Opinion
No. FST CV 11 5013583
September 1, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#103.00)
FACTS
In this matter, the plaintiff, Lou Guimond, a self-represented party, has brought suit against the defendants, Rudolph Supina and Kevin Fitzpatrick. The following factual allegations are gleaned from reading the various pleadings filed by the parties. Sometime in the fall of 2009, the plaintiff brought his motor vehicle to Imported Cars of Stamford, LLC (Imported Cars) in order to receive some automobile repair work. When the plaintiff checked back with employees of Imported Cars in December 2009 or January 2010, the repair work was not finished. The plaintiff then paid Imported Cars $2,500 in cash, thinking that was a complete payment of the amount owed. Following this payment, the plaintiff attempted to register the vehicle with the department of motor vehicles, but he could not do so because the automobile did not pass the required emissions test. Consequently, the plaintiff returned the vehicle to Imported Cars for additional repair work. Once the automobile was released to the plaintiff, it stalled and had to be towed to Imported Cars for more repairs. According to the plaintiff, his "[v]ehicle begins its 2nd year residency [at Imported Cars] and is still there to date. Unable to pass emissions. Electrical still in disrepair . . . Vehicle still sleeping there, had to purchase another in the interm [sic] for transportation. $4K total, since it needed brake and a.c. repair."
The plaintiff originally filed this case with the centralized small claims session in Hartford. On February 1, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to transfer this matter to the regular Superior Court docket, which was granted on February 7, 2011. The document that is labeled "complaint" in the courthouse records (docket entry number 100.31) is actually the certificate and notice of transfer of this case from small claims to the regular civil docket. Docket entry number 100.30, which is labeled as "summons" in the courthouse records, is the "small claims writ and notice of suit." To date, the plaintiff has not filed a formal complaint with the court. Consequently, this small claims writ and notice of suit is the closest document to a traditional complaint that is found in this case's file. In this document, the plaintiff makes allegations that comprise the factual underpinnings of his case against the defendants. The plaintiff also makes additional allegations in subsequent pleadings filed with the court that further flesh out the malfeasances he alleges that the defendants committed.
As a result of his dissatisfaction with his dealings with Imported Cars, in July 2010, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the department of motor vehicles' consumer complaint center. According to the affidavit attached to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the defendant Supina is employed as a lieutenant and director of the department of motor vehicles consumer complaint center and the defendant Fitzpatrick works as an analyst in the same office. The plaintiff's complaint was assigned to Fitzpatrick for review and Supina acted as Fitzpatrick's supervisor. The plaintiff contends that Fitzpatrick took approximately six to eight weeks to reply to his complaint and then only responded with "boiler plate, requesting additional info." Additionally, the plaintiff asked for some type of hearing, but this request was denied. In general, the plaintiff describes the typical bureaucratic morass the one frequently encounters when dealing with a governmental entity, in that he alleges that he had difficulty speaking with Fitzpatrick on the phone and it took a long time for the process to be completed. On November 10, 2010, the department of motor vehicles informed the plaintiff that it was terminating its investigation against Imported Cars because it found that Imported Cars did not commit any violations. In fact, the department of motor vehicles determined that the plaintiff's complaint was satisfied because the subject vehicle had been returned to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against both of the defendants. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants did not act in a proper manner when processing his complaint with the department of motor vehicles. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Fitzpatrick was "indifferent/lazy" and Supina acted in "derelection [sic] of duty," and that the defendants' conduct resulted in "costing me the use of the vehicle."
On March 29, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum of law. Attached to the defendants' motion is Supina's sworn affidavit. The defendants move to dismiss this action on the ground of sovereign immunity. In response to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff filed documents with the court on April 15, April 18, and August 17, 2011, that serve as his memorandum of law in opposition. The court heard argument in this matter at the August 15, 2011 short calendar, and the plaintiff also made an oral presentation before the court in which he outlined his opposition to the defendants' motion.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007). "When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "Moreover, [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 131, 913 A.2d 415 (2007).
In their memorandum of law, the defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because they are entitled to the protections of the doctrine of common-law sovereign immunity. Specifically, the defendants contend that because they are being sued for conduct that occurred in their official capacity as state employees, they have immunity from this lawsuit. Moreover, the defendants argue that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply to the present case. Additionally, the defendants claim that they are entitled to the protections of statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165. The plaintiff does not offer any substantive opposition to the defendants' legal arguments.
"It is a well-established rule of the common law that a state cannot be sued without its consent . . . A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends . . . The practical and logical basis of the doctrine is today recognized to rest on this principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 396-97, 968 A.2d 416 (2009). "[The Connecticut Supreme Court has] held that a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that: (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 397. "This [second] exception does not apply . . . to claims against the state for monetary damages." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 315, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Moreover, the Supreme Court "[n]ot only . . . [has] recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but . . . also [has] recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).
