Opinion
CASE NO. 734 CRD-7-88-5
OCTOBER 4, 1989
The claimant was represented by Robert P. Wenten, Esq.
The respondents were represented by Serge Mihaly, Esq., and Bruce L. Levin, Esq., Mihaly Mihaly.
This Petition for Review from the May 16, 1988 Finding and Award of the Commissioner of the Eighth District acting for the Seventh District was heard June 23, 1989 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Robin Waller and Andrew Denuzze.
OPINION
Respondents' appeal from the Seventh District May 16, 1988 Finding and Award alleges error in that: (1) the notice of claim failed to disclose that the foreign corporation employer had only twenty days to contest under Sec. 31-297(b); (2) the notice of claim did not contain claimant's street address.
Claimant's notice of claim was a letter set out below. Respondents' argument that such a notice was insufficient attempts once more to attack the constitutionality of Sec. 31-297(b) which does not require that notices of claim need to provide information concerning the time limitations contest. That statute's constitutionality was upheld in DeLeon v. Jacob Brothers, Inc., 38 Conn. Sup. 331 (1981) appeal dismissed 456 U.S. 952 (1982). Here respondents argue essentially that the New York corporation was ignorant of Connecticut law limiting the time for contest and that therefore the notice of claim should have contained that information.
Ronald S. Rosenstein Robert P. Wenten February 28, 1985 Of The Conn. and Mass, Bars Direct Marketing Association 6 East 43rd Street New York, New York 10017 Re: Mary Ellen Guinan Dear People: This office represents Mary Ellen Guinan of Cos Cob, Connecticut in relation to a worker's compensation matter. Ms. Guinan injured her lower back while setting up an exhibit for you at a trade fair in Chicago, Illinois on October 13, 1984. Since that time she has been unable to pursue her employment with you and has been seen and treated by numerous physicians, chiropractors and physical therapists. She has been hospitalized for an extended period of time at Greenwich Hospital in Greenwich, Connecticut. At this time she is still being treated actively and is unable to perform any of the tasks associated with her former employment. As the injury our Client sustained occurred in the course of her employment, and her employment included a territory encompassing Connecticut, and she resides in Connecticut at this time and apparently performed a substantial portion of her daily work in Connecticut prior to this injury, we hereby notify your that we claim all benefits due available to us under the Workers' Compensation Laws of the State of Connecticut. Sincerely yours, Robert P. Wenten RPW: dk CERTIFIED MAIL — P 476 247 875 Return receipt requested.
Interestingly the respondents first two Reasons of filed May 23, 1988 in the Eighth District attack the commissioner's findings that claimant was a Connecticut employee and her employment was covered under our compensation law. The commissioner's conclusions were made after factual hearings April 1 and November 24, 1987. In their brief and oral arguments respondents seem to have abandoned those parts of their jurisdictional argument.
This New York corporation then was clearly doing sufficient business in Connecticut to cause those findings to be made. Given those facts, an ancient principle of the law obtains, "Ignorantia juris nemen excusat," Atlas Realty Corp. v. House, 123 Conn. 94, 101 (1937). Thus in the instant matter respondents' ignorance of Connecticut law in Sec. 31-297(b) gives no basis for reconsideration of DeLeon v. Jacob Brothers, Inc., supra, and its holding that the statute was constitutional.
As to the second issue raised respondents argue that the notice of claim merely identified the claimant as Mary Ellen Guinan of Cos Cob, Connecticut and gave no street address required by Sec. 31-294. We recently held, Robinson v. Miller, 686 CRD-1-88-1, (August 28, 1989) that a Person's address is a place where mail or other communications will be received. If an address provided in a notice is such to result in mail reaching the claimant, that address would be sufficient. Cos Cob is a relatively small locality in the town of Greenwich. It is not a large city such as Hartford where a street address would be necessary to reach the person addressed. The commissioner's ruling apparently found the notice's designation to be sufficient address. That finding therefore stands in the absence of a showing that it was without evidence, contrary to law or based on unreasonable or impermissible inferences. Fair v. People's Savings Bank Conn. 535 (1988).
Section 31-294 requires that a notice "state in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting therefrom. . . and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed."
We, therefore, affirm the Finding and Award of the trial commissioner and dismiss the appeal.
Commissioners Robin Waller and Andrew Denuzze concur.