The testimony here, however, was in effect forced out of her by the examination of the plaintiff's attorney, which, in the circumstance of the trial status, was equivalent to being under cross-examination. That testimony adduced in the first instance under cross-examination is not a waiver of the privilege is supported by decisions in various States outside of New York (114 A.L.R. 798, 806, and cases cited therein), and to me this represents a sound and logical view. (See, also, Gunn v. Robinson, 103 Misc. 547, revd. on other grounds 188 A.D. 948; cf. Kaufman v. Rosenshine, 97 A.D. 514, affd. 183 N.Y. 562.) If it be said that the defendant or her counsel could have objected when the defendant was asked these questions as a witness placed upon the stand by the plaintiff (see Murphy v. New York, N.H. H.R.R. Co., 171 A.D. 599, 604), the answer is practical — and that is that a party should not be put upon such onerous horns of a dilemma during a jury trial.

The testimony here, however, was in effect forced out of her by the examination of the plaintiff's attorney, which, in the circumstance of the trial status, was equivalent to being under cross-examination. That testimony adduced in the first instance under cross-examination is not a waiver of the privilege is supported by decisions in various States outside of New York (114 A. L. R. 798, 806, and cases cited therein), and to me this represents a sound and logical view. (See, also, Gunn v. Robinson, 103 Misc. 547, revd. on other grounds 188 App. Div. 948; cf. Kaufman v. Rosenshine, 97 App. Div. 514, affd. 183 N.Y. 562.) If it be said that the defendant or her counsel could have objected when the defendant was asked these questions as a witness placed upon the stand by the plaintiff (see Murphy v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 171 App. Div. 599, 604), the answer is practical — and that is that a party should not be put upon such onerous horns of a dilemma during a jury trial. In the forensic battlefield of a contested trial, the contrast is striking in the effect on a jury between a witness whose answers are full and frank and a witness who refuses to answer or on whose behalf objection is made — whatever the merit of the basis for such refusal or objection.

Disclosure extracted by compulsion of judicial process is not in law a voluntary disclosure. ( Gunn v. Robinson, 103 Misc. 547; Matter of Cravath, 58 Misc. 154, and cases cited.) Nor does the client's disclosure of the attorney's communication to the client unseal the attorney's lips regarding the client's communication to him.