"Whether a particular action is one against the state is not determined solely by referring to the parties of record . . . If the plaintiff's complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar those claims . . . The fact that the state is not named as a defendant, however, does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenney v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 215-16, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010). "To determine whether an action is against the state or against a defendant in his individual capacity, [Connecticut courts] look to the four criteria established by our Supreme Court in Somers [v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476, 479, 123 A.2d 468 (1956)] . . . If all four criteria are satisfied, the action is deemed to be against the state and, therefore, is barred . . . The criteria are: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 216.
In the present case, the named defendants are Supina and Fitzpatrick. As previously mentioned, Supina is employed as a lieutenant and director at the consumer complaint center of the department of motor vehicles and Fitzpatrick is an analyst with the same employer. Neither the state of Connecticut nor one of its agencies is named as a party defendant. Accordingly, the court first needs to determine whether this lawsuit has been brought against the defendants in their individual or professional capacity as state employees. Using the four criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in Somers, it becomes clear that this lawsuit is actually against the state. The plaintiff has sued two state employees regarding their allegedly improper acts committed while in the scope of their employment at the department of motor vehicles, a state agency. See, generally, Kenney v. Weaving, supra, 123 Conn.App. 211 (holding that a lawsuit filed against Robert M. Ward, the former commissioner of the department of motor vehicles, was actually a suit against the state). Additionally, as the plaintiff is seeking money damages from the defendants for conduct stemming from work-related activities, this lawsuit would potentially subject the state to liability and the state is the actual party against whom relief is sought. See id., 216-17 (stating that "[t]he third criterion, that the state clearly is the real party in interest . . . is satisfied . . . [when] [d]amages are sought for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant for performing or not performing acts that are part of his official duties"); see also General Statutes § 5-141d(a). The fourth prong is also established here because any ruling against these state employees in this lawsuit would potentially effect how the department of motor vehicles resolves its consumer complaints.
General Statutes § 5-141d(a) provides in relevant part: "The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state officer or employee . . . from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee or member is found been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious."
It is also worth noting that in his "small claims writ and notice of suit," the plaintiff used the defendants' address at the department of motor vehicles in Wethersfield as opposed to their home addresses. "When a complaint is unclear as to whether a state actor is being sued in their official or individual capacity, the court may look to the summons to aid in the determination." Hanton v. Walker, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5029721 (March 29, 2010, Keegan, J.), citing Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002) (stating that "the identities of the parties are determined by their description in the summons"). Consequently, the fact that the plaintiff used the defendants' work addresses as opposed to their home addresses lends further credence to the conclusion that the defendants are being sued in their professional as opposed to their individual capacities. See, e.g., Sienkiewicz v. Ragaglia, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0401770 (April 3, 2007, Matasavage, J.) (stating that the plaintiffs' summons "list[s] each defendant's address as `c/o Office of the Attorney General,' which . . . lends some support to the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' action is brought against them in their official capacities").
Having made the determination that the state is the real party in interest in this matter, the plaintiff must allege facts implicating one of the two exceptions to sovereign immunity in order to avoid the dismissal of this case. The first exception is that the legislature has waived the state's sovereign immunity via a statute. Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 397. In his complaint and supporting documentation, the plaintiff fails to cite any statute that would allow him to bring a claim against employees of the department of motor vehicles for allegedly performing their duties in a negligent manner. Independent legal research has also failed to reveal such a statute. The second exception to sovereign immunity is that in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the defendants acted in excess of statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. Id. Although the plaintiff does make some factual allegations that could possibly implicate this second exception, it is clear that the plaintiff is seeking monetary damages in this matter as opposed to declaratory or injunctive relief. In his "small claims writ of summons and notice of suit," the plaintiff filled out the box "amount claimed" with the figure "$5,000." As the plaintiff in the present case wants to obtain money damages as opposed to an equitable remedy, the second exception to sovereign immunity is inapplicable. As a result, the plaintiff's action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the court must grant the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Having made this determination, it is unnecessary to examine the defendants' argument that this matter should be dismissed because they are entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165. Although the defendants' memorandum of law discusses sovereign immunity and § 4-165 statutory immunity as though they are the same doctrines, "[c]ommon-law sovereign immunity is distinct from the statutory immunity provided by § 4-165 . . . By its own terms, § 4-165 applies only to state officers and employees sued in their personal capacities . . . (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental Health Center, 74 Conn.App. 264, 268, 812 A.2d 95 (2002). "It is well settled that the defense of sovereign immunity can be raised for claims brought directly against the state or against state employees acting in their official capacities. Likewise, the defense of statutory immunity can be raised for claims brought against state employees acting in their individual capacities . . . Because an action against state employees in their official capacities is, in effect, an action against the state . . . the only immunity that can apply is the immunity claimed by the state itself — sovereign immunity." (Citations omitted.) Mercer v. Strange, 96 Conn.App. 123, 128, 899 A.2d 683 (2006).
If this court had not found that the defendants acted in their official capacities and, therefore, are not entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity, § 4-165 could then become applicable and bar this action. Section 4-165(a) provides: "No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter."