v. China Online, Inc., 2009 WL 2601357, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Hale v. Victor Chu, 614 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Giordano v. Marta, 1998 WL 227888, at *4 (Del. Ch. April 28, 1998)). But courts interpreting Delaware law have found that dissolution is not the legal equivalent of a corporation being declared void for non-payment of taxes.

That is "an explicit waiver, unqualified and permanent." See Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, Ill., 59 F.4th 887, 901 (7th Cir. 2023); Hale v. Victor Chu, 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying waiver because "[t]he record contains no evidence that the plaintiffs ever alerted the district court that China Online was pursuing a direct claim against the defendants, despite having ample opportunity to do so").

EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1973 n.14, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).Hale v. Victor Chu, 614 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2010). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."