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Gurofsky v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department
Jul 9, 1907
121 App. Div. 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907)

Opinion

July 9, 1907.

Shire Jellinek and Vernon Cole, for the plaintiff.

Bissell, Carey Cooke, Lyman M. Bass and Elton H. Beals, for the defendant.


The exceptions should be overruled, and the motion for a new trial denied, with costs to the defendant.

The action was brought to recover damages for injuries resulting in the death of plaintiff's intestate, alleged to have resulted from defendant's negligence.

The intestate, a girl about twenty-one years of age, met her death in Pennsylvania while going from Suspension Bridge to New York city on one of defendant's trains. She was born and always resided in Canada. She left surviving no husband or children, but a father and mother, both residents of Canada. The plaintiff administrator is a cousin of the intestate, and resides in the State of New York.

The nonsuit did not involve the questions of defendant's negligence or the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the intestate. It was made to rest on the proposition that no recovery could be had because no right of action existed under the laws of Pennsylvania, the intestate and her father and mother all being residents of Canada at the time the accident and death occurred.

The statute of Pennsylvania (Laws of Penn. of 1851, No. 358, § 19) provides: "Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow of any such deceased, or, if there be no widow, the personal representatives may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned."

The act of 1855 provides: "The persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased, and no other relative, and the sum recovered shall go to them in the proportion they would take his or her personal estate in case of intestacy, and that without liability to creditors." (Laws of Penn. of 1855, No. 323, § 1.)

Since the act of 1855 no action exists in favor of an administrator under the law of Pennsylvania. The action must be brought in the names of the persons entitled to recovery under the statute of 1855. ( Books v. Borough of Danville, 95 Penn. St. 158.)

The present action is brought in the name of an administrator, but the complaint alleges who the next of kin are, and upon a recovery being had the same would go to the father under our statutes (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1902-1905, 2732), and very likely under the Pennsylvania statute also. Possibly this form of action would answer under Wooden v. W.N.Y. P.R.R. Co. ( 126 N.Y. 10).

The more serious questions is whether any right of action exists in favor of any one. It must be regarded as settled that an action in this State for the death of a person in Pennsylvania can only be maintained where a right of action exists in that State. It is only the right of action given by the law of that State which may be enforced here upon principles of comity. The liability of a party for his acts, whether wrongful or negligent, depends upon the law of the place where the acts were committed. ( McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546; Wooden v. W.N.Y. P.R.R. Co., supra.)

No right of action for this death exists in Pennsylvania because the deceased and the persons entitled to the recovery, if any could be had, all resided at the time of the accident and death in Canada. ( Deni v. Penn. R.R. Co., 181 Penn. St. 525.)

The court in that case said: "Our statute was not intended to confer upon non-resident aliens rights of action not conceded to them or to us by their own country, or to put burdens on our own citizens to be discharged for their benefit. It has no extra-territorial force, and the plaintiff is not within the purview of it. While it is possible that the language of the statute may admit of a construction which would include non-resident alien husbands, widows, children and parents of the deceased, it is a construction so obviously opposed to the spirit and policy of the statute that we cannot adopt it." The Court of Appeals of this State recognizes this as the law of Pennsylvania, while holding the contrary as the law of New York. ( Alfson v. Bush Co., 182 N.Y. 393.)

Such being the law of Pennsylvania, it would seem to follow that no right of action exists or can be enforced in this State.

We do not think the action can be maintained upon the theory that the negligence causing the injury and death occurred in this State. The proofs would not support such a finding of fact, and the statute of this State gives no right of action for an injury and death taking place outside the State. Nor can it be maintained upon the theory that the right of action existed under the Pennsylvania statute, that only the right to maintain the action is forbidden by the law of that State. If the action could not be maintained there it cannot be here.

All concurred, except McLENNAN, P.J., who dissented.

Plaintiff's exceptions overruled and motion for a new trial denied, with costs, and judgment directed for defendant on the verdict.


Summaries of

Gurofsky v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department
Jul 9, 1907
121 App. Div. 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907)
Case details for

Gurofsky v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.

Case Details

Full title:DAVID M. GUROFSKY, as Administrator, etc., of FANNY C. GUROFSKY, Deceased…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department

Date published: Jul 9, 1907

Citations

121 App. Div. 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907)
105 N.Y.S. 514

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