Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; Super. Ct. No. 06CEJ300196-1, Jane Cardoza, Judge.
Kenneth K. Taniguchi, Public Defender, and Maria del Carmen Romero, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Janelle E. Kelley, Interim County Counsel, and William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Wiseman, J., and Gomes, J.
OPINION
Petitioner (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from respondent court’s order issued at a contested 18-month review hearing terminating her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her four children. We will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Dependency proceedings were initiated after petitioner was arrested in November 2006 for possession of methamphetamine and for being in violation of probation. In February 2007, the juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction over her then 16, 12 and 4-year-old sons and 5-year-old daughter and ordered petitioner to complete a parenting course, complete mental health and substance abuse evaluations and participate in recommended treatment, and to submit to random drug testing. The court did not offer services to the fathers of the children. The children were placed together in foster care.
Over the ensuing year, petitioner completed her reunification services. In October 2007, she moved into her mother’s home where her mother and disabled father and two disabled adult brothers lived. Her case worker immediately began working with her to find an apartment. However, petitioner was having difficulty obtaining subsidized housing because of her criminal history. However, petitioner was employed and, according to the department, could afford to rent an apartment. Petitioner was also having unsupervised visitation with the children on weekends. However, she was having difficulty controlling her oldest son and, according to her case worker, petitioner appeared overwhelmed by her long work hours and the prospect of reunifying with her children.
In its 12-month review of services prepared in December 2007, the social services department (department) recommended the court continue services to the 18-month review hearing and stated petitioner’s chances were good of having the children returned to her at that time as long as she found stable housing, progressed with her visits and continued to test negative for drugs.
In January 2008, at the 12-month review hearing, the court found petitioner made significant progress in her court-ordered services and continued services until the 18-month review hearing, which it set for May 2008.
In February 2008, petitioner’s oldest son moved into a group home, while the three younger children remained in their original foster home. Petitioner and all four children had weekend visitation, however, by May 2008, petitioner was still living with her parents and was no closer to having established independent housing. According to the department, petitioner could not afford an apartment because she purchased a new car in April 2008 and the monthly payments were high. In addition, petitioner’s work schedule prevented her from being able to transport the children to and from school and her mother was physically unable to help her care for the children. To make matters worse, petitioner could not afford daycare for the younger children. In addition, petitioner failed to drug test several times in March and April 2008.
In its report for the 18-month review hearing, the department recommended the court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing based on petitioner’s failure to progress to more extended visitation, establish suitable housing and provide a backup plan of care for the children while she worked. The department also advised the court the children’s foster parents were willing to provide the children long-term guardianship.
Petitioner challenged the department’s recommendation and the court convened a contested 18-month review hearing in June 2008. Prior to the hearing, petitioner, through her attorney, and county counsel agreed that her nearly 18-year-old son would remain in foster care so he could graduate from high school. She also agreed to withdraw her objection to the two youngest children remaining in foster care. However, petitioner wanted to reunify with and begin immediate extended visitation with her then 13-year-old son.
Minors’ counsel objected to extended visitation with any of the children. She informed the court petitioner converted her mother’s garage into a room where she intended to live with the children. Minors’ counsel informed the court there were not enough beds for the children and there was no air conditioning. In addition, minors’ counsel raised concerns about petitioner’s recent failure to drug test and her driving without a license.
Petitioner’s attorney countered that, if reassessed, the modified garage would be found adequate. In addition, she argued petitioner was in the process of getting her driver’s license reinstated and there was no evidence petitioner relapsed. Petitioner’s attorney asked the court to continue the 18-month review hearing and grant the department discretion to begin extended visitation. She proposed the department could reassess petitioner’s living arrangement and observe the children during extended visitation so that at the continued hearing, petitioner would be closer to complete reunification.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court expressed its concern that petitioner was not drug testing. The court ordered petitioner to submit to a hair follicle test immediately following the hearing and, after being informed it took 10 days to receive the results, continued the hearing for a month to be heard in July.
The July hearing was continued and ultimately conducted in August 2008. However, meanwhile, petitioner’s oldest child turned 18 and moved in with her. In addition, an investigator from the juvenile division made an unannounced visit to evaluate petitioner’s mother’s home. Petitioner’s mother showed the investigator her home, which consists of five bedrooms, two bathrooms, a kitchen, dining room and living room. The house was clean, orderly and adequately furnished. The garage was furnished with a trundle bed with two mattresses, a couch, a bunk bed with a mattress on the top bunk and two blow-up mattresses tucked under the bottom area of the bunk bed. Petitioner’s mother explained that petitioner slept on the trundle mattress and her 18-year-old son slept on the top bunk mattress. When the other children visited, they slept on the extra trundle bed mattress and on the two blow-up mattresses. The room had a window air conditioner and there were plastic dressers for the children to put their clothes in, and there were toys in the room.
