Summary
granting summary judgment where “it is undisputed that no force was used”
Summary of this case from Edwards v. MoraOpinion
No C 00-1395 VRW (PR)
February 26, 2002
Plaintiff, a prisoner of the State of California, filed this pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, and found cognizable plaintiff's claims for the use of excessive force, the denial of due process, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Defendants have filed a motion for dismissal/summary judgment, which plaintiff has opposed. Plaintiff has filed a request for immediate and preliminary injunctive relief, which defendants have opposed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motion for summary judgment and DENIES plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.
Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file his opposition (Doc # 31). The request is hereby GRANTED and the court will consider the opposition.
I
Plaintiff alleges that correctional officers at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) used excessive force againstd him in an incident that occurred on November 10, 1999, and that he was denied proper medical care by a medical technician assistant (MTA) following the incident, both in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff further alleges that prison officials violated his right to due process at a subsequent disciplinary hearing in which he was found guilty of "creating a potential for violence" in connection with the use of force incident.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FRCP 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.
The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. SeeCelotex Corp v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FRCP 56(e). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp, 477 US at 323.
II A
Plaintiff's excessive force claim is asserted against defendant Correctional Officers Castro and Cunningham, and Sgt EA Johnson, who allegedly failed to intervene. In support of their dispositive motion, these defendants submit declarations, portions of plaintiff's deposition testimony and other documentary evidence which show the following:
On Friday November 19, 1999, at SVSP, Correctional Officer Castro observed plaintiff kicking the outside of the Facility B Program Office door and pounding on the door window with his fist. Officer Castro approached plaintiff and instructed him to stop kicking and hitting the door. Plaintiff turned to Officer Castro and replied, "I need to see the mother-fucking Sergeant. It is the third quarter and I need my law library books. I am going to do what I got to do to see somebody, even if I got to go in cuffs."
Correctional Officer Cunningham, who was the acting Sergeant that day and inside the Facility B Program Office, heard the banging noises and went to investigate. As Sgt Cunningham opened the door, he observed plaintiff state to Officer Castro, "Then cuff me up and take me to my cell." Next, plaintiff turned around and put his hands behind his back so that he could be handcuffed.
After plaintiff had been handcuffed, Sgt Cunningham asked him to identify the building where he was housed. Plaintiff replied, "Building number 3." In order to assist in escorting plaintiff to his housing unit, Sgt Cunningham took hold of plaintiff's right bicep with his left hand.
After plaintiff was handcuffed, Officer Castro and Sgt Cunningham told plaintiff he was being escorted to his housing unit cell. In response, plaintiff began to resist the escort and, in an apparent attempt to break free from the grasp of Officer Castro and Sgt Cunningham, he turned and fell facing the Program Office door. Plaintiff fell because he "tripped over" his own feet as he was turning around to face the officers. Had it not been for Officer Castro and Sgt Cunningham holding on to his arms, plaintiff's face could have struck the ground when he fell.
In order to assist plaintiff back to his feet, Sgt Cunningham took hold of plaintiff's left arm under his armpit and Officer Castro took hold of plaintiff's right arm under his armpit. While being lifted to his feet, plaintiff began yelling, "My back, you're breaking my back, I am disabled."
Following plaintiff's verbal outburst, several inmates on the yard began to approach Officer Castro and Sgt Cunningham in front of the Program Office. The potential involvement of these other inmates in support of plaintiff's resistance to the escort created a risk to the safety of Castro, Cunningham, plaintiff and other staff. Fearing that plaintiff might instigate other inmates to get involved and due to the fact that he was already handcuffed and standing upright, Officer Castro and Sgt Cunningham removed plaintiff from the yard for both his safety as well as their own. Maintaining their hold on plaintiff under his armpits, they carried him to the Program Office. Upon entering the Program Office, they were instructed by Lt Garner to place plaintiff in one of the nearby holding cells until he could be examined by medical staff. During the escort from the Program Office doorway to the holding cell, plaintiff would not attempt to walk on his own despite being ordered several times to stand and walk.
While in the holding cell, plaintiff was examined by MTA C Jones. When asked by MTA Jones to describe the circumstances regarding this incident, plaintiff replied, "No comment. Later, I want to fill out an incident report." MTA Jones completed his examination, noting no injuries and prescribing no treatment. Plaintiff was cleared to be returned to his housing assignment.
During the time plaintiff was in the holding cell, Correctional Officer S Chavez checked on him every fifteen minutes. Chavez noted whether plaintiff was standing or sitting. Chavez also noted plaintiff's request to see the MTA and on several occasions, plaintiff's indication that he did not need to used a restroom.
