Opinion
No. CV 03 019 7013 S
March 30, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
This action arises out of the monetary damages and emotional distress allegedly sustained by the plaintiff, Ellen Grimley, as a result of the termination of her employment by the defendant, Icon International, Inc. The plaintiff alleges that: (1) the defendant violated the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1), by discriminating against the plaintiff because of her sex in the terms, conditions and privileges of her employment (count one); (2) the defendant violated § 46a-60(a)(1) in that it discharged the plaintiff because of her decision to adopt a child as a single person and the accompanying familial responsibilities (count two); (3) the defendant invaded the plaintiff's privacy by disclosing the plaintiff's childbearing capacity to a prospective employee (count three); and (4) the defendant's termination of the plaintiff constitutes a wrongful discharge because the reasons underlying the termination violate established public policies in Connecticut (count four). The defendant filed a motion to strike count four.
Section 46a-60(a)(1) of the CFEPA provides that "it shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent . . . to discriminate against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's . . . sex [or] marital status . . ."
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003).
Count four of the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendant terminated the plaintiff because of the familial responsibilities associated with her decision to adopt a child. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the grounds underlying her termination violate established public policies in Connecticut, including: (1) promoting the welfare of children and families; (2) protecting the best interests of children; and (3) strengthening the family unit and making the home safe for children by enhancing the parental capacity for good child care. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant's actions were made with reckless indifference to the plaintiff's rights and/or wilful, wanton and/or malicious intent. The plaintiff also alleges that, as a result of her wrongful termination, she has suffered damages including lost wages and benefits related to her employment, as well as pain, suffering and emotional distress.
In count four, the plaintiff incorporates paragraphs one through forty-five of her complaint.
The defendant moves to strike count four on the ground that it fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action for common-law wrongful discharge because the plaintiff has not identified a particular public policy that was violated by her termination. Additionally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim is further limited because she has an available statutory remedy. In support of its motion the defendant contends that Connecticut follows the common-law rule that employment is at-will and may be terminated by either the employer or employee without impunity. The defendant further claims that Connecticut courts have employed a narrow exception to this general rule when the former employee can demonstrate that the reasons for her dismissal derive from an important violation of public policy. Only in such a case, the defendant argues, may the employee bring an action for wrongful discharge against her former employer. The defendant emphasizes, however, that the public policy violations alleged in the plaintiff's complaint neither contravene an explicit statutory or constitutional provision, nor identify a particular public policy. Rather, the defendant contends, the allegations merely assert generalized statements of supposed public policies regarding the welfare of children and families. Additionally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim for common-law wrongful discharge is further limited because she has an available statutory remedy. The defendant contends, therefore, that the plaintiff's cause of action for common-law wrongful discharge is legally insufficient.
The court in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), discusses the doctrine of employment at-will and addresses whether that doctrine is applicable to claims for wrongful discharge where the termination violates a "clear mandate of public policy." Generally, permanent employment contracts and contracts for an indefinite term may be terminated by either the employer or the employee without just cause. Id. The court in Sheets, however, analyzed the plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge based on the defendant's request that he be found liable only if its "former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." Id., 475. Although the "inherent vagueness" associated with the concept of public policy often creates difficulty in determining the scope of this exception, the court has noted that the limitation on the employment at-will doctrine may be invoked only when "the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . . or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy." Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 798, 734 A.2d 112 (1999).
"[T]he public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one." Burnham v. Karl Gelb, P.C., 252 Conn. 153, 159, 745 A.2d 178 (2000). The plaintiff in Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., supra, 249 Conn. 804, failed to plead a legally sufficient cause of action for wrongful discharge despite allegations that she was terminated due to her request for a work-at-home schedule that would better enable her to raise her new son. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that her termination violated Connecticut's policy of discouraging employers from discriminating against employees who choose to have and raise children, that such a policy obligates employers to establish "family-friendly scheduling options," and that Connecticut recognizes the importance in encouraging employment opportunities for women. Id., 798-99. The Daley court rejected all of the plaintiff's arguments and held that "[a]lthough Daley alleges that her discharge contravened the aim of civil rights laws . . . to free women from the shackles of outworn prejudices, she has not established that her discharge contravened an explicit statutory or constitutional provision, or judicially conceived notion of public policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 804.
Like the plaintiff in Daley, the plaintiff in the present case merely alleges violations of generalized principles governing child and family welfare. Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to plead that the defendant violated a well-established public policy in Connecticut. "[T]he employee has the burden of pleading and proving that [her] dismissal occurred for a reason violating public policy." Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679, 513 A.2d 66 (1986). Because the plaintiff has not alleged that her termination violates a particular public policy, her claim for common-law wrongful discharge is legally insufficient.
Even if this court were to conclude that the plaintiff's termination violated an established public policy, the plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge would be stricken because she has an available statutory remedy under the CFEPA. In Deura v. Greenwich Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of' Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 94 0140029 (April 10, 1995, D'Andrea, J.) ( 14 Conn.L.Rptr. 49), this court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge in light of the statutory remedy available to the plaintiff pursuant to § 46a-60(a)(1). "[A] cause of action in tort for wrongful termination . . . exist[s] only when a discharge violates public policy and the employee is otherwise without remedy." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deura v. Greenwich Hospital, supra, 14 Conn.L.Rptr. 49. This court further emphasized that "the public policy against discrimination which the plaintiff invokes through General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1) . . . [offers a] statutory [remedy] and, therefore, cannot support an action in wrongful discharge" Id., 50. Because the plaintiff in the present case has an adequate statutory remedy available to her pursuant to the CFEPA, her claim for common-law wrongful discharge is stricken.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike the fourth count of the plaintiff's complaint is granted.
D'ANDREA, J.T.R.