Opinion
CRIMINAL 7:23-CR-33 (WLS) 7:24-CV-17 (WLS)
04-29-2024
GARRY HAGGINS, JR, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 Case No.
RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is before this Court for preliminary consideration as required by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. (Doc. 23).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 10, 2008, a Second Superseding Indictment was filed in the Southern District of Florida charging Petitioner with one count of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base. (Doc. 2-1). On May 29, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to that count. (Doc. 2-3 at 7). A judge in the Southern District of Florida entered judgment on September 16, 2009, imposing a sentence of 135 months imprisonment followed by 5 years of supervised release and a $100.00 assessment fee. (Docs. 2-2, 2-3 at 8).
On September 25, 2018, Petitioner began his term of supervised release in the Southern District of Florida. (Doc. 2). On April 6, 2023, the Middle District of Georgia accepted jurisdiction over Petitioner, and Petitioner's supervised release was transferred to the Middle District of Georgia. Id. Following that transfer, the United States Probation Office filed a Petition alleging that Petitioner violated the terms of his supervised release. (Doc. 3). On July 5, 2023, the Court entered a judgment revoking Petitioner's supervised release. (Doc. 22).
On February 20, 2024, Petitioner filed the pending Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his sentence. (Doc. 23). Petitioner's Motion alleges two grounds of relief. First, Petitioner states that he is seeking a “[r]eduction in [his] term of imprisonment under 18 USC 3582 (c)(2).” (Doc. 23 at 4). Petitioner alleges that his “sentencing guideline range has been lowered based on the retroactive application of Amendment 821.” Id. Petitioner also indicates he is “seeking [a] reduction in status points under §4A1.1.” Id. Second, Petitioner cites “Amendment 750” and claims that he “was sentenced ...before the sentencing disparity for crack to cocaine went into effect.” Id. at 5. Petitioner notes he was subject to “a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years to life,” and asserts that the “updated guideline ranges...changed the range to 5 to 40 years.” Id.
The Court ordered Petitioner to supplement his Motion to Vacate and clarify whether he is challenging the validity of his underlying criminal conviction, which was imposed in the Southern District of Florida, or the revocation of his supervised release, which occurred in the Middle District of Georgia. (Doc. 24). Petitioner did not file any supplement in response to this Court's Order.
DISCUSSION
Section 2255 provides that a petitioner “under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress” who wishes to challenge the validity of his sentence “may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (a) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 220 (1952) (“The very purpose of Section 2255 is to hold any required hearing in the sentencing court.”). The grounds raised in Petitioner's Motion to Vacate concern only the validity of his original criminal sentence that was imposed in the Southern District of Florida. Because this Court did not impose that sentence, the Court lacks the authority to grant Petitioner relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The fact that Petitioner is currently incarcerated based on a revocation judgment entered in this district does not grant this Court the authority to address a challenge to a sentence imposed in another district. See United States v. Cottom, 2021 WL 3046643 at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[N]otwithstanding any transfer of jurisdiction over supervised release, ‘the proper forum to hear the § 2255 petition is the court which originally imposed the sentence.'”) (quoting Napoles v. United States, 536 F.2d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 1976)); see also Anthony v. United States, 2008 WL 190636 at *1 (D. Idaho 2008) (“[Petitioner's] current incarceration is related to the term of supervised release imposed in connection with the Eastern District of Washington sentence even though he was sentenced to his current incarceration by this Court.”). The Court notes that nothing in Petitioner's Motion to Vacate attacks the validity of the revocation proceedings conducted in this district. United States v. Cordova-Ordaz, 2015 WL 12859406 at *1 (D. N.M. 2015) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction where petitioner “filed his § 2255 motion under the caption of this revocation proceeding, [but] raise[d] no issues related to the revocation”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, “it plainly appears.. .that the [Petitioner] is not entitled to relief.” § 2255 Rule 4(b). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Motion to Vacate (Doc. 23) be DISMISSED, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of this Recommendation to which objection is made; all other portions of this Recommendation may be reviewed by the district judge for clear error. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
The undersigned finds no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). Therefore, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY a certificate of appealability in its Final Order. If Petitioner files an objection to this Recommendation, he may include therein any arguments he wishes to make regarding a certificate of appealability.
SO RECOMMENDED