Upon being released from the holding cell, Lt Garner ordered Officer Chavez to escort plaintiff from the holding cell back to his housing unit cell. En route to the housing unit, but prior to leaving the holding cell area, Sgt Cunningham interviewed plaintiff. Sgt Cunningham asked plaintiff if he had staged the whole incident in front of the Program Office door in order to get his property. Plaintiff responded, "Yeah, I need my legal work because I have a legal deadline."
Upon returning to his cell, plaintiff did not immediately seek any further medical attention. Rather, he took some of his pain medications, put a hot towel behind his head and lay down. The medication plaintiff took was able to "subside the pain."
Plaintiff has had on-going back problems since 1991. While at SVSP, plaintiff was taking the pain medications Methacarbonal and Ibuprofen for his back condition. Although plaintiff was considered "mobility impaired" due to his back problems at the time of the November 19, 1999, incident, the impairment was not sufficiently serious to have affected his placement within CDC or to have required assistive devices to walk. As of September 14, 1999, a medical examination disclosed that plaintiff could walk 100 yards or up a flight of stairs without pause and without the aid of crutches, prosthesis or a walker.
At the time of the incident, neither Officer Castro nor Sgt Cunningham had access to plaintiff's medical records, and they were not otherwise aware of any disability or adverse medical condition related to plaintiff's back. In addition, while inmates with certain types of disabilities at SVSP wear a flourescent green vest to make the inmate's disability status easily identifiable for staff, plaintiff was not wearing such a vest at the time of the incident, nor was he relying upon any assistive devise to aid him, such as a cane, walker, wheelchair, back brace, or special shoes.
In September 2000, plaintiff underwent an x-ray examination regarding his back condition, ie "mild levoscoliosis." In reviewing the x-ray, the radiologist determined that there were some changes consistent with the aging process. The radiologist, however, found that there were no changes in the mild levoscoliosis since January 1998.
Prior to November 19, 1999, plaintiff never filed a written grievance regarding the conduct of Officers Cunningham or Castro, or Sgt Johnson. Other than the incident at issue in this case, plaintiff does not believe that any of the defendants in this lawsuit have ever used excessive force against him.
B
Plaintiff both concedes and disputes various aspects of defendants' statement of facts. The court sets forth only those factual allegations it deems relevant to the issue of the use of force.
Plaintiff disputes that he was causing a disturbance outside the Program Office door. He concedes that after being approached by defendants Cunningham and Castro at the door he asked to be cuffed up, and turned around and put his hands behind his back so that this could be accomplished. Plaintiff also concedes that after he had been handcuffed, Sgt Cunningham asked him to identify plaintiff's housing unit; plaintiff replied "building number 3." Contrary to defendants' assertions that they informed plaintiff that he was going to be returned to his housing cell, plaintiff alleges that they said nothing, so he turned to face the Program Office door to go to the security cell. Plaintiff alleges that at that point, one of the defendants grabbed him, causing him to fall on to his knees. Pl Dep 1/30/01 at 63, 65. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants then "stuck their whole arm between plaintiff's arms, in the cuffed (sic] behind the back position and jerked plaintiff's both arms upwards, and then dragged plaintiff all the way down the long hall way, causing immediate, and severe pain . . . ." Pl Opp at 12:19-22.
Plaintiff does not dispute that during this course of events he yelled "You're breaking my back, my back, I'm disabled." Pl Opp at 39:23-24. Plaintiff disputes defendants' contention that several inmates on the yard began to approach Castro and Cunningham in front of the Program Office to see what was going on. He also disputes that he refused to walk of his own accord. He instead alleges that defendants dragged him down the hallway, without giving him the opportunity to walk after he had fallen. Plaintiff disputes defendants' contention that he admitted he "staged" the whole incident in order to get into the Program Office so that he could lodge a complaint about his property, although he admits that getting his property was the reason he went there.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he was seen by MTA C Jones, although he alleges that he had to wait two and one-half hours to be seen. He also does not dispute that he did not explain the circumstances of the incident to Jones, and that he told Jones he would be filling out an incident report later. Plaintiff does not dispute that he had no bruises or abrasions, that Jones noted ne injuries, that no treatment was needed and that plaintiff was cleared to be returned to his housing assignment. Nor does he dispute that upon returning to his cell he did not immediately seek any further medical attention, but took some of his pain medications, put a hot towel behind his head and lay down. Plaintiff alleges that he did not seek medical attention because the medical system at SVSP was so slow that he knew it would be at least a month before he could see someone. He states, however, that within the next three months he did eventually seek medical care for symptoms he maintains resulted from the use of force.
