Summary
In Grosse v. Friedman, 118 A.D.2d 539, 498 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (N.Y.App. Div. 1986), the court permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint because no "significant prejudice would result."
Summary of this case from Bigay v. GarveyOpinion
March 3, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Walsh, J.).
Order affirmed, insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On or about March 22, 1984, the defendant, acting pursuant to CPLR 3216 (b) (3), made a demand upon the plaintiff to resume prosecution of the instant action commenced in February 1980, and to serve and file a note of issue within 90 days of the receipt of the demand. The plaintiff's prior counsel then moved for leave to withdraw and by an order dated April 26, 1984, the court permitted him to withdraw and stayed the 90-day notice until 30 days after the defendant served upon the plaintiff a notice to appoint new counsel. On or about June 29, 1984, such a notice was served upon the plaintiff. On July 24, 1984, the plaintiff, by new counsel, moved to vacate the 90-day notice, to amend his complaint and for further discovery. By order dated October 4, 1984, that motion was denied with leave to renew upon proper papers. There is no evidence in the record indicating the date upon which the plaintiff was served with this order. On or about January 3, 1985, the plaintiff served the papers bringing on the instant renewed motion.
The record indicates that the plaintiff's new counsel has diligently prosecuted this action. It would plainly have been fatuous for the plaintiff to have filed a note of issue during the pendency of his July 24, 1984 motion to vacate the 90-day notice, to amend his complaint, and for further discovery. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the fact that the plaintiff's motion was not renewed until on or about January 3, 1985 was the result of any neglect on his part. Under these circumstances, dismissal of the plaintiff's action for want of prosecution is unwarranted.
The defendant has failed to prove that any significant prejudice would result from allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Thus, the amendment was properly allowed (see, Krupp v. Aetna Life Cas. Co., 104 A.D.2d 857, 858). Further, the date of interposition of the informed consent claim added by the amendment relates back to the date the claims in the original complaint were interposed (see, CPLR 203 [e]; Vastola v. Maer, 48 A.D.2d 561, 566, affd 39 N.Y.2d 1019). Gibbons, J.P., Thompson, Niehoff and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.