Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills

7 Citing cases

  1. Murphrey v. Williams-Sonoma Stores

    CIVIL ACTION NO. H-19-3114 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    "[A]n action for damage to property is governed by the two-year period of limitations." Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868, (Tex. 1984)). "Causes of action accrue and statutes of limitations begin to run when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy."

  2. Hollywood Park Humane Society v. Town of Hollywood Park

    Civil Action No: SA-03-CA-1312-XR (W.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2004)

    Texas courts allow Plaintiffs to be compensated for takings pursuant to the police power if an ordinance is not substantially related to the health, safety, or general welfare of the people or if it is unreasonable or arbitrary. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1984); Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. App-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing Mayhew v. Town of' Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 935 (Tex. 1998) (a compensable regulatory taking occurs if the governmental restrictions unreasonably interfere with the right to use and enjoy one's property). Thus, Texas provides an adequate procedure to address and compensate claims such as the Plaintiffs have alleged here.

  3. City of Mason v. Lee

    No. 04-18-00275-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 7, 2018)

    As previously noted, both the Texas Supreme Court and this court have recognized "the law does not recognize takings liability for a failure to" act. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 499 S.W.3d at 800; Meuth, 2017 WL 603646, at *2. In addition, this court has also recognized a city's failure to enforce applicable zoning ordinances and special permit restrictions does not constitute a regulatory taking.Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Schmitz v. Denton Cty. Cowboy Church, 550 S.W.3d 342, 356 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. filed) ("[A] claim based upon a governmental unit's refusal or failure to enforce its own regulations or ordinances is not a viable takings claim."); cf. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 499 S.W.3d at 804, 807 (questioning whether approval of private development met the public use element of a takings claim and holding no taking occurred where county was not substantially certain approval of private development would damage specific property). Finally, we question whether the appellees have a protected property interest in the manner in which the City enforced or failed to enforce its ordinances against the land owned by Tyler and the Reyeses.

  4. Schmitz v. Denton Cnty. Cowboy Church

    550 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. App. 2018)   Cited 33 times
    Holding private-citizen landowners could not seek to enforce zoning ordinance against alleged violator via a UDJA claim

    But a viable takings claim must allege that the governmental unit affirmatively acted; a claim based upon a governmental unit’s refusal or failure to enforce its own regulations or ordinances is not a viable takings claim. SeeAlves v. United States , 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ; Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills , 100 S.W.3d 350, 353–54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Here, Appellants challenged the manner in which the Town enforced its ordinances, changed the zoning on the new tract, and issued the permits to the Church, i.e., the infirmity of the process; therefore, they failed to allege a viable takings claim that would waive the Town’s governmental immunity.

  5. Schrock v. City of Baytown

    NO. 01-13-00618-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 10, 2015)   Cited 2 times
    Remanding regulatory takings claim

    The City asserts that Schrock has alleged a property-damage claim, which is subject to a two-year limitations period; Schrock's claim accrued in June 2009, when it filed a lien on the property; and he did not file his lawsuit until January 19, 2012, which was after the limitations period had expired. There is not a statutory provision that provides a certain limitations period for inverse-condemnation actions. Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 353-54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); see also Hallco Tex. Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 74 (Tex. 2007) (Hecht, J., dissenting) ("It is not entirely clear what statute of limitations applies to such claims . . . ."). Courts have held that a regulatory-taking action is barred after the expiration of a ten-year period of limitations, but that an action for damage to property is governed by a two-year period of limitations. Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Hous., 69 S.W.3d 350, 358 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ("There is no specific statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation claim.

  6. Schrock v. City of Baytown

    NO. 01-13-00618-CV (Tex. App. Apr. 23, 2015)

    The City asserts that Schrock has alleged a property-damage claim, which is subject to a two-year limitations period; Schrock's claim accrued in June 2009, when it filed a lien on the property; and he did not file his lawsuit until January 19, 2012, which was after the limitations period had expired. There is not a statutory provision that provides a certain limitations period for inverse-condemnation actions. Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 353-54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); see also Hallco Tex. Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 74 (Tex. 2007) (Hecht, J., dissenting) ("It is not entirely clear what statute of limitations applies to such claims . . . ."). Courts have held that a regulatory-taking action is barred after the expiration of a ten-year period of limitations, but that an action for damage to property is governed by a two-year period of limitations. Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 69 S.W.3d 350, 358 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ("There is no specific statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation claim.

  7. City of Hous. v. Young Song

    NO. 14-11-00903-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 24, 2013)   Cited 5 times
    Concluding plaintiffs' pleadings affirmatively negated jurisdiction over their takings claim when they did not allege a compensable material and substantial impairment of access to their properties

    Physical takings occur when a governmental authority physically occupies, destroys, or damages an individual's property. Westgate, 843 S.W.2d at 452; Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills, 100 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) A taking may also occur when the government undertakes some physically non-intrusive action which may have an unconstitutional impact on real property rights.