Contrary to Levoritz's contention, Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 does not bar an employee who has accepted workers’ compensation benefits from suing a coemployee who has committed an intentional assault against him or her (seeHanford v. Plaza Packaging Corp., 2 N.Y.3d 348, 351, 778 N.Y.S.2d 768, 811 N.E.2d 30 ; Maines v. Cronomer Val. Fire Dept., Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 535, 543–544, 429 N.Y.S.2d 622, 407 N.E.2d 466 ). Additionally, Levoritz failed to establish, prima facie, that he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident, and was not engaged in a willful or intentional tort (seeGuida v. Rivera Investigations, Inc., 207 A.D.3d 1110, 1112, 172 N.Y.S.3d 258 ; Shumway v. Kelley, 60 A.D.3d 1457, 1458, 876 N.Y.S.2d 299 ). The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff's cross-motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action to recover damages for assault and battery insofar as asserted against Levoritz.