Opinion
20-55423
12-21-2021
MICHAEL HAKIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04219-VAP-SS Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Michael Hakim appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his diversity action arising out of Hakim's homeowners' insurance claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's denial of an extension of time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hakim's ex parte application for a continuance so that he could file an opposition to defendant Federal Insurance Company's summary judgment motion because Hakim failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (outlining the four-factor test for determining excusable neglect); Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1998) (a presumption of prejudice arises from a plaintiff's failure to prosecute).
Contrary to Hakim's contention, the district court was not required to explicitly discuss each Pioneer factor, or to consider prejudice to Hakim. See Doe ex rel. M.D. v. Newport-Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 840 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The district court may consider the Pioneer factors without discussing how much weight it gives to each" so long as "the omitted factors could reasonably support the district court's conclusion."); Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[P]rejudice to the movant is . . . not a factor that we think should be assessed in each and every case ....").
AFFIRMED.