Opinion
No. 30311.
January 2, 1933.
1. RAILROADS.
Railroad had right to occupy crossing with cars for its legitimate business purposes.
2. RAILROADS.
In absence of peculiar environment, railroad employees are justified in believing travelers in automobiles properly lighted and driven will observe cars on crossing at night in time to avoid collision.
3. RAILROADS. Evidence of negligence in leaving unlighted freight train on crossing held not to present jury question, in action for injuries to automobile guest.
The facts disclosed that freight train had blocked the crossing for less than five minutes when automobile driven by injured guest's father collided therewith, and that at time of collision conductor was on his way with lantern, but had not reached crossing which, for considerable distance, was unobscured.
APPEAL from circuit court of Greene county. HON. J.D. FATHEREE, Judge.
C.C. Smith, of Richton, and Welch Cooper, of Laurel, for appellant.
The appellant had the right to occupy the crossing for its legitimate business purposes.
Gulf, M. N.R.R. Co. v. Holifield, 120 So. 750, 152 Miss. 674; Section 6128, Code of 1930; Southern R. Co. v. Floyd, 55 So. 287, 99 Miss. 287.
The crew of that train had the right to assume, even if the surroundings had been such as to make vision impossible, that the car and its occupants would obey the law and stop.
Section 6124, Code of 1930.
The trainmen in the case at bar were justified in acting upon the assumption that an automobile would not be unnecessarily driven into the side of their train.
Gage v. R.R. Co., 77 N.H. 289, 90 A. 855, L.R.A. 1915A 363.
In order to charge the defendant with the negligence claimed it must be held that the jury would be justified in finding that men of ordinary prudence and foresight, in charge of the train at the time, would have anticipated that such an accident might happen in these circumstances. We think that reasonable men could come to only one conclusion. Defendant's servants would be amply justified in acting upon the belief that travellers in automobiles properly lighted and traveling at reasonable speed, would observe the cars upon the crossing, in time to avoid a collision.
Gilman v. Central Vermont R. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122, 16 A.L.R. 1102.
Currie Currie, of Hattiesburg, and J.M. Byrd, of Leakesville, for appellee.
In an action of damages for negligence, where the defendant's freedom from culpability is not so clear as to leave no room for differences of opinion, the question of negligence is for the jury, and it is error to instruct for defendant.
Nesbit v. Greenville, 69 Miss. 22.
So many questions are integrated usually into the solution of the question of negligence — it is so necessary to carefully examine all of the circumstances making up the situation in each case — that it must be a rare case of negligence which the court should take from a jury.
Bell v. Southern Railroad Company, 87 Miss. 234, 30 So. 821.
These close questions of negligence vel non can only be determined safely and righteously by the juries of the country. A standard of conduct constituting negligence, or due care in the numerous affairs of life, cannot be safely established from the bench; but such questions must be left to the logic and reasoning of the laymen who compose the juries, taken from all the walks of life, and who are familiar with ordinary human affairs and general conditions of every day life.
Y. M.V.R.R. Co. v. Williams, 74 So. 835.
All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury to determine.
Section 512, Code of 1930.
Where there is substantial evidence tending to establish plaintiff's case, verdict may not be directed for defendant.
Haynes-Walker Lumber Company v. Henkins, 141 Miss. 55, 105 So. 858.
The evidence for the appellee shows that the car across the highway in this crossing was shrouded in utter darkness, without evidence of life and without any lights, and with no person stationed there to give warning of its presence. It was a dangerous obstruction in a public highway, and it was gross negligence to leave this car standing dead across this public highway in utter darkness, at a place where the appellant knew and was bound to know that it would be impossible for traveler in the highway to discover it until he was within a very few feet of it and within very dangerous proximity of it.
Owing to one of the curves within close proximity of the railroad track itself in this crossing, the headlights of an automobile would shine on a gin house or building north of the crossing, and the lights would fall upon the crossing until the automobile had reached a place within twenty or twenty-five feet of the crossing, and owing to these curves in the highway it was impossible to see the crossing or a car or a train standing on the track across the highway until the automobile was within very close proximity to the crossing within dangerous proximity thereto, so close that it would be impossible to avert collision therewith.
