Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-001630-MR
02-01-2013
BRADLEY S. GUTHRIE APPELLANT v. JESSICA E. FERGUSON APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Elmer George Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Crystal L. Osborne Lexington, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE O. REED RHORER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00023
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: NICKELL, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. VANMETER, JUDGE: Bradley Guthrie appeals from the August 10, 2011, order of the Mercer Family Court requiring him to reimburse Jessica Ferguson for child care expenses for the parties' minor child. Finding no error, we affirm.
Bradley and Jessica are the parents of a minor child. Following Jessica's termination of her employment, the parties entered into an agreed order in November 2009 suspending Bradley's obligation to pay child care expenses since no expenses were incurred while Jessica was unemployed. The parties further agreed that upon gaining employment, Jessica shall notify the Commonwealth and submit documentation to permit the Commonwealth to reinstate the parties' child care obligations. On April 11, 2011, Jessica filed a motion for reimbursement of child care expenses incurred, alleging that she had gained employment in January 2010 and that Brad had failed to pay his share of the child care costs she incurred since that time. The trial court granted Jessica's motion and ordered Brad to reimburse her $3,491 in twelve payments over twelve months. This appeal followed.
Child support, and likewise child care costs, as with most other aspects of domestic relations law, "are prescribed in their general contours by statute and are largely left, within the statutory parameters, to the sound discretion of the trial court." Van Meter v. Smith, 14 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Ky. App. 2000) (citations omitted). "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
Bradley's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by ordering him to reimburse Jessica for child care costs that accrued prior to the filing of her motion. He asserts that the reimbursement violates the general prohibition against the retroactive modification of child support contained in KRS 403.213(1). KRS 403.213 governs the criteria for modifying child support orders. It provides that "[t]he provisions of any decree respecting child support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification[.]" KRS 403.213(1).
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Kentucky cases have routinely held that child care costs are independent and distinguishable from child support payments, and are not held to the same statutory standard. See Connelly v. Degott, 132 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Ky. App. 2003); Olson v. Olson, 108 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Ky. App. 2003). KRS 403.211(6) addresses the allocation of child care costs between parties and provides that child care costs are considered "in addition to the amount ordered under the child support guidelines." As no statute prevents a spouse from recouping child care expenses that accrued prior to a motion for reimbursement, courts have held that parties may be reimbursed for past child care expenses at any time. See Olson, 108 S.W.3d at 652; Suiter v. Suiter, 2005 WL 1252359 at *2 (Ky. App. May 27, 2005) (holding that because child care expenses are not subject to child support statutes, they "may either be increased or decreased at anytime upon a showing of circumstances requiring a change[]"). Likewise, under the circumstances here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Bradley to reimburse Jessica for child care expenses incurred.
The order of the Mercer Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Elmer George
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Crystal L. Osborne
Lexington, Kentucky