Opinion
Suit by the Guantanamo Sugar Company against the Untied States to recover an alleged overpayment of taxes.
Petition dismissed.
This case have been heard by the Court of Claims, the court, upon the report of a commissioner and the evidence, makes the following special findings of fact:
1. Plaintiff is a New Jersey corporation with it principal office and place of business in New York City.
2. December 27, 1918, plaintiff filed a tentative income and profits tax return for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, and on or about June 16, 1919, filed an amended income and profits tax return for the same year, disclosing a tax liability of $138,126.22, which was duly assessed. It was paid in installments as follows: March 19, 1919, $36,500; June 16, 1919, $32,536.11; September 16, 1919, $34,531.56; and December 16, 1919, $34,531.55.
3. December 15, 1919, plaintiff filed a tentative income and profits tax return for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1919, disclosing an estimated tax liability for that year of $400,000, which was assessed on the December 1919 assessment list. February 18, 1920, plaintiff filed its completed return for that year disclosing a tax liability of $394,855.63. The tax shown on the completed return was not assessed. Plaintiff paid the estimated tax shown on the tentative return of $400,000 in the following installments: December 16, 1919, $100,000; July 26, 1920, $98,713.91; September 17, 1920, $98,713.90; May 18, 1920, $97,427.82; December 15, 1926, $4,625, and August 26, 1930, $519.37.
4. February 19, 1924, October 2, 1925, November 12, 1926, and November 13, 1928, plaintiff filed income and profits tax waivers extending the period for assessment and collection of taxes for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, to and including December 31, 1929.
5. May 14, 1924, plaintiff filed a claim for refund of $138,126.22, the entire income and profits tax paid for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, and assigned as grounds therefor: "That the taxes paid by it were excessive. This claim is filed in the full amount of the tax paid purely to protect the taxpayer's rights pending the final settlement of the taxes for this year now under decision with the Department."
6. March 31, 1925, plaintiff filed another claim for refund for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, in the amount of $251,335.80, which, in addition to a claim for special assessment, assigned the following grounds therefor:
"The Treasury Department in its undated letter, reference IT: CR: EEDL--App., fixed the total tax liability for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1918, at $240,917.25, resulting in an overassessment of $10,418.55. The taxpayer now claims refund of $10,418.55, together with such greater amount as may be found to be legally refundable after final consideration has been given to its claims as set forth in its memorandum dated March 5, 1924, and its affidavits filed on May 15, 1924, and July 11, 1924, all of which are now made a part hereof. "[Omitted portion refers to claim for special assessment.] "The taxpayer further asks and demands refund of so much of the income and profits tax paid for the taxable year 1918 as may hereafter appear to have been overpaid (a) as the result of decisions by the Board of Tax Appeals or the Courts of United States overruling the interpretation placed on the Statute by the Commissioner; or (b) as a result of a valuation of its properties at March 1, 1913, giving rise to an increased deduction for depreciation; or (c) as a result of revision or redetermination of its liability for foreign income and excess-profits taxes; or (d) as a result of any change in the allowance for depreciation of cane stubble or other property which may be determined upon." The memorandum of March 6, 1924 (erroneously referred to in the claim for refund as March 5, 1924), and the affidavits of May 15, 1924, and July 11, 1924, referred to in the claim for refund, related to contentions advanced by plaintiff that it was entitled to greater deductions from gross income than those allowed by the Commissioner for repair and maintenance charges, losses, amortization, and depreciation.
7. December 13, 1924, plaintiff filed a claim for refund of income and profits tax paid for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1919, in the amount of $109,286.59, which was based upon the same invested capital as previously determined by the Commissioner, with a deduction from gross income claimed in addition to the deductions previously allowed by the Commissioner of $27,080.96 for repairs and a claim for special assessment. In addition the claim contained a paragraph identical, except as to the year, with the final paragraph set out in the claim for refund quoted in finding 6 for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918.
8. December 27, 1924, October 15, 1925, December 7, 1926, October 26, 1927, and November 13, 1928, plaintiff filed income and profits tax waivers extending the period for assessment and collection of taxes for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1919, to and including December 31, 1929.
