Opinion
5:22-cv-00199 (DNH/TWD)
04-05-2022
JOANNA GRIFFITHS, Plaintiff, v. SAINT JOSEPHS HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.
JOANNA GRIFFITHS Plaintiff, pro se
JOANNA GRIFFITHS Plaintiff, pro se
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a pro se complaint submitted by Joanna Griffiths (“Plaintiff”), together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP Application and recommends that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety with leave to amend.
I. PLAINTIFF'S IFP APPLICATION
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds she meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP Application is granted.
Plaintiff is reminded that, although her IFP Application has been granted, she will still be required to pay fees that she may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
II. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
Section 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must look to see whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although extreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and the parties have had an opportunity to respond, Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding a district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, “does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 836 (1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Similarly, allegations that “are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” are subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009). Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the pleadings must be read liberally and construed to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Generally, when the court dismisses a pro se complaint sua sponte, the court should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to amend at least once; however, leave to replead may be denied where any amendment would be futile. Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Futility is present when the problem with the plaintiff's causes of action is substantive such that better pleading will not cure it. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Utilizing a form complaint pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq, Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Saint Joseph's Hospital (“Hospital”) and CEO Jeremy Zochs. (Dkt. No. 1.) As a basis for the Court's jurisdiction, Plaintiff has indicated “Federal Jurisdiction” and specifies the ADA and “disparate treatment resulting in loss of dentures, causing personal injury.” (Dkt. No. 1-1.) She lists the following disabilities in the complaint:
The Court assumes Plaintiff is referring to St. Joseph's Health Hospital. The address that Plaintiff has listed for this Defendant is that of St. Joseph's Health Hospital. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that St. Joseph's Health Hospital is a regional non-profit health care system based in Syracuse, New York, and is part of Trinity Health, the nation's second-largest Catholic Health System. See https://www.sjhsyr.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2022); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC, 127 F.Supp.3d 156, 167 (noting that, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a court may take judicial notice of information publicly available on a party's website, as long as the website's authenticity is not in dispute and ‘it is capable of accurate and ready determination.'”).
severe mental disability, bi-polar, post traumatic stress, ADD, borderline personality disorder. My physical condition has greatly worsened due to the loss of my dentures, my face has sunken in and I have lost 31 pounds.(Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 4.) As to the conduct at issue in this action, she checked “failure to make alterations to accommodate disability” and “other acts.” Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff states that on November 20, 2021, she was having a nervous breakdown and was brought to “CPAP” and was given “additional meds”. Id. She has “little memory” of that day, “but some memory.” Id. According to Plaintiff, her dentures were lost, stolen, or misplaced while she was in the Hospital's care. Id. She has “since gone 3 months with no teeth causing [her] to lose 31 pounds, emotional distress.” Id. Plaintiff wants a jury trial where she can “prove disparate treatment.” Id. at ¶ 7. She has “suffered greatly both physically and mentally from their discrimination.” Id. Plaintiff seeks $100,000.00 in damages. Id.
Plaintiff may be referring to the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program, also known as “CPEP”. See https://www.sjhsyr.org/location/st-josephs-health-hospital-comprehensive-psychiatric-emergency-program-cpep (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
In an “Affidavit of Disparate Treatment” which is attached to the complaint, Plaintiff states that from what she can remember, she “was not treated well at all.” (Dkt. No. 1, Exhibit A.) She avers she had her dentures when she arrived at “CPAP” but did not have them when she returned home. Id. On “numerous occasions” she contacted the Hospital and received “more disparate treatment from the internal investigation done by . . . Jennifer from Loss Prevention.” Id. Plaintiff claims employees of the hospital “colluded their statements as to prevent the hospital's correct responsibility.” Id. “Jennifer told [Plaintiff] that the hospital in no way lost [her] teeth in a disparaging manner, and in fact very rudely.” Id. As a result, she has suffered physical and mental stress and loss of enjoyment. Id.
See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference).
IV. DISCUSSION
The complaint refers to the ADA generally, and does not identify the title of the ADA allegedly violated by Defendants. (See generally Dkt No. 1.) The ADA is divided in five separate titles. Reading the complaint liberally, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has stated a claim under Title III of the ADA.”
Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff could not proceed with a claim under Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination, because she has not alleged that she was employed by Defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 12117; see Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 169 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Title I of the ADA expressly deals with th[e] subject of employment discrimination ....”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Title II of the ADA covers disability discrimination in public services, programs, and activities, defined as “state or local governments and their instrumentalities.” Sherman v. Black, 510 F.Supp.2d 193, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)). However, “[a] private hospital performing services pursuant to a contract with a municipality[, ] even if it does so according to the municipality's rules and under its direction, is not a creature of any governmental entity.” Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, Title IV of the ADA does not appear to be applicable to Plaintiff's claims because Title IV prohibits disability discrimination in telecommunications. See Genco v. Sargent & Collins LLP, No. 18-CV-0107, 2018 WL 3827742, at *3, n.5 (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018). Lastly, Title V of the ADA, sometimes referred to as the “retaliation provision, ” also does not appear applicable because Plaintiff does not allege that she engaged in activity protected by the ADA, that Defendants were aware of that activity, or any causal connection between the allegedly adverse actions that Defendant took against her and the protected activity. See Chiesa v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 638 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Hurd, J.).
