Opinion
No. C-01-2787 EDL
February 26, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS.
INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 2001, Plaintiff, Herbert L. Grimes, acting pro se, filed this action against Defendant Pinn Brother's Construction Co., alleging that his civil rights were violated. On December 3, 2001, Defendant filed a Request for Judicial Notice, a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Sanctions. In response, Plaintiff filed three documents: an Opposition requested Motion to Oppose Judicial Notice in Motion to Dismiss, and to Allow Plaintiff to Resume Lawsuit on December 10, 2001; a Motion Plaintiff Oppose to Dismissal Also Oppose to Changing or Reassignment of Judicial Area or Magistrate Honorable Elizabeth D. Laporte on December 12, 2001; and a Declaration and Physical Evidence Including Short Brief on February 8, 2002.
On February 12, 2002, the Court held a hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and oral argument, good cause appearing, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court enters the following Order.
FACTS
On July 1, 1996, Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. Def's Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A at 4. Plaintiff sued the same Defendant as here in the Superior Court for Santa Clara County alleging personal injury arising from that accident. Grimes v. Castellanos. et al., No. CV767179 (Cal.Super.Ct. filed June 30, 1997), Grimes v. Pinn Brothers Construction Co., No. H022629 (Cal.Ct.App. filed February 15, 2001). Although Plaintiff was initially represented by counsel, his counsel withdrew before the case went to trial. Def's Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B. After rejecting an arbitration award in his favor, the case went to trial. The jury found that Defendant was negligent, but that Defendant's negligence was not the cause of injury to Plaintiff Def's Mot. to Dismiss Ex. L. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Request for Relief in Monetary Form for Personal Injuries and Damages with the trial court. Def's Mot. to Dismiss Ex. O. After this request was rejected, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeal. Def's Mot. to Dismiss Ex. Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as untimely. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. R. Plaintiff asked the Court of Appeal to set aside the dismissal. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. S. The Court of Appeal denied his request. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. U.
In this federal case, Plaintiff alleges that his civil rights were violated by Defendant in connection with the state court litigation. Pl.'s First Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 11, 13. According to Plaintiff, Defendant invaded his medical records, tampered with Veteran's Administration documents, and sponsored perjured testimony. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant's counsel slandered and defamed him. Pl.'s First Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4. Plaintiff also accuses his former counsel of a conflict of interest and the trial court judge of favoring the defendant's throughout trial. Compl. at 2, 3; Pl.'s Second Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Plaintiff stated at the hearing that his complaint was meant to serve as an appeal of his state court case.
DISCUSSION
A. Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant asks this Court to take judicial notice of the state court actions Grimes v. Castellanos, et al., No. CV767179 (Cal.Super.Ct. filed June 30, 1997), and Grimes v. Pinn Brothers Construction Co., No. H022629 (Cal.Ct.App. filed Feb. 15, 2001). These documents include Plaintiff's complaint in the initial auto accident law suit, the state court's order granting Defendant's motion to compel discovery, the state court's order granting Plaintiff's motion to compel the production of documents and monetary sanctions, the state court order compelling the VA hospital to produce Plaintiff's medical records, Plaintiff's counsel's motion to withdraw, the state court's order denying defendant's motion to terminate sanctions, the arbitrator's award, Plaintiff's communication with the state court and Defendant's attorney after arbitration, the jury's special verdict, Plaintiff's appeal to the Sixth District Court of Appeal and the court of appeal's denial of the appeal. It is proper for a court to take judicial notice of the contents in court files in other lawsuits. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, n. 9 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's request for judicial notice.B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction lies with plaintiff Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal district courts have no authority to review the final determinations of state court judicial proceedings, even when the challenge to the state court decision involves federal constitutional issues. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416 (1923);Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party who loses in state court cannot appeal to the lower federal courts on the ground that the state court judgment violates federal constitutional rights if those rights were "inextricably intertwined" in the state court proceedings. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994).
Here, an examination of Plaintiff's complaint reveals that he is asking this Court to reconsider the decision of the state court in his negligence case. Further, Plaintiff acknowledged at the hearing that he believed that this case constituted another avenue of appeal from his state court loss. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to re-examine issues already litigated and decided by the state court. Since there has been a final determination by the state, Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is GRANTED without leave to amend.
C. Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
In the alternative, Defendant seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).
A broad reading of the complaint in light of Plaintiff's statements at the hearing revealed that he is alleging a violation of his civil rights, presumably under section 1983. In order to allege a civil rights cause of action under section 1983, Plaintiff must prove that a person acting under color of state law committed an act that deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity protected by the United States Constitution or laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 187 (1961). A private party can only be liable under section 1983 if there is a close nexus between the state and the private party. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim under section 1983. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant, Defendant's counsel and Defendant's witnesses are state actors or have the requisite connection with state actors. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or laws, with the possible exception of invasion of the privacy of his medical records. In sum, Plaintiff simply complains about his state court negligence case against Defendant. He admitted at the hearing that he had no new facts on which to base a section 1983 action.
While leave to amend is generally granted, it may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject to dismissal. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988); Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co. Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, leave to amend would be futile. Plaintiff alleges no facts independent of the facts contained in the state law court case that could support his federal action. As set forth above, the Court has no jurisdiction to re-examine a state court's final determination. Therefore Defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED without leave to amend.
D. Motion to Dismiss Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata
A federal court applies the law of res judicata of the state where the prior action was brought. Dobard v. City of Oakland, 1997 WL 252093, *6 (N.D.Cal.) (citing In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 814 F.2d 1226, 1230 (7th Cir. 1987)). The doctrine of res judicata bars a federal action where an earlier lawsuit involving the same claims and the same parties or their privies reached a final judgment on the merits. Blonder Tongue Laboratories v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-324 (1971);Nordham v. Ladish Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 1402-1404 (9th Cir. 1993). Further, res judicata bars relevant claims that could have been raised in the prior case, but were not. Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1996).
Essentially, Plaintiff is seeking a more favorable result in his state court negligence action. The issues raised by Plaintiff have already been litigated and a final determination rendered in state court. The state court claim involved the same parties and the same claims that Plaintiff raises here. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A. Therefore, his claim, and any relevant claims that could have been brought in his state court action, are barred under principles of res judicata. Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED based on res judicata.
E. Motion for Sanctions
Defendant also moves for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on the ground that this lawsuit is frivolous. A motion for sanctions must be served on the opposing party twenty-one days before it is filed with the court, or sanctions cannot be awarded. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 11(c)(1)(A). Here, Defendant failed to comply with this provision. Further, Civil Local Rule 7-8(a) requires a motion for sanctions to be filed separately, which Defendant did not do.
Even if Defendant had complied with Rule 11 and Local Rule 7-8(a), the relief that it seeks could not be awarded. Defendant seeks an order prohibiting Plaintiff from filing additional law suits pertaining to the state court negligence case, which is tantamount to having Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant. The court has the power to enjoin litigants with abusive and lengthy histories from filing without leave of court. DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990). While the Court understands Defendant's concern about the expense of defending further meritless litigation, Plaintiff has not filed any other lawsuit with this Court. Therefore, it does not appear that the standards for declaring him a vexatious litigant have been met. The Court warns Plaintiff, however, that future filings with this Court that attempt to appeal his state court case are inappropriate and may lead to sanctions, including a ban on such future filings without leave of court.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion to dismiss (docket number 12) is GRANTED with prejudice and without leave to amend. Defendant's motion for sanctions is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
This action came before the Court for hearing, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte presiding, and the issues have been heard and a decision having been fully rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in accordance with the Court's order of February 26, 2002, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Request for Judicial Notice are GRANTED. Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.