9. April 1, 1927, plaintiff filed a supplemental claim for refund for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1919, of the same amount as that set out in the original claim for that year, namely, $109,286.59, which included, among the various grounds assigned, the following:
"With respect to invested capital it is the contention of the taxpayer that in computing the correct tax liability the following sums should be added to invested capital as determined by the Commissioner in the aforesaid letter: * * * "13. The sum of $768,287.25 which was charged against capital surplus in 1911 representing the reduction of the book value of the capital stock of the Guantanamo Railroad Company owned by the taxpayer from $465,458.81 to $1.00 and a reduction in the book value of land, buildings, and equipment of $302,829.44. "14. Such as sum as may be necessary to increase from the book value to the actual value thereof at acquisition the property paid in for the capital stock of the taxpayer."
10. December 15, 1925, plaintiff filed a claim for refund for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1920, in the amount of $757,131.54, which asked for the refund of that amount on the basis of various memoranda and affidavits theretofore filed with the Commissioner and by an application of the special assessment provision, and that claim concluded with a paragraph which was substantially identical, except as to year, with the concluding paragraph in the claim for refund for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, and set out in finding 6.
April 1, 1927, plaintiff filed a supplemental claim for refund for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1920, in the amount of $757,131.54, which assigned substantially the same grounds as were set out in the claim for refund filed on the same day for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1919, and referred to in finding 9.
11. April 3, 1924, May 18, 1925, July 27, 1925, and June 12, 1928, conferences were held in the office of the Commissioner by plaintiff's representatives with the Commissioner's representatives in respect to plaintiff's tax liability for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920.
12. January 16, 1929, the Commissioner mailed to plaintiff a sixty-day registered deficiency letter, with statements attached showing his determination of plaintiff's tax liability for the fiscal years ended September 30, 1918, 1919, and 1920, as follows: 1918 deficiency, $2,147.95; 191 overassessment, $32,556.98, and 1920 deficiency, $52,568.24.
13. March 16, 1929, plaintiff filed a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals for a redetermination of the taxes set forth in the deficiency letter of January 16, 1929, referred to in 12. The petition assigned the following errors in the Commissioner's determination:
"a. That proportion of repairs which were disallowed and which are now treated as capital expenditures for the year 1918. "b. Denying the petitioner's contention that its excess-profits taxes should be computed for the year 1920 under Sections 327 and 328."
May 3, 1929, the Commissioner filed his answer to plaintiff's petition, denying the assignments of error as set out in plaintiff's petition.
14. January 28, 1932, plaintiff filed an amended petition with the Board of Tax Appeals contesting the determination of the Commissioner as set forth in the Commissioner's letter of January 16, 1929, and assigned the following error in the Commissioner's determination: "(a) Failure to restore to the invested capital of the petitioner the sum of $768,287.25 written off petitioner's books in 1911 and not included in invested capital in returns filed by the petitioner."
Included in the list of assets making up the total of $768,287.25, referred to in plaintiff's assignments of error, was an item described as "Guantanamo R.R. Co. common stock, $465,457.81."
February 10, 1932, the Commissioner filed his answer to the amended petition denying the allegation of error contained therein.
15. October 4, 1932, the Board of Tax Appeals entered an order of dismissal of plaintiff's petition, referred to above, for failure to prosecute. October 22, 1932, and December 13, 1932, plaintiff filed motions to vacate the order of dismissal of the Board, which motions were denied by the Board on October 24, and December 20, 1932, respectively.
16. November 9, 1932, the Commissioner notified plaintiff by registered letter that all of its claims for refund for the years 1918 and 1920 were rejected on a schedule of the same date.
17. December 15, 1932, the Commissioner assessed the deficiencies determined in his deficiency letter of January 16, 1929, for the years 1918 and 1920, and scheduled the overassessment of $32,556.98 for 1919, as shown by the deficiency letter of January 16, 1929, with interest of $266.86. December 31, 1932, the sum of $2,147.95 of that overassessment, which was determined to be an overpayment, was credited against the deficiency for 1918 and the balance, with interest, was credited against the deficiency for 1920.
18. January 4, 1933, the Board of Tax Appeals vacated its order of dismissal entered October 4, 1932, and restored the case to the calendar for hearing.
19. January 19, 1933, the Commissioner mailed to plaintiff by registered mail, a notice of disallowance of the claims for refund for the year 1919 except as to the amount of $32,556.98 previously determined and allowed as shown in findings 12 and 17, and set out in a certificate of overassessment.
20. January 17, 1933, the Commissioner received the following letter from counsel for the taxpayer (plaintiff):
"I beg to refer to your letter of January 19th, 1933, addressed to the taxpayer, the Guantanamo Sugar Company. "Kindly be advised that the liability for the year 1918 and 1920 is pending before the United States Board of Tax Appeals, docket No. 32191, and set down on the calendar in New York for trial the last week in February. "I understand that the claims for refund pending for the various years, together with the claim for 1919 will be left in abeyance awaiting the final decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals. If this is not correct, I wish to begin suit at once, so kindly inform me."