The appellant had the right to occupy the crossing for its legitimate business purposes, and while so occupying the crossing it was not required to maintain lights on its cars, or to station a man with a lantern at its crossing to give warning that it was obstructed by the cars, unless the conditions and circumstances were such that the employees knew or in the exercise of reasonable care and caution should have known, that a person driving upon the street at a reasonable rate of speed in an automobile properly equipped with lights, and carefully operated, could not see or might not be able to see, the cars in time to avoid a collision therewith.
Gulf, Mobile Northern Railroad Co. v. Holifield, 120 So. 750.
Argued orally by Ellis B. Cooper, for the appellant.
Appellee brought this action against appellant in the circuit court of Greene county to recover damages in the sum of three thousand dollars for an injury suffered by her, alleged to have been caused by appellant in blocking the public highway with one of its freight cars where the highway crosses appellant's railroad tracks in the town of Lucedale. An automobile in which appellee was traveling ran into the freight car, thereby causing her injury. There was a trial on the pleadings and the evidence, resulting in a verdict and judgment in appellee's favor in the sum of one hundred dollars. From that judgment, appellant prosecutes this appeal.
The court refused appellant's request for a directed verdict. This action of the court, along with others, is assigned and argued as error. We notice none of the other errors assigned and argued, because we are of the opinion that this one is well founded.
The material evidence was undisputed. An automobile in which appellee and her father and a kinsman were traveling ran into one of appellant's freight cars standing on its main line track at the public crossing in the town of Lucedale. Appellee was injured by the collision. Appellee's father owned and was driving the automobile in which they were traveling. Appellee was her father's guest. They were traveling east on their way to Leakesville. Appellant's line of railroad runs practically north and south through Lucedale. About eleven o'clock at night one of appellant's freight trains, consisting of an engine and some thirty-odd cars, pulled into Lucedale going north. It stopped on the main line, and one of the cars blocked the public highway crossing over the railroad; the engine had cut loose from the train and was switching north of the crossing. The train had blocked the crossing less than five minutes, according to the uncontradicted testimony — about three minutes — when the automobile in which appellee was riding going east ran into the freight car. The railroad is in a valley. Appellee and her father knew they were approaching the crossing. The crossing was not lighted. The conductor was on his way north with a lantern, but had not reached the crossing. According to the testimony on behalf of appellee, the automobile in which she was traveling was going about twenty or fifteen miles an hour, and had the usual lights. For a considerable distance before reaching the crossing, there was nothing to obscure the presence of the freight car which blocked it.
The case of Gulf, M. N.R. Co. v. Holifield, 152 Miss. 674, 120 So. 750, 751, is controlling in this case in appellant's favor. It was held in that case that a railroad company had the right to occupy a public crossing with its freight cars for its legitimate business, and in the absence of some unusual environment its employees were justified in believing that travelers in automobiles properly lighted and driven at a reasonable rate of speed would observe such cars at night in time to avoid coming into collision with them. The court quoted with approval substantially the above language used by the Supreme Court of Alabama in St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Guthrie, 216 Ala. 613, 114 So. 215, 56 A.L.R. 1110. In the Holifield case the court used this language: "The appellant had the right to occupy the crossing for its legitimate business purposes, and while so occupying the crossing it was not required to maintain lights on its cars, or to station a man with a lantern at the crossing to give warning that it was obstructed by the cars, unless the conditions and circumstances were such that the employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care and caution should have known, that a person driving upon the street at a reasonable rate of speed in an automobile properly equipped with lights, and carefully operated, could not see or might not be able to see the cars in time to avoid a collision therewith."
The undisputed facts in the present case show that the conditions and circumstances were not such that appellant's employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care and caution should have known, that a person driving upon this highway at a reasonable rate of speed in an automobile properly equipped with lights would collide with the freight car standing on the crossing.
Reversed, and judgment here for appellant.