Opinion
No. 210, 2000.
Submitted: January 30, 2001.
Decided: February 14, 2001.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr.A. No. IN98-08-1792, 1793, 0990, and 0991.
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
This 14th day of February 2001, it appears to the Court that:
1) The defendant-appellant, Bruce Gronenthal, was indicted on charges of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, Kidnapping in the First Degree and Attempted Murder. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, Gronenthal was found guilty, as charged, on all counts in the indictment.
2) On April 7, 2000, Gronenthal was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences at Level 5 for Attempted Murder and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree convictions. He was also sentenced to an additional two years at Level 5 for the kidnapping conviction.
3) A timely notice of appeal was filed with this Court. This direct appeal was submitted for a decision on the briefs. We have concluded that a limited remand is necessary before this matter can be decided.
4) In this appeal, Gronenthal's contends that the Superior Court erroneously denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the kidnapping charge. According to Gronenthal, the Superior Court failed to determine, as a matter of law, that the restraint employed by Gronenthal to commit the alleged kidnapping offense was substantially greater than the restraint normally incident to the other alleged underlying offenses.
5) In Weber, this Court has held that when a defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunction with other underlying offenses that also involve restraint, such as Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, the jury must be instructed that the restraint upon which the kidnapping is premised has to be independent of and not incidental to the other underlying crime or crimes, in order to convict for the separate offense of kidnapping. In Weber, this Court specifically held that the interference with the victim's liberty "must be much more interference than is ordinarily incident to one or more underlying offenses to support a conviction for the separate offense of kidnapping."
Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 948, 957-58 (1988); Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary § 783, p. 228 (1973).
Id. at 958.
6) Most importantly, in Weber, this Court held a kidnapping charge should be submitted to the jury only after the trial judge makes an initial determination, as a matter of law, that the facts of the State's case support a separate conviction for kidnapping. If the trial judge, after performing this initial determination, is satisfied that the jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the restraint was substantially greater than the restraint normally incident to the other underlying offenses, the kidnapping charge may be submitted to the jury with the appropriate required instruction. The question of whether the restraint involved is sufficient to constitute kidnapping only becomes a factual question for the jury, however, after the trial judge makes an independent judicial determination that there is sufficient factual support in the record for a separate kidnapping conviction, as a matter of law.
Id. at 959.
Id.
7) In this case, the record reflects that Gronenthal's attorney asked the trial judge to make an initial determination whether the facts of the State's case supported an independent conviction for kidnapping. In response, the trial judge simply stated that "it is a jury question as to whether or not the restraint of the victim interfered substantially with the victim's liberty and it was much more restraint than necessary to commit the underlying offenses. Therefore, I'll let the kidnaping go to the jury based on the evidence that we have had."
8) This Court's holding in Weber requires the trial judge to function as a "gatekeeper." In Gronenthal's case, contrary to the requirements of Weber, the trial judge did not identify any "facts in the record" which warranted a conclusion that, "as a matter of law," there was "much more" interference with the victim's liberty than was ordinarily incident to the other underlying offenses, all of which also included an element of restraint. In the absence of the analysis mandated in Weber, it is impossible to this Court to review on appeal the trial judge's decision to submit kidnapping charge to the jury, as a matter of law.
Id.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the Superior Court for findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the propriety of submitting the independent charge of kidnapping to the jury, on the basis of the record evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief. Jurisdiction is retained.
Supr. Ct. R. 19(c).
BY THE COURT: /s/Randy J. Holland, Justice.