Opinion
Case No. 4:00cv224.
October 27, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff Jerry Miles Grover, an inmate at a federal prison, filed the above-captioned lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Warden John J. LaManna, Unit Manager Terry Groh, Case Manager Kevin Mitchell, and Correctional Counselor Deborah Smith violated his rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments by penalizing him for failing to comply with the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, 28 C.F.R. pt. 545 (IFRP). More specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants infringed upon his constitutional rights by making him sleep on the top bunk of a bunk bed in a three-person cell, denying him a higher paying job, requiring him to send home or donate items that he brought with him from another prison, and refusing to transfer him to another prison.
In their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12), Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and because Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are barred by qualified immunity. The Court agrees.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims
Plaintiff brings his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 prohibits persons acting under color of state law from depriving any person within the jurisdiction of the United States of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). It is well established that the federal government, its officers, and its agents may not be held liable under § 1983 for actions taken pursuant to federal law. See, e.g., Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987). Defendants in this case are agents of the federal government who have been sued for actions that they allegedly took under color of the IFRP, a federal law. 28 C.F.R. pt. 545. Because Defendants' actions were taken pursuant to federal rather than state law, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims and they must be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff Cannot Sustain a Bivens Action Against Defendants
As Defendant has noted, Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. No. 12, p. 3). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that when a federal agent "acting under color of his authority" violates the Constitution, the agent's victim may recover damages against the agent. Id. at 389. Such lawsuits are difficult to sustain, however, because of heightened pleading requirements and the qualified immunity of government officials. In this case, Plaintiff is hindered by both of these obstacles.
Complaints alleging a Bivens cause of action are subject to the same heightened pleading requirements that exist for § 1983 claims.Nuclear Transp. Storage v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348, 1355 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1079 (1990). One of those requirements is that the plaintiff specify whether defendants are being sued in their official or individual capacities. Graham v. Mercer, unreported, 198 F.3d 245, **1 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff's Complaint does not clearly indicate whether Defendants are being sued in their official or individual capacities. If Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacities, his lawsuit is in effect an action against the United States. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166 (1985). A suit against the United States for constitutional violations is properly dismissed because such a suit is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2nd Cir. 1994).
If Plaintiff's lawsuit is against Defendants in their individual capacities, Defendants may raise the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity "grants government officials engaged in discretionary activities immunity from individual liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996, 999 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 944 (2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Courts determine whether a government official is protected by qualified immunity by asking two questions: "1) whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right; and, if so, 2) whether that right was clearly established such that a reasonable official understood that his behavior violated that right." Id. If a plaintiff fails to present facts in the Complaint indicating that a constitutional violation occurred and that a reasonable official would have understood his behavior to be in violation of the constitutional right, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and the plaintiff's claim must fail. See, e.g. Nuclear Transport and Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d at 1355; Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by making him sleep on the top bunk of bunk bed in a three-person cell, denying him a higher paying job, requiring him to send home or donate items that he brought with him from another prison, and refusing to transfer him to another prison. (Doc. 1). None of these alleged deprivations rises to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Muslim v. Frame, 854 F. Supp. 1215, 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (inadequate cell size and ventilation do not amount to violations of the due process clause); Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 248 (7th Cir. 1991) (prisoner has no right to a particular job assignment); Grover v. Helman, unpublished, 175 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 1999) (transfer of inmate to three-person cell is not a constitutional violation); Muhammad v. Moore, 760 F. Supp. 869, 871 (D. Kansas 1991) (reduction in pay of inmate who refused to participate in IFRP was not unconstitutional); Chapdelaine v. Keller, unreported, 1998 WL 357350 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying an inmate possession of clothing purchased at another correctional facility is not a constitutional violation); McFarland v. Luttrell, unreported, 51 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1995) ("There is no inherent constitutional right to placement in any particular prison. . . .") (citing, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983)).
Nor can Plaintiff sustain a claim that the IFRP is itself unconstitutional. Numerous courts have held that the IFRP serves valid penological interests and that its requirement that an inmate choose between participation and the imposition of sanctions is not unconstitutional. See, e.g., Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819 (1990); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 870 (1989); Muhammad v. Moore, 760 F. Supp. 869 (D. Kansas 1989).
Plaintiff's only potential constitutional claim with regard to the IFRP is that the sentencing court inappropriately delegated the task of setting a payment schedule to the Bureau of Prisons. It is unclear whether Plaintiff has raised such a claim, but even if he has, he would not be able to satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity test. In order to satisfy that prong, Plaintiff must prove that a reasonable government official would have understood that the setting of a payment schedule would violate a constitutional right. Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d at 999. Plaintiff cannot establish such an understanding because the federal courts themselves are in disagreement on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Albro, 32 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that court may not delegate duty to designate restitution payment schedule);United States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that sentence ordering inmate to pay fine in accordance with IFRP was improper delegation of Court's authority); Montano-Figuero v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 549-550 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1091 (1999) (rejecting delegation argument); McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing Bureau of Prisons to set repayment schedule not improper delegation of authority). In any case, the appropriate vehicle for challenging the sentencing court's delegation of authority would be an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Rule 35 motion for correction or reduction of sentence — not a Bivens action. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to all of Plaintiff's claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from all potential Bivens claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12).
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum of Opinion and Order filed contemporaneously with this Judgment Entry, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above-captioned case is hereby terminated and dismissed with prejudice as final.