H. F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman

13 Citing cases

  1. Collis v. Ashland Oil and Refining Co.

    722 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    Peppers Refining Co. v. Spivey, 285 P.2d 228, 231 (Okl. 1955). See also H.F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okl. 382, 101 P.2d 1050, 1056 (1940). Oklahoma cases recognize the distinction in Collis' requested instruction between temporary or abatable damage and permanent damage from continuing salt water pollution.

  2. Redwine v. Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc.

    1983 OK 55 (Okla. 1984)   Cited 26 times
    In Redwine, a plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against a surgeon and hospital more than two years after her husband's death.

    Okla., 316 P.2d 840 (1957). Accord, H.F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050 (1940); Harper-Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge, Okla., 311 P.2d 947 (1957); Perkins v. U.S., (D.C.Okla. 1976), 76 F.R.D. 590. The rule on review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is as expressed in Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian:

  3. McCarroll v. Doctors General Hosp

    1983 OK 54 (Okla. 1983)   Cited 25 times
    In McCarroll v. Doctors General Hosp., 664 P.2d 382 (Okla. 1983), we held that § 18 did not violate Art. 5, § 46, Okla. Const.

    In Flowers v. Stanley, Okla., 316 P.2d 840 (1957), we held that where the period of limitations starts when the claimant knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence would have discovered the act which gives rise to the claim, the beginning of the running of the statute of limitations is usually to be determined from the facts and circumstances of the particular case; and, where these are such that reasonable men might reach conflicting opinions thereon, the issue is a question for determination by the trier of facts. Accord, H.F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050 (1940); Harper-Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge, Okla., 311 P.2d 947 (1957); Perkins v. U.S., (D.C.Okla. 1976), 76 F.R.D. 590. The rule on review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is as expressed in Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, Okla., 569 P.2d 967 (1977): "[A]ll inferences and conclusions to be drawn from underlying facts contained in such materials as affidavits, admissions, depositions, pleadings, exhibits and the like, must be viewed in light most favorable to party opposing the motion."

  4. Nance v. Cook

    399 S.W.2d 262 (Ark. 1966)   Cited 3 times

    In the case of Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Thurman, 238 Ark. 789, 384 S.W.2d 482 this Court was confronted with much the same issue which is here considered, and under a similar factual situation. In that case we quoted with approval the language set out below as taken from H. F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 101 P.2d 1050: "`It seems well settled that in an action for damages for permanent injury to real estate caused by continuing saltwater pollution the limitation begins to run at the time when it becomes obvious that a permanent injury has been suffered.'"

  5. Sunray Dx Oil Co. v. Thurman

    384 S.W.2d 482 (Ark. 1964)   Cited 4 times

    " In H. F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 101 P.2d 1050, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "It seems well settled that in an action for damages for permanent injury to real estate caused by continuing salt water pollution the limitation begins to run at the time when it becomes obvious that a permanent injury has been suffered."

  6. Harper-Turner Oil Company v. Bridge

    1957 OK 124 (Okla. 1957)   Cited 35 times
    Finding circumstantial evidence of contamination of water well by oil well located 233 feet from the water well sufficient to submit to jury on causation

    However, it is equally well settled that the two year period of limitations does not commence to run against a cause of action for permanent damage to real property until the damage is apparent and it becomes obvious that such damage is of a permanent character. Peppers Refining Co. v. Spivey, Okla., 285 P.2d 228; H.F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norvell, Okla., 240 P.2d 80. Furthermore, the burden is upon the defendant to prove that plaintiffs' action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Peppers Refining Co. v. Spivey, supra; Shell Oil Co., Inc., v. Haunchild, 203 Okla. 456, 223 P.2d 333. Plaintiffs alleged in their petition that the permanent nature of the damage to their well had not become reasonably apparent to them until around the 1st of August, 1952. Plaintiffs' evidence reasonably tended to establish that they first noticed that the water well was not as good as it had been within some two or three months after Harper-Turner had ceased its drilling operations; that the taste of the water produced from said well became such that they were forced to cease to use it for drinking and cooking purposes; that in the spring of 1952 they used the water from the well to water the plants and grass around their home and that the water killed the plants and grass; that they pumped the water well exte

  7. Peppers Refining Company v. Spivey

    1955 OK 214 (Okla. 1955)   Cited 10 times

    However, it is an equally settled rule that the two year period of limitations does not commence to run against a cause of action for permanent damage to realty until the damage is apparent and it becomes obvious such damage is of a permanent character. H.F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050, and cases cited. And, the burden of establishing the bar of statute of limitations is upon the party asserting such defense.

  8. Skelly Oil Co. v. Humphrey

    195 Okla. 384 (Okla. 1945)   Cited 4 times

    The plaintiff relies upon Commercial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy, supra, wherein it was held that in an action for damages for permanent injury to real estate caused by continuing salt water pollution, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time it becomes obvious that a permanent injury has been suffered; but in a case where the injury grows progressively greater due to a continuation of the tortious acts, the statute of limitations bars recovery only for the damages flowing exclusively from that portion of the permanent injury which was obvious more than two years prior to the commencement of the action. Subsequent to the opinion in Commercial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy, supra, we held in H. F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050, that it was error to refuse to submit to the jury the question of the bar of the statute of limitations where the evidence is in conflict as to whether or not it was obvious a permanent injury has been suffered to the freehold within two years prior to the action; and in Shell Oil Co. v. Vanderslice, 192 Okla. 690, 138 P.2d 841, in following Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, supra, we stated that in case of injury to land caused by the pollution of a stream running through the land by salt water and oil, a cause of action arises at the time it becomes obvious that the land has been permanently injured. The rules announced in the above-cited cases of Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman and Shell Oil Co. v. Vanderslice are applicable here.

  9. Carter Oil Co. v. Jackson

    194 Okla. 621 (Okla. 1944)   Cited 6 times
    In Carter Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194 Okla. 621, 153 P.2d 1013, where we found no evidence of contributory negligence, this Court held it was unnecessary to determine whether contributory negligence was a defense to an action brought under a statute imposing liability upon one allowing oil and salt water to escape from oil wells and pollute a stream located on plaintiff's land.

    We have heretofore held that such an action is independent of that for permanent pollution of the stream and does not arise until the damage occurs. H. F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Johnson, 184 Okla. 198, 86 P.2d 51; H. F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Murphy, 186 Okla. 188, 97 P.2d 84; H. F. Wilcox Oil Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050. There is no evidence here of previous damage to the area involved. Furthermore, neither the pleadings nor the evidence present a case for permanent injury nor was the case submitted to the jury by the court on the theory of permanent injury, but solely on the question of damage actually suffered within the statutory period previous to the action, from wrongs occurring within such period.

  10. Shell Oil Co., v. Vanderslice

    192 Okla. 690 (Okla. 1943)   Cited 3 times

    However, none of his witnesses, and no evidence introduced by the defendants, contradicted plaintiff's own testimony about the time the damage to him began to be obvious. Under the rule announced in H. F. Wilcox Oil and Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050, it is clear that plaintiff's injury came from a permanent source and that the injury done was of a permanent nature, and that it was observed by him and known to him more than two years before he filed the action that he was being thus injured from such a source. See Pine v. Duncan, 179 Okla. 336, 65 P.2d 492, and other cases of like effect.