A. Title III of the ADA
Title III of the ADA prevents discrimination on the basis of a disability in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. “[P]ublic accommodations” are defined under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), which includes a long list of qualifying private facilities, provided that their operations “affect commerce, ” such as an “insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” To state a claim under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege (1) that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that defendants are a public accommodation as defined under Title III; and (3) that she was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants' services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by defendants on the basis of her disability. Doe v. NYSARC Tr. Serv., Inc., No. 1:20-CV-801 (BKS/CFH), 2020 WL 5757478, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2020), report-recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7040982 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2020); see Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 368 (2d Cir. 2008). Title III provides a private right of action for injunctive relief but no right of action for monetary relief. 42 U.S.C. § 12188; see Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Title III of the ADA “authorizes private actions only for injunctive relief, not monetary damages.”); Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Monetary relief . . . is not available to private individuals under Title III of the ADA.”).
Under the ADA, the term “disability” means “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102. A physical or mental impairment can be “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability [or an] emotional or mental illness[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending speaking, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
As an initial matter, because Plaintiff seeks only monetary relief, the complaint “fails to state a plausible claim for relief under Title III of the ADA.” Sandler v. Benden, 15-CV-1193, 2016 WL 9944017, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2016), aff'd, 16-3218, 2017 WL 5256812 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2017); see, e.g., Doe v. NYSARC Tr. Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 7040982, at *3 (sua sponte dismissing the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages pursuant to Title III of the ADA with prejudice and without leave to amend).
Additionally, even assuming the Hospital is a public accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), and that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), the complaint is devoid of factual allegations concerning “policies, practices, [or] procedures” by Defendants that deprived Plaintiff of the ability to access goods, services, or privileges available to those without Plaintiff's disabilities. See Benyi v. New York, No. 3:20-CV-1463 (DNH/ML), 2021 WL 1406649, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021), report-recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1404555 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Heendeniya v. St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr. (SJHHC), No. 5:15-CV-1238 (GTS/TWD), 2017 WL 1013081, at *9 n.14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2017) (dismissing Title III ADA claims against St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center for failure to state a claim where the plaintiff failed to alleged that he was denied the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations” and that Defendants discriminated against him “based on [his] disability”). Rather, as described above, Plaintiff was provided with medication at “CPAP” due to her “nervous breakdown” and seems to argue that employees of the Hospital were negligent and/or rude. Thus, the complaint does not state a Title III ADA claim against the Hospital.
As to CEO Jeremey Zochs, “the question of whether a person is a proper defendant under the ADA turns . . . on . . . whether the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA.” Doe v. NYSARC Tr. Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 5757478, at *4 (quoting Coddington v. Adelphi Univ., 45 F.Supp.2d 211, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (emphasis removed)). In assessing whether an individual is a proper defendant under Title III of the ADA, “[c]ourts . . . have focused on the issue of control and whether the named defendant ‘operates' a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA.” Id. at *4. “Under Title III, ‘to operate' means ‘to put or keep in operation,' ‘to control or direct the functioning of,' or ‘to conduct the affairs of; manage.'” Id. (quoting Green v. DGG Properties Co., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01989, 2013 WL 395484, at *13 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2013) (quoting Celeste v. East Meadow Union Free School Dist., 373 Fed.Appx. 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2010)) (summary order) (additional internal quotation marks and citation omitted))). Further, “[t]he term ‘operate' has been interpreted as being in a position of authority and having the power and discretion to perform potentially discriminatory acts.” Coddington, 45 F.Supp.2d at 215. Moreover, courts have explained that “[s]uch discriminatory acts may result in the imposition of liability under the ADA where they are the result of the exercise of the individual's own discretion, and not merely the implementation of institutional policies or the mandates of superiors.” Id.
However, courts have held that “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” concerning an individual defendant's level of control over a public accommodation are insufficient for purposes of establishing individual liability under Title III of the ADA. Doe v. NYSARC Tr. Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 5757478, at *4 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see Green, 2013 WL 395484, at *14. For example, in Green, where “[p]laintiff merely assert[ed] the names of the individual defendants and their respective titles, ” without more, the court held that, although the individual defendants could “be proper defendants in [the] action if they exercised the requisite control over [the public accommodation], the plaintiff “failed to allege any facts in his complaint that would allow the court to conclude that [the individual defendants] exercised such control over the functioning of affairs of [the public accommodation].”
Here, even affording the complaint the most liberal construction possible, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts to state a claim against CEO Jeremy Zochs under Title III of the ADA. In this regard, CEO Jeremy Zochs is listed as a party and his name is not referenced in body of Plaintiff's complaint. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a Title III ADA claim against CEO Jeremey Zochs.
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff claims brought pursuant to Title III of the ADA for monetary damages against Defendants be dismissed. See Benyi, 2021 WL 1406649, at *15.
B. State Law Claims
Inasmuch as this Court is recommending that Plaintiff's federal claims-to the extent that she alleged any-be dismissed, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See Kolari v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims because all claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction have been dismissed.”). Of course, Plaintiff may also pursue any state law claims in state court.
C. Opportunity to Amend
This Court has serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can amend to assert actional ADA claims against Defendants. Nevertheless, in light of Plaintiff's pro se status and out of an abundance of caution, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint, except that Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages pursuant to Title III of the ADA be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.
If the District Court adopts this Report-Recommendation, and if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the pleading must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules. The revised pleading will replace the original complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”). The revised pleading should not attempt to resurrect any claims dismissed with prejudice in this action Additionally, although Plaintiff may submit objections to this Report-Recommendations, see infra, Plaintiff should wait for the District Court to rule on this Report-Recommendation before submitting an amended pleading.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages pursuant to Title III of the ADA be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall file a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).