Opinion
10-P-2069
12-06-2011
BRIAN HAGGERTY & others v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS, LOCAL 4 & another.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs, two of whom are employees of a nonunion business, Keystone Elevator Service and Modernization, LLC (Keystone), appeal from a Superior Court order, pursuant to G. L. c. 214, § 6, awarding the defendants costs and fees for their successful defense of the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. We affirm.
Brian Haggerty (Haggerty) was director of operations for Keystone. For many months the International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 4, and Kevin McGettigan, its business manager (collectively, the union) had been trying to persuade Haggerty to enter into a collective bargaining agreement under which union members would be hired as elevator mechanics. On February 10, 2010, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the union was violating their civil rights under G. L. c. 12, § 11I, by having unemployed union members wait outside Haggerty's home and follow him, Cindy Haggerty (his wife), and Thomas Haggerty (his son), to their activities throughout the day. The complaint also alleged that Susan Barreda, a sales consultant for Keystone, was being followed while running personal errands during her lunch break. The union responded that it was attempting to learn the locations of other job sites so that it could engage in lawful picketing activities at those locations.
Over the union's objection, the plaintiffs obtained a limited injunction from a judge of the Superior Court (injunction judge). The injunction prohibited union members from coming within fifty yards of Haggerty's home, but permitted them to follow the vehicles of Haggerty, his son, and other Keystone employees to ascertain job sites; Haggerty's wife and Barreda were not included in the injunction. The union immediately filed a petition for review in the Supreme Judicial Court, arguing that the injunction judge did not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the petition to the single justice of this court.
The single justice of this court ruled that as the matter was a labor dispute, the injunction judge lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction; he remanded the case to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court to designate a three-judge panel to hear the case, pursuant to G. L. c. 212, § 30, and G. L. c. 214, § 6. Before the hearing, the parties came to an agreement and the case was voluntarily dismissed. However, the union preserved its right to seek attorney's fees. Thereafter, a different Superior Court judge (fee judge) allowed the union's motion for award of attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $10,178.25. The plaintiffs appealed.
The reasonableness of the fees is not disputed.
Discussion. General Laws c. 212, § 30, provides that any action involving a labor dispute must be heard before a three-judge panel of the Superior Court. The term labor dispute 'includes any controversy arising out of any demand of any character whatsoever concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange, terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.' G. L. c. 149, § 20C(c), as amended by St. 1950, c. 452, § 2.
The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), G. L. c. 214, § 6, was enacted 'to regulate the issuance of injunctions restraining the acts of labor unions in trade controversies, that is to say, to regulate preventive injunctions.' Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 316 Mass. 631, 637-638 (1944). The AIA applies 'to every kind of labor dispute regardless of whether the dispute is lawful or unlawful as a matter of substantive law.' Poirier v. Superior Court, 337 Mass. 522, 527 (1958). In addition, a defendant enjoined by an injunction is entitled under the AIA to compensation 'for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order of injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney's fee.' G. L. c. 214, § 6(2)(B), inserted by St. 1973, c. 1114, § 62.
The plaintiffs did not appeal the ruling of the single justice of this court that the injunction judge lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction in this labor dispute. Nonetheless, they now insist that, because the case never came before a three-judge panel in Superior Court, the AIA does not apply. They are mistaken. The AIA is automatically triggered when the case involves a labor dispute, and the defendants are entitled to compensation for attorney's fees incurred while defending against the erroneously issued injunction. See G. L. c. 214, § 6(2)(B). Once the fee judge found the union's attorney's fees to be reasonable, he was correct in ordering them to be paid.
The union's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs is denied.
Order awarding attorney's fees affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Sikora & Hanlon, JJ.),