However, despite the readiness of the modified garage, petitioner’s mother told the investigator she suffers from exhaustion and is unable and unwilling to help petitioner care for the children. She said she told petitioner she needed to move out and find a place of her own but petitioner would not listen. She did not know how petitioner would provide daycare for the children while she worked if the children were returned to her care.
At the continued 18-month review hearing in August 2008, county counsel and petitioner’s attorney advised the court they argued the case and submitted it at the hearing conducted in June. In addition, county counsel informed the court petitioner’s hair follicle test came back negative. With that, the court found the department provided petitioner reasonable services and return of the children to petitioner’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment. The court terminated petitioner’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing to consider a permanent plan for the children. This petition ensued.
DISCUSSION
Detriment
Petitioner seeks custody of the children, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding it would be detrimental to return them to her care. She points to evidence that she fully complied with her reunification plan. She also intimates that, if she posed a detriment to the children, the department either did not help her eliminate the detriment or turned a blind eye to it. She claims, for example, that the record is silent as to any effort the department made to help her find housing. In addition, she finds it inconsistent that the department considered the modified garage sufficient for overnight visitation but inadequate as permanent housing. Finally, she claims the department knew she transported the children in the car and yet took no action to prevent it.
To the extent petitioner asks this court to reweigh the evidence, we decline to do so as it not our role. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.) Rather, our role is to determine whether the appellate record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of detriment. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.) In this case, we conclude that it does.
At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court was required to return petitioner’s children to her physical custody unless it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, their return would place them at a substantial risk of detriment. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) Petitioner’s compliance with her reunification plan, which is undisputed, is important but not determinative to the court’s assessment of detriment. (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141, 1142.) Rather, the court’s paramount concern is the children’s safety. (§ 366, subd. (a).)
After 18 months of services, petitioner was unable to resume full custody of the children. She, in essence, conceded as much by asking for extended visitation rather than custody. In addition, she did not have a permanent home to offer the children. Even though it appeared the modified garage might eventually satisfy the department’s requirements, petitioner’s mother was not offering it to petitioner on a permanent basis. Rather, she made it plain she did not want petitioner and the children to live there. Consequently, it was just a matter of time before petitioner would find herself without a home. To make matters worse, she was either ineligible for or unable to afford any other housing options and, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the record is not silent with respect to the department’s efforts to help her find housing. According to the record, petitioner’s case worker began efforts to help her find an apartment as soon as she moved in with her parents in October 2007. Further, petitioner did not have a plan for the children’s care and supervision while she worked.
Petitioner further claims and, correctly so, that the juvenile court is required by statute to specify the factual basis for its conclusion that return would be detrimental. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) However, the court’s failure to do so in this case is not error because we can infer a required finding where, as here, substantial evidence supports it. (In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73, 83.)
Continuance of the 18-month Review Hearing
Petitioner argues that based on her compliance with her case plan, the juvenile court abused its discretion in not continuing the 18-month review hearing. She points to the children’s desire to return to her custody and her ability to obtain housing and daycare in a reasonable time with more assistance by the department.
California’s juvenile dependency system contemplates a maximum reunification period of 18 months. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3) & 366.22, subd. (a).) However, the juvenile court has the discretion to extend reunification services beyond the statutory 18-month limit in special cases, namely, if (1) no reunification plan was ever developed for the parent; (2) the court finds reasonable services were not offered; or (3) the best interests of the child would be served by a continuance of the 18-month review hearing. (Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 167.)
The juvenile court’s decision whether to extend services beyond the 18-month date is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Andrea L. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1388.) As a reviewing court, we will not disturb a trial court’s discretionary ruling, absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
In this case, the court found petitioner was provided a reasonable services plan and she does not contend otherwise. To the extent she suggests the department could have done more to help her find housing and daycare, she does not specify what further actions the department could have taken to assist her. The department does not bear an affirmative burden to prove the extent of its efforts and the record’s evidence in this regard is scant. Consequently, we would not have an adequate record to review the issue even if it were raised.
What petitioner does raise is whether the children’s best interest would be served by continuing reunification services beyond the 18-month review hearing. Real party in interest argues the court in effect continued services for petitioner at the June 2008 hearing and she did not take the opportunity to resolve the housing and daycare issues. Our review of the record makes it clear that the juvenile court did not continue the June 2008 hearing to extend reunification. Rather, it continued it for the sole purpose of having petitioner take a hair follicle test.
However, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in not continuing reunification services. Granted, the children were bonded to petitioner and enjoyed their time with her. However, their security and safety was uncertain until she could secure a permanent home for them. We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.