Grimes v. Lamar

4 Citing cases

  1. Hughes v. De Mund

    195 Cal. 242 (Cal. 1924)   Cited 30 times

    This would amount to a nullification to this extent of the legislative purpose so clearly evidenced in the amendments of 1915. It may be assumed for the purpose hereof that one of the grounds of the motion for a new trial was insufficiency of the evidence and that the order dismissing it was, therefore, appealable, as was assumed in Grimes v. Lamar, 60 Cal.App. 623 [ 213 P. 270]. Nevertheless, the taking of an appeal therefrom would not ipsofacto extend the time for filing transcript upon appeal from the judgment ( Williams v. Williams, 176 Cal. 230 [ 168 P. 19]; Bryan v. Tevis, supra).

  2. Jameson v. Warren

    91 Cal.App. 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928)   Cited 12 times

    The notice of entry of the judgment and the only notice served was mailed to the attorneys for appellants on November 14, 1924; but, as shown by the record, the judgment in the action was not entered until November 18, 1924. This notice was premature, and therefore ineffectual ( North American Dredging Co. v. Outer Harbor etc. Co., 178 Cal. 406 [ 173 P. 756]; Grimes v. Lamar, 60 Cal.App. 623 [ 213 P. 270]), and the notice of intention, which was served and filed on December 3, 1924, was within time. The action was one for rescission, the complaint alleging that the plaintiff was induced by the fraudulent representations of defendant Warren to exchange 100 shares of the stock of Guarantee Mortgage Company for certain shares of the common and preferred stock of Morosco Holding Company, Inc., owned by Warren.

  3. Allegheny County v. Maryland Casualty Co.

    132 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1943)   Cited 15 times

    * * * As, however, the effect of the affirmance of the order granting a new trial has been to set aside the judgment, the only appropriate order that can now be made in the present appeal is to dismiss it." To the same effect are San José Safe Deposit Bank v. Bank of Madera, 1898, 121 Cal. 543, 54 P. 85; Grimes v. Lamar, 1923, 60 Cal.App. 623, 213 P. 270, and Forrester v. Spitzer, 1935, 7 Cal.App.2d 650, 46 P.2d 999. The fact that both the judgment n.o.v. and the order for a new trial were entered at substantially the same time does not change the result.

  4. Swinerton Builders v. Fresno Plumbing & Heating, Inc.

    No. F069825 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2018)

    Consequently, "[t]he notice of entry of judgment was premature and ineffectual for any purpose, since there could be no valid notice of the existence of something which did not in fact exist. [Citation.]" (Grimes v. Lamar (1923) 60 Cal.App. 623, 624.) As a result, the date of Swinerton's misguided notice of entry of judgment is not relevant.