February 7, 1933, counsel for plaintiff was advised by letter by the Commissioner that the claims for refund for the fiscal years 1918 and 1920 were rejected on schedule dated November 9, 1932, and the claim for refund for 1919 was partially rejected on schedule dated December 15, 1932, concerning which advice was contained in Bureau letters of November 9, 1932, and January 19, 1933, respectively.
21. April 20, 1933, and May 9, 1933, the case pending before the Board of Tax Appeals, heretofore referred to, was heard by the Board on the sole issue of the right of the plaintiff to restore to its invested capital for the taxable years before the Board, the sum of $457,319.02, representing the value of the stock of the Guantanamo Railroad Company owned by it.
22. July 31, 1934, the Board of Tax Appeals rendered a memorandum decision holding that plaintiff was not entitled to have the value of the stock of the Guantanamo Railroad Company restored to its invested capital for the taxable years involved and its taxes recomputed accordingly, and upheld the determination of the Commissioner.
23. October 30, 1934, plaintiff filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for a review of the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, which court, upon consideration of the question involved, rendered its decision May 25, 1936, reversing the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals and holding that plaintiff was entitled to have the value of the stock of the Guantanamo Railroad Company, which has been written down on its books, restored to its invested capital. The court remanded the case to the Board of Tax Appeals which instructions to determine plaintiff's tax liability in accordance with its decision. No supersedeas bond was filed by plaintiff at the time it filed its petition for review. The case is reported in Guantanamo Sugar Co. v. Helvering, 66 App.D.C. 86, 85 F.2d 252.
24. June 3, 1936, plaintiff requested the Commissioner to reopen its claims for refund for the year 1919 and restore to its invested capital the value of the stock of the Guantanamo Railroad Company for that year in accordance with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, just referred to, and make refund of the tax shown after such restoration. September 18, 1936, the Commissioner denied plaintiff's request for the reopening of its claims.
25. December 7, 1936, the Commissioner recomputed plaintiff's tax liability for the fiscal year 1918 and 1920 in accordance with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and delivered a copy of his recomputation to plaintiff. December 19, 1936, a stipulation was entered into between plaintiff's representatives and the Commissioner, based on the Commissioner's recomputation for the years 1918 and 1920, showing an overpayment for the fiscal year 1918 of $18,414.64, and an overassessment of $48,150.56 for the fiscal year 1920. These amounts were determined after taking into consideration the credits made by the Commissioner on account of the 1919 overpayment, as shown in finding 17.
26. December 19,1936, the Board of Tax Appeals entered its order pursuant to the stipulation referred to in the preceding finding showing an overpayment of tax for the year 1918 of $18,414.64, a deficiency of $4,417.68 for 1920 and dismissed the proceedings as to the year 1919 for lack of jurisdiction.
27. December 22, 1936, plaintiff requested that its claims for refund for the years 1918 and 1919 be reopened and reconsidered and refund made in accordance with the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. February 20, 1937, the Commissioner made reply to that request, which concluded as follows:
"The claims referred to are based upon grounds other than those which formed the basis of the overpayment for the year 1918, as determined by the United States Board of Tax Appeals in this case, which overpayment this office is without authority to refund. "Your request for the reopening of the refund claim on file for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, is, therefore, denied. "As to the taxable year 1919 you have been previously advised in Bureau letter dated September 18, 1936, of the denial of your request for reopening of the rejected claims in accordance with the provisions of section 608 of the Revenue Act of 1928 as amended by section 503 of the Revenue Act of 1934. This position is adhered to."
28. June 14, 1937, the Commissioner issued to plaintiff a certificate of overassessment showing an overassessment of $20,562.59 for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, that $18,414.64 thereof was barred by the statute of limitations, and that $2,147.95 was allowable, with interest of $1,129.08.
29. September 10, 1937, plaintiff again requested the reopening of the claims for refund for 1918 and 1919, the refunding of the overpayment determined by the Board for the year 1918, and the refunding of tax for 1919 based on the same adjustment in invested capital. December 3, 1937, the Commissioner advised plaintiff that the previous denials of the request for the reopening of the claims for refund were sustained.
