On appeal to this court, plaintiff raises two issues: (1) whether the plaintiff received a fair and impartial hearing before the Board; and (2) whether the Board's decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. • 1 Plaintiff first contends that he did not receive a fair hearing before the Board because the Board was biased against him. Our supreme court addressed a similar issue of bias involving a board of education in Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398. The court there said that State administrators are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own merits. Additionally, the court stated that a decision maker is not disqualified simply because he has taken a position on a policy issue related to the dispute, unless it can be shown that the particular decision maker is not capable of judging a controversy solely on the basis of its own circumstances.
In order to establish the bias or prejudice of an administrative decision maker, a claimant must show more than the mere possibility of bias or that the decision maker is familiar with the facts of the case. ( Collura, 113 Ill.2d at 370, 498 N.E.2d at 1152; Grissom v. Board of Education of Buckley-Loda Community School District No. 8 (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 320, 388 N.E.2d 398, 400; Batka v. Board of Trustees of the Village of Orland Park Police Pension Fund (1989), 186 Ill. App.3d 715, 721, 542 N.E.2d 835, 838-39; Carrao, 46 Ill. App.3d at 39, 360 N.E.2d at 541.) The claimant must demonstrate that the decision maker is not "`capable of judging a particular controversy [fairly] on the basis of its own circumstances.'"
Therefore, the procedures which followed plaintiff's "dismissal" were identical to what would have followed a "suspension" and were entirely consistent with what the statute required. Plaintiff cites two cases, Neal v. Board of Education (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 10, and Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, for the proposition that an attempted discharge is void if the hearing is not held prior to the school board's date of dismissal. We find the cases entirely inapposite.
We find the District's position to be the more persuasive. On point is Grissom v. Board of Education, 75 Ill.2d 314, 26 Ill.Dec. 683, 388 N.E.2d 398 (1979). A tenured teacher had been dismissed and requested a hearing and a bill of particulars.
]" (Emphasis added.) (Accord, Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 322, 388 N.E.2d 398; Aulwurm v. Board of Education (1977), 67 Ill.2d 434, 442, 367 N.E.2d 1337.) Gilliland contended, as does Slavin, that the charges against her were remediable, and she had not been given the requisite written warning.
The damage must be significant before the conduct causing the damage can be declared irremediable." ( Board of Education v. State Board of Education (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 769, 776, 513 N.E.2d 845, 849; see Board of Education of School District No. 131 v. State Board of Education (1983), 99 Ill.2d 111, 457 N.E.2d 435; Grissom v. Board of Education of Buckley-Loda Community School District No. 8 (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398.) We find no basis in the record for reaching such a conclusion.
While plaintiff cites no cases which address the issue of whether a hearing officer's receipt of evidentiary materials before a hearing violates due process rights, the Board notes several cases which hold that an adjudicator's possession of information about the subject matter of a hearing does not in itself result in deprivation of the right to a fair hearing. In Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a teacher was not denied a fair and impartial hearing before a school board even though the school board conducted the investigation leading to dismissal. Relying on the United States Supreme Court cases of Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association (1976), 426 U.S. 482, 49 L.Ed.2d 1, 96 S.Ct. 2308, and Withrow v. Larkin (1975), 421 U.S. 35, 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 95 S.Ct. 1456, the Grissom court held that mere familiarity with the facts of a case does not disqualify a decision maker without a showing that he is not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.
• 2 Defendant next maintains that plaintiff has waived any objection to the sanction imposed by failing to raise the issue at the hearing. While we agree that an objection to the failure to follow procedural requirements may be waived by a failure to raise it before the Board (see Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398), we believe that, in the instant case, no such waiver occurred. Initially, we note that, while a 60-day suspension was recommended, no sanction was actually imposed until the Board acted on the committee recommendation over one month after the hearing.
• 4 The parties each make reference to a number of Illinois decisions which they argue are analogous to the present case. We have reviewed these decisions and believe that Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398, represents the case most factually analogous to the instant case. In Grissom the plaintiff, a tenured teacher, was discharged based on charges that he failed to maintain discipline, provided inadequate classroom instruction and failed to act upon the suggestions of his principal and superintendent.
A mere possibility of prejudice is insufficient to show that a board, or any of its members, was biased. ( Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 321.) The plaintiff argues that People v. Taylor (1984), 101 Ill.2d 377, in which this court observed that the results of polygraph examinations were generally unreliable and often afforded undue significance by jurors, stands for the proposition that "exposure to [a polygraph examination] is enough to raise the presumption of partiality."