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acknowledging that "`federal courts have recognized that a mentally ill person's noncompliance with psychiatric medications could be the result of mental impairment and, therefore, neither willful nor without a justifiable excuse'"
Summary of this case from Burns v. AstrueOpinion
No. SA-02-CV-903-RF
December 9, 2003
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") (Docket No. 27), filed on October 20, 2003. A hearing was held on the matter on November 13, 2003, at which time the Court ordered the parties to file additional briefing on the issue of whether the government was substantially justified in its defense of the cause. Based upon all of the briefs and the oral arguments and after careful consideration, it is the opinion of the Court that Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees should be DENIED as discussed herein.
28 U.S.C. § 2412.
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 30, 2003 the Court reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion that the ALJ failed to properly consider that Plaintiff's failure to comply with his prescription drug regime might be a symptom of his medical diagnosis. As a result of that favorable finding, Plaintiff moved for an award of attorney's fees under EAJA. Plaintiff originally sought fees in the amount of $10,469.00, based upon an affidavit stating the amount, reasonableness and necessity of the time spent on the matter, as well as cost of living increases. Plaintiff claims his counsel spent 72.2 hours in preparation and pursuit of the eventually favorable appeal. Defendant argues that her position was substantially justified in the defense of the claim, that Plaintiff's request for fees is excessive and duplicative, and that the determination of the reasonableness of hours, the fee and the ultimate award is within the discretion of the Court.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Discussion
RAJA provides for attorneys fees in certain successful cases brought against the United States, including any agency or official of the United States. Section 2412(d) states that "a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . including proceedings for judicial review of agency action . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust."
Attorneys who successfully represent Social Security benefits claimants in court may be awarded fees under both the RAJA and the specific provision found in 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), but the attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee awarded. An RAJA award offsets an award under section 406(b), so that the amount of past-due benefits actually received by the claimant are increased by the RAJA award, up to the point where claimant receives the full amount past-due. Thus, section 406(b) of the Social Security Act is not a statute that "otherwise specifically provides" for attorney's fees so as to preclude an award under RAJA.
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002).
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Frazier v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2001).
Various facets of the RAJA provision are not disputed. Both parties agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and that the claim falls within the scope of section 2412(d). Both parties agree that the amount of the award, if awarded, is within the discretion of the Court. Furthermore, the government does not object to the process of Plaintiff s application for the fees. However, the parties dispute whether the government's defense was substantially justified, and the determination of attorney's fees under RAJA depends upon this sole disputed issue.
The Plaintiff is not entitled to RAJA attorney fees if the position of the United States was "substantially justified" or if the awarding of such fees in whole or part makes the award unjust. The government argues that at all times its position and defense were substantially justified and that an award would be unjust because the government was reasonable to rely upon the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation ("RR"). Substantial justification is to be determined on the basis of the record, including the record below before the ALJ and the record before the district court. The United States bears the burden, in this case, of establishing substantial justification for its position.
Milton v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 812, 813, n. 1 (5th Cir. 1994).
Sims v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 597, 602 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. (citing Herron v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1986).
Substantial justification means justification "in substance or in the main — that is justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person."
Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)); Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003).
The Court has repeatedly stated its position that the Magistrate Judge's R R was thorough, despite this Court's ultimate rejection of the opinion and remand. Furthermore, at the November 13 hearing, the Court stated its inclination to award attorney's fees to the Plaintiff, pending the filing of additional briefing on this issue. Based upon both parties' competent treatment of the issue, the Court must reconsider its inclination because it finds that the government was substantially justified in its position.
The Defendant's argument in support of its justification points to evidence in the record that may tend to support Defendant's original position on the denial of benefits. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues the merits of the substantial justification issue as separate, although related to, the original substantive dispute. The issue now before this Court is whether Defendant's position was substantially justified, that is justified to a reasonable person. The Court is not meant, at this stage, to reconsider the merits of the Plaintiff's claim for benefits, nor the merits of the review of the ALJ. In this regard, the Court agrees with Plaintiff, that the analysis need focus upon whether the Commissioner's position was substantially justified, even in light of a ruling declaring the ALJ erred. The government's position is not made reasonable by virtue of the ALJ's decision, nor by virtue of the RR. The government's position is not made reasonable by virtue of correctness. Rather, the government's position is reasonable and substantially justified because it is a reasonable and justified response to the whole of the proceedings. In short, the government's argument was substantially justified, even though the determination made by the ALJ on the basis of that argument and the evidence presented was not justified, nor correct in law.
Davidson, 317 F.3d at 507. ("The substantial justification standard should not be used to prevent the government from making novel arguments.") (citing SEC v. Fox, 855 F.2d 247, 252).
The government reasonably argued that the claimant's noncompliance with prescription medication directives was supported by evidence and weighed against a determination that he was disabled under the meaning of the Social Security Act. Although ultimately determined to be incorrect, the Court does not find that argument to be unreasonable, but rather reflective of a genuine dispute, one over which reasonable people could differ and one in which Plaintiff ultimately prevailed.
It is obvious to the Court that the government's position in this matter was never frivolous at any stage of the proceedings, nor does any party suggest that it was. However, substantial justification is a higher burden than that of sanctions for frivolousness; instead, the government's position must be reasonable both in fact and in law. The position of the government is substantially justified "if there is a `genuine dispute' . . . or `if reasonable people could differ as [to the appropriateness of the contested action].'" The government's position was reasonable, if incorrect, in both.
Davidson, 317 F.3d at 506.
Id.
Plaintiff argues that the government has misstated the law with respect to substantial justification and that the Court should not fragment the determination of substantial justification to separate stages of the entire proceeding. (Plf's Response on Issue of Substantial Justification, at 3). However, Plaintiff assumes that the government's position was unjustified below and that the parties now solely dispute whether the appeal to this Court was justified. This view is incorrect. The Court has never before determined the substantial justification issue at any stage of the proceedings, nor have the parties mutually agreed to such. The Court, despite its initial inclination that Plaintiff's competent counsel earned attorney's fees in diligent work on the claim, now finds that the government's argument throughout this matter was substantially justified and that determination bars Plaintiff's claim for fees under section 2412(d).
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, the Court will deny Plaintiff's application for EAJA fees because the government's position was substantially justified.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application (Docket No. 27) is DENIED.