30. February 25, 1938, plaintiff filed its petition in this court for the recovery of taxes overpaid for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918 and 1919. David A. Buckley, Jr., of Washington, D.C. (Harvey L. Rabbit, of Washington, D.C., of counsel), for plaintiff.
S.E. Blackham, of Washington, D.C., and Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert N. Anderson and Fred K. Dyar, both of Washington, D.C., on the brief), for defendant.
Before WHALEY, Chief Justice, and LITTLETON, WHITAKER, JONES, and MADDEN, Judges.
MADDEN, Judge.
This is a suit to recover an alleged overpayment of taxes in the amount of $18,414.64 for the fiscal year 1918 and in the amount of $17,841.41 for the fiscal year 1919, with interest on each amount.
Plaintiff filed a tentative income and profits tax return for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, on December 27, 1918. It filed an amended return on June 16, 1919, showing a tax liability of $138,126.22, which was assessed and paid during 1919. Plaintiff filed waivers extending the period for assessment and collection of its 1918 income and profits tax to December 31, 1929.
On May 14, 1924, plaintiff filed a general claim with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for refund of the entire amount paid by it for 1918. Another claim for refund of the 1918 taxes was filed March 31, 1925. This claim set out certain specific grounds for recovery. Both claims were timely. Revenue Act of 1926, sec. 284(g), 44 Stat. 9, 67, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Acts, page 222.
Plaintiff filed a tentative income and profits tax return for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1919, on December 15, 1919. It filed a completed return on February 20, 1920, but the tax was assessed on the amount shown on the December, 1919 return. The tax was paid during 1919 and 1920, except for two small payments made in 1926 and 1930. Waivers were filed extending the period for assignment and collection to December 31, 1929.
Plaintiff filed a claim for refund of a part of the 1919 tax on December 13, 1924, stating both general and specific grounds. April 1, 1927, plaintiff filed a supplemental claim for refund for the year 1919, asking, among other things, for certain adjustments in the amount of its invested capital. On the same day it filed a claim on the same grounds for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1920, supplementing an earlier claim for that year filed on December 15, 1925.
During 1924, 1925, and 1928 conferences were held between the Commissioner and plaintiff's representative with respect to plaintiff's tax liability for all the years involved. The Commissioner on January 16, 1929, mailed to plaintiff a sixty-day registered deficiency letter, with a statement attached showing his determination of plaintiff's tax liability. He found a deficiency of $2,147.95 for the year 1918, an overassessment for 1919 of $32,556.98 and a deficiency of $52,568.24 for 1920.
March 16, 1929, plaintiff filed a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals for a redetermination of the taxes set forth in the sixty-day deficiency letter. It filed an amended petition in January 1932, assigning as error the Commissioner's failure to make certain adjustments in its invested capital. The petition was dismissed October 4, 1932, for failure to prosecute.
November 9, 1932, the Commissioner notified plaintiff by registered mail that its claims for refund for the years 1918 and 1920 had been rejected. A registered letter of January 19, 1933, notified it of the disallowance of its claims for 1919, except as previously allowed in the sixty-day letter of January 16, 1929. The Commissioner had, in December 1932, assessed the deficiencies determined in the sixty-day letter and scheduled the overassessment. The sum of $2,147.95 of that overassessment was credited against the deficiency of that amount for 1918 and the balance was credited against the deficiency for 1920.
January 4, 1933, the Board of Tax Appeals vacated its order dismissing the petition. Plaintiff's counsel wrote to the Commissioner January 27, 1933, asking whether the claims for the three years involved were to be held in abeyance pending the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, as he wished to bring suit if such were not the case. By letter dated February 7, 1933, he was reminded that the claims had been rejected and referred to the letters of November 9, 1932, and January 19, 1933. The letter of the Commissioner gave no other answer to the question of plaintiff's counsel.
During April and May 1933, the Board heard the case on the sole issue of the right of plaintiff to make the desired adjustments in invested capital. On July 31, 1934, the Board rendered a memorandum decision upholding the determination of the Commissioner.
October 30, 1934, plaintiff filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for a review of the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. May 25, 1936, the court reversed the decision of the Board.
Thereafter, plaintiff requested the Commissioner to reopen its claims for refund for the year 1919 and make an adjustment in its invested capital for that year in accordance with the decision of the court. The request was denied September 18, 1936.
