Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4670-12T2
09-23-2014
PHILLIP M. HAASE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION, Respondent-Respondent.
Gregory C. Dibsie, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Valentina M. DiPippo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Maven and Carroll. On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. Gregory C. Dibsie, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Valentina M. DiPippo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Phillip M. Haase appeals the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission's (MVC) May 14, 2013 final Order of Suspension suspending his driving privileges for forty-five days effective June 7, 2013. We affirm.
On June 14, 2013, the MVC stayed the order of suspension pending determination of this appeal.
On August 30, 2012, a Pitman police officer issued Haase a summons for having no license, registration or insurance card in his possession. N.J.S.A. 39:3-29. Haase was not issued a summons for driving with a suspended driver's license. N.J.S.A. 39:3-40.
Previously, the MVC mailed Haase a Scheduled Suspension Notice, prepared on June 26, 2012. The notice advised Haase that his driving privileges were scheduled to be suspended indefinitely as of August 24, 2012, for failure to answer an earlier summons in the Pitman Municipal Court. It also required that he submit proof "that the summons[] is satisfied . . . before the suspension date or your New Jersey driving privilege will be suspended." Haase evidently failed to satisfy the earlier summons, and the MVC suspended his license on August 24, 2012, which it then confirmed in a September 9, 2012 Order of Suspension.
The record includes a certification by a MVC employee that on July 6, 2012, this notice was mailed to Haase at his last address shown on MVC's records.
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The MVC ultimately became aware of the August 30, 2012 summons. Consequently, on March 14, 2013, it sent Haase another Scheduled Suspension Notice at the same address as the earlier notice. This notice advised Haase that his driving privileges were to be suspended "[b]y authority of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, 39:5-30, and N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.8" because he had operated his vehicle during a period of suspension on August 30, 2012. The scheduled suspension period was 180 days, and the notice informed Haase that he could either accept this suspension or request a hearing.
Haase then requested a hearing challenging his proposed 180-day suspension. The request was submitted on a MVC form which noted, in bold letters, "If your request fails to set forth any disputed material facts, legal issues, or arguments of such issues, the request will be denied and the suspension will become effective . . . and constitute the [MVC's] final decision in this matter." In his hearing request, Haase admitted receiving the August 30, 2012 summons, but contended that he had been unaware his license was suspended on that date, and that the officer did not charge him with driving while suspended. He also claimed that the suspension would cause a financial hardship to himself and his family.
On May 14, 2013, the MVC issued a "Denial of Hearing Request/Final Decision," setting forth the following findings and conclusions:
On 3/27/2013, the MVC received your request for a hearing on the matter of the proposed suspension of your driving privilege. Despite the requirement noted in the MVC's Scheduled Suspension Notice that you identify all disputed material facts and/or legal issues that you intend to raise at a hearing, your submitted request merely indicates personal hardship. Because you have failed to identify any disputed material fact(s) and/or legal issue(s) to be resolved at a hearing, your request for a hearing is hereby denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(d).
It remains undisputed, and I therefore find, that you were convicted of 39:3-29 (No License, Registration or Insurance ID in Possession) for an offense that occurred on 08/30/2012, in Pitman. This was during a period of suspension that began on 08/24/2012 and ended on 01/28/2013. As such, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, 39:5-30 and N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.8, I order your driving privilege to be suspended.
Based upon a review of your driver history record and the mitigating circumstances indicated in your request and considering your need for your driving privilege, the 180 day proposed term of suspension of your driving privilege is being reduced to 45 days. The MVC notes that suspension of your driving privilege is intended to be rehabilitative rather than punitive in nature.
Haase now appeals the Order of Suspension, arguing that (1) he did not have proper notice of his suspension; (2) the MVC's action was barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to the issuance of motor vehicle summonses under N.J.S.A. 39:5-3; and (3) the MVC improperly denied his request for a hearing. We find his contentions to be without merit.
We will uphold an administrative agency decision "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). "An agency's determination must be reversed if 'it is plainly unreasonable.'" Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 200 N.J. 413, 420 (2009) (quoting T.H. v. Div. of Dev. Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478, 490 (2007)(citation omitted)). When reviewing an agency decision, we must determine whether the agency followed the law, whether substantial evidence in the record supports the decision, and "whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors." Herrmann, supra, 192 N.J. at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)). We give "substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Ibid.
We first address Haase's claim of insufficient notice. Under N.J.S.A. 39:5-30, "every privilege to drive motor vehicles . . . may be suspended . . . by the director for a violation of any of the provisions of this Title or on any other reasonable grounds, after due notice in writing of such proposed suspension." N.J.A.C. 13:19-10.8 provides:
(a) Whenever the driving privileges of an individual have been suspended or revoked for any reason, either judicially or administratively:
1. The operation of a motor vehicle by the individual during the period of suspension or revocation shall be cause for extending the period of revocation or suspension for an additional six months, or for some other period determined by the Chief Administrator.
2. Should information be received by the Commission after restoration of an individual's driving privileges that the individual operated a motor vehicle during the period of revocation or suspension, the Chief Administrator may revoke or suspend the individual's driving privileges for a period of six months, or for some other period which the Chief Administrator determines.
Here, the MVC's records include not only the June 26, 2012 notice of Haase's proposed suspension, to take effect on August 24, 2012, but also a certification by the agency that it was mailed to him on July 6, 2012. The notice clearly stated the grounds upon which the suspension was based. It was sent to him at the same address where he received the March 14, 2013 Scheduled Suspension Notice, which is the address that Haase himself listed on his hearing request form. We presume "that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted was received by the party to whom it was addressed." SSI Med. Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996) (citing Bruce v. James P. MacLean Firm, 238 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (Law Div.), aff'd o.b., 238 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1989)); Tower Mgmt. Corp. v. Podesta, 22 6 N.J. Super. 300, 304 n.3 (App. Div. 1988); Cwiklinski v. Burton, 217 N.J. Super. 506, 509-10 (App. Div. 1987). Haase has not presented any evidence to overcome that presumption, and we conclude that the MVC supplied him with the requisite statutory notice of his proposed suspension.
We next reject Haase's statute of limitations defense, predicated on N.J.S.A. 39:5-3, which requires a complaint to be made to a judge within ninety days of a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. He argues that this proscription was violated because the MVC did not act until March 13, 2013, more than six months after the alleged driving while suspended offense occurred. However, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30 provides the MVC with independent authority to administratively issue license suspensions for violations of the Motor Vehicle Act or on any other reasonable grounds, and contains no prescribed time limitation within which the MVC must act. See Sylcox v. Dearden, 30 N.J. Super. 325, 330 (App. Div. 1954).
Finally, the MVC did not err in declining to grant Haase a hearing. Haase's certified driver's abstract detailed his August 24, 2012 suspension, as well as his offense record which included several prior suspensions. As noted, the agency's records included a certification that Haase was mailed written notice of the proposed suspension as required by N.J.S.A. 39:5-30, which plainly stated the grounds upon which the suspension was based. See In re Kovalsky, 195 N.J. Super. 91, 101-02 (App. Div. 1984). Haase admitted receiving a summons on August 30, 2012, which was during the period of suspension. Thus there were no material facts or legal issues that needed to be resolved at a hearing, as the MVC properly determined. See N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(e).
We are satisfied that substantial evidence in the record supports the MVC's decision to suspend Haase's license. The agency acted neither arbitrarily nor unreasonably. Rather, it displayed leniency in reducing Haase's suspension period from 180 to 45 days in recognition of the hardship the suspension would entail, despite his less than impeccable driving history.
Affirmed. We remand to the MVC to implement the license suspension that was stayed during the pendency of this appeal.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION