Opinion
No. 04-03-00152-CV
Delivered and Filed: December 31, 2003.
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Webb County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2000-CVF-002090-C1, Honorable Alvino Ben Morales, Judge Presiding.
Abated.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice and Paul W. GREEN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Anil Gupta ("Gupta") and Laredo Perfume, Inc. ("Laredo Perfume") appeal a judgment entered after a bench trial. Gupta and Laredo Perfume allege that the trial court erred by, among other issues, failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree that the trial court's failure to make findings was harmful error; therefore, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the entry of the findings of fact and conclusions of law may affect the issues Gupta and Laredo Perfume intend to raise upon reinstatement of the appeal, we do not address the other issues raised in the appellants' brief in this opinion.
"Following a proper request and reminder, the trial court's duty to file findings of fact and conclusions of law is mandatory." Brown v. McGonagill, 940 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ). "The failure to respond where all requests have been made is presumed harmful, unless the record affirmatively shows no injury." Id. at 179-80. "The appropriate question to consider in determining harm in such a case is whether the appellant will be forced to guess the reason or reasons that the trial court ruled against it." Id. at 180.
"If there is only a single ground of recovery or a single defense, an appellant does not usually have to guess at the reasons for the trial court's judgment." Larry F. Smith, Inc. v. The Weber Co., Inc., 110 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. filed). "When there are two or more possible grounds of recovery or defense, [however], an appellant is forced to guess what the trial court found unless the trial court's findings are provided to him." Id. "Forcing the appellant to guess at the trial court's reasons for rendering judgment defeats the inherent purpose of both rule 296 and rule 297, [which is to] `narrow the bases of the judgment to only a portion of [the multiple] claims and defenses, thereby reducing the number of contentions that the appellant must raise on appeal.'" Id. (quoting 6 McDonald Carlson, Texas Civil Practice 2d § 18:3 (1998)).
In this case, Kish Manwani and Manisha Manwani (the "Manwanis") sued Gupta and Laredo Perfume for damages to property the Manwanis leased to Gupta. The Manwanis previously had Gupta evicted from the property in a separate action. Although the original lease named Laredo Perfume as the lessee, the lease in effect at the time of the eviction named Gupta as the lessee. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Manwanis on November 18, 2002. On November 21, 2002, Gupta and Laredo Perfume filed a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296 (requiring request to be filed within twenty days from the date of the judgment). When the trial court failed to meet the deadline for filing the findings and conclusions, Gupta and Laredo Perfume filed a timely notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 13, 2002. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (requiring notice to be filed within thirty days after the original request).
In general, it would appear that a landlord can recover for damages to the leased premises under a claim for waste, a tort claim, or a claim for breach of an implied covenant, a contractual claim. See King's Court Racquetball v. Dawkins, 62 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.); Flores v. Rizik, 683 S.W.2d 112, 115-16 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ). Although the trial court's award of attorney's fees could be an indication that the trial court was basing its judgment on a contractual claim, Laredo Perfume, which was not a party to the lease agreement in effect at the time of the eviction, is included in the judgment. Furthermore, during trial, the Manwanis' attorney stated, "This is not a suit on the lease. . . . We are not collecting damages under the lease. . . . There is nothing in the lease that says, and nothing in our petition, rather, that says that we are suing under the lease. We are suing for the damages that he caused prior to leaving the building. This is not a suit under the lease."
We express no opinion as to whether the Manwanis could recover against Laredo Perfume under a contractual claim, we simply note the apparent inconsistency as a reason findings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary.
Because the record does not affirmatively show the nature of the claim upon which the trial court granted relief, this appeal is abated, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.