December 7, 1936, the Commissioner recomputed plaintiff's tax liability for 1918 and 1920 in accordance with the decision of the court and stipulation was entered into between plaintiff's representative and the Commissioner, showing an overpayment of $18,414.64 for the fiscal year 1918 and an overassessment of $48,150.56 for the fiscal year 1920. These amounts were determined after taking into consideration the credits made on account of the 1919 overpayment previously found.
The Board of Tax Appeals entered its order pursuant to the stipulation on December 19, 1936, showing an overpayment for the year 1918 of $18,414.64, a deficiency of $4,417.68 for the year 1920 and dismissed the proceedings as to the year 1919 for want of jurisdiction, apparently on the ground that the Commissioner had assessed no deficiency for that year.
December 22, 1936, plaintiff again requested the Commissioner to reopen and reconsider its claims for refund for 1918 and 1919 and make refund in accordance with the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. The Commissioner replied February 20, 1937, refusing to reconsider the 1918 claims on the ground that the claim filed with his office was based on grounds other than that on which the Board's decision was based and that he was without authority to make a refund in such a case, and adhering to his refusal to reconsider the 1919 claims.
June 4, 1937, the Commissioner issued to plaintiff a certificate of overassessment, showing an overassessment of $20,562.59 for the year 1918, $18,414.64 of which was barred by the statute of limitations, and $2,147.95 of which was allowable, with interest, apparently for the reason that that sum was regarded as having been paid in December 1932, when the overpayment then determined for 191 was credited against the deficiencies determined at that time.
Plaintiff in September of 1937 made another request for reopening, which also was denied by the Commissioner.
Plaintiff filed its petition in this court February 25, 1938.
Considering first the claim for the taxes for 1918: Is plaintiff entitled to recover the overpayment determined by the Board of Tax Appeals? The Revenue Act of 1932, approved June 6, 1932, provided in section 1103(a), 47 Stat. 169, 286, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Act, page 652: " * * * No such suit or proceeding [for the recovery of taxes] shall be begun before the expiration of six months from the date of filing such claim, unless the Commissioner renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of two years from the date of mailing by registered mail by the Commissioner to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which such suit or proceeding relates." As there is nothing in the saving clause in subsection (b) to make subsection (a) inapplicable, the 1932 Act must be regarded as the controlling statute.
Plaintiff's claims for refund of taxes paid for the fiscal year 1918 were rejected by the Commissioner's registered letter of November 9, 1932. In the absence of anything further, suit should have been brought by November 9, 1934. However, section 284(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 67, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Acts, page 220, provides that where the Commissioner has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency and the taxpayer has filed a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals within the time prescribed, for a redetermination of its tax liability for the year involved, no refund of the tax for the taxable year for which the Commissioner has determined the deficiency should be made and no suit by the taxpayer for the recovery of any part of such tax should be instituted in any court, except as provided in subsection (e).
Subsection (e) of section 284, as amended by section 507 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 791, 871, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Acts, page 221, provided that if the Board of Tax Appeals determined that there was no deficiency and further found that there was an overpayment of the tax in question, it should have jurisdiction to determine the amount of such overpayment, and such amount should, when the decision of the Board had become final, be refunded to the taxpayer. The taxpayer must, however, have filed a claim for credit or refund within the time prescribed for filing claims under section 284(g) of the Act, which time, in this case, expired April 1, 1926.
It is the contention of the defendant that the taxpayer never filed a claim for refund for 1918 within the meaning of the above sections within the required time. The defendant argues that the claim referred to in section 284(e) is one based on the ground upon which the Board of Tax Appeals ultimately finds the overpayment. In National Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, 52 F.2d 1011, 72 Ct.Cl. 663, this court held that section 284(e) requires a timely and sufficient claim, that is, one that gives notice of the items of overpayment actually found by the Board. There the taxpayer had filed a claim for refund with the Commissioner that was allowed in part and rejected as to the rest. Thereafter its account was reaudited and a deficiency determined. The taxpayer filed a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals after the time for filing claims for refund with the Commissioner had expired. Some time later the taxpayer filed another claim and an amended petition, both of which mentioned new items later found to be overpayments on grounds not asserted in the claims that were timely filed. The Commissioner refused to refund the overpayments on the ground that no claim for refund had been filed within the time allowed by the statute. This court sustained the Commissioner's contention.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish that case on the theory that it takes in none of the factors of notice or knowledge chargeable to the Commissioner in this case by virtue of this participation in the litigation before the Board of Tax Appeals and the court; but that distinction is hardly sound as in that case as well as in the instant case the amended petition to the Board of Tax Appeals gave notice to the theory on which the taxpayer was proceeding.
The question then becomes whether plaintiff filed a sufficient and timely claim. Its first claim for refund for 1918 filed May 14, 1924, was admittedly a general claim, subject to amendment before action by the Commissioner (see United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 53 S.Ct. 278, 77 L.Ed. 619); and timely. The amended claim of March 31, 1925, was a proper amendment, setting out certain definite claims for refund. If by virtue of the amendment, the claim then became a specific claim, it could not be amended again on some new and unrelated ground after the expiration on April 1, 1926, of the time for filing claims. United State v. Andrews, 302 U.S. 517, 58 S.Ct. 315, 82 L.Ed. 398. That being so, plaintiff's argument that the amended petition to the Board of Tax Appeals on January 18, 1932, might be regarded as an amendment of the claim is without merit. The fact that the amended petition set out the claims ultimately relied on is no aid to the plaintiff because it was filed after April 1, 1926.
Plaintiff's argument that the claim as amended was still a general claim because of the inclusion of a demand for the refund "of so much of the income and profits tax paid for the taxable year 1918 as may hereafter appear to have been overpaid (a) as the result of decisions by the Board of Tax Appeals or the Courts of the United States" is equally without merit. The Supreme Court in the Andrews case, supra, rejected the contention that a specific claim can be left open to amendment on a new ground indefinitely merely by including a demand for general relief.
In view of the language of section 284(e), as interpreted by the courts, it is necessary to reject as untenable plaintiff's claim that where the Commissioner, after the time for filing claims has expired (cf. Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U.S.258, 265, 51 S.Ct. 395, 75 L.Ed. 1018), is informed from sources other than the filed claim of the basis on which the taxpayer intends to claim an overpayment, the filing of a claim stating that basis is no longer essential. Cf. Rock Island, Ark. & L.R.R.Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 41 S.Ct. 55, 65 L.Ed. 188.
As to the claim for refund for 1919, plaintiff's suit on that claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed two sufficient and timely claims for refund for the taxes paid for the fiscal year 1919. It was notified of the rejection of its claims for that year except as previously allowed by notice sent by registered mail January 19, 1933. This suit was not instituted until more than five years later; it should have been brought within two years of the mailing date of the notice. Sec. 1103(a), Revenue Act of 1932. The Commissioner's rejection was clear and unequivocal and there is no ground on which the plaintiff can claim an estoppel. That plaintiff's counsel understood the effect of the notice of rejection is clear from his letter of January 27, 1933, in which he stated that if the claims were not to be held in abeyance, he wished to bring suit. There was nothing in the Commissioner's reply to lead him to believe that the claims would be held in abeyance in spite of the rejection; and the Commissioner consistently refused to reopen or reconsider the claim for 1919.
The pendency of the proceedings before the Board of Tax Appeals did not prevent the statute of limitations from running against the claim for 1919. Under the provisions of sec. 608(b)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 791, 874, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Acts, page 460, plaintiff could have protected itself against the running of the statute by entering into an agreement in writing with the Commissioner to suspend the running of the statute of limitations for filing suit from the date of the agreement to the date of the final decision in the case pending before the Board of Tax Appeals. In the absence of such an agreement here, plaintiffs right to sue is lost.
Nor is plaintiff entitled to any recovery for the year 1919 under a theory of recoupment. Except for the overpayment determined in the deficiency letter of 1929 and credited against the deficiencies there set out, no overpayment for 1919 was ever determined, the Board of Tax Appeals having dismissed the petition as to 1919 for want of jurisdiction. It is plaintiff's contention that an overpayment for 1919 should be found for the same reason that the Board determined the overpayments for 1918 and 1920. The difficulty with that reasoning is that plaintiff failed to keep alive its right to have the claim for 1919 considered after the decision of the Board by entering into the agreement provided for by the statute. Further, there is no deficiency claimed by the government in any way related to the claimed overpayment against which to recoup an overpayment, if one had been found. There has been no tendency in the cases allowing a recoupment to extend the doctrine beyond the situation in which the overpayment and deficiency involved were both based in some way upon the same transaction. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 55 S.Ct. 695, 79 L.Ed. 1421; Lit v. United States, D.C.E.D.Pa., 18 F.Supp. 435. The only deficiency finally determined in this case is a small one for 1920, and it is based not upon the failure of the Commissioner to make the desired adjustment in the amount of plaintiff's invested capital for either 1919 or 1920, but upon other factors.
We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover and that the petition must be dismissed. It is so ordered.