Plaintiff does not dispute his history of ongoing back problems. Nor does plaintiff dispute that at the time of the incident he was not using assistive devices to walk and that as of September 14, 1999, a medical examination disclosed that he could walk 100 yards or up a flight of stairs without pause and without the aid of crutches, prosthesis, or a walker. Plaintiff also does not dispute that at the time of the incident, neither Castro nor Cunningham had access to plaintiff's medical records and they were not otherwise aware of any disability or adverse medical condition related to plaintiff's back. He does not dispute that he was not wearing a green vest to identify him as disabled, but maintains that at the time such vests were not available for mobility impaired inmates such as himself. He claims that, in light of their training, defendants "should have known" that a lot of inmates who are mobility impaired may not be wearing a vest or using assistive devices.
C
Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912-13 (9th Cir 2001). In making this determination, a court may evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 US at 7. Prison administrators "should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986). That deference extends to prophylactic or preventative measures intended to reduce breaches of prison discipline. Id. This court finds that plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether the defendants used excessive force.
First, it is undisputed that no force was used when the defendants handcuffed plaintiff. After being refused entry to the Program Office, plaintiff asked to be handcuffed and voluntarily put both of his hands behind his back to accommodate the procedure. There is no allegation by plaintiff that either defendant used force to handcuff him, and the court notes that only in December 1999, subsequent to this incident, was a medical chrono issued advising that, if acceptable under the circumstances, plaintiff should be handcuffed only in front.
The parties disagree, however, what happened next. Defendants allege that after handcuffing plaintiff they told him they were taking him back to his housing unit, at which time he became a dead weight, letting himself fall to the ground. Plaintiff maintains that defendants never told him that he was going back to his cell, so he turned to face the Program Office door, at which point one of the defendants grabbed him by the shoulder, causing him to fall to the ground. See Pl Dep at 63:16-20 ("I turned around and faced the program door to go into the security cage. And next thing you know, I was grabbed at the upper shoulder, I believe it was the right shoulder, and knocked down."); 65:4-7 (". . . it was Cunningham that tried to snatch me, like spin me around, which caused me to fall, trip over my feet and fall down."). While the parties dispute whether defendants tried to prevent plaintiff's fall, plaintiff's own deposition testimony confirms that he fell when he tripped over his own feet.
No triable issue exists regarding defendants' perceived need to grab plaintiff as he turned to face the Program Office door. Plaintiff claims that defendants never explicitly told him that they were taking him back to his cell, but his deposition testimony also clarifies that they never told him to face the Program Office door. And it was only after he did so that one of the defendants "grabbed" him to "spin" him around, causing him to fall. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, plaintiff's version of the facts supports the inference that when he turned to face the door without being told to do so, defendants were justified in grabbing plaintiff's shoulder to spin him around to face him in the right direction.
The parties dispute what happened next. They agree that defendants put their arms under plaintiff's armpits. See Castro Decl; Cunningham Decl; Pl Dep at 66:1. Defendants claim that they then proceeded to lift plaintiff to his feet, at which point he began yelling: "My back, you're breaking my back, I am disabled." Because other inmates were present and the defendants were concerned they might attempt to intervene, defendants maintained their hold on plaintiff under his armpits and carried him to the Program Office. Plaintiff alleges that defendants never attempted to lift him and dragged him down the hallway, even though they knew he was in pain.
The court finds no disputed issue whether the defendants used excessive force in so lifting and moving plaintiff. Plaintiff's outburst combined with the presence of other inmates (whether those inmates attempted to intervene or not), caused defendants to perceive a possible threat to prison security, thereby justifying a need to remove him from the scene. In hindsight, carrying or dragging plaintiff while holding him under the armpits may not have been the ideal way to move him in light of his back problems. The perceived security concerns justified the defendants' actions and there is no indication that they acted maliciously and sadistically to cause plaintiff harm. Contrary to plaintiff's assertions that the defendants "should have known" that he could be a person with mobility problems, the facts are undisputed that defendants did not know of plaintiff's health problems. Plaintiff was not wearing a vest or using assistive devices that would identify him as disabled and he did not inform defendants prior to being handcuffed that he was disabled. Once plaintiff began to yell that he was in pain, the course of events was quickly set in motion, and the possible threat to safety and security did not allow time for defendants to stop and consider how plaintiff could otherwise be transported. Moreover, once defendants got plaintiff to the holding cell their physical contact with him ceased. Transporting him into the Program Office and to the holding cell in a hurried and somewhat rough manner was necessary for a reasonable security purpose, and defendants' use of force was limited to accomplishing this task. This court will not second-guess defendants' perceived need to act swiftly and without finesse.
Finally, the parties dispute the extent of injury suffered by plaintiff. Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff suffered more than de minimis injury as a result of the defendants' actions, his excessive force claim nevertheless fails. Where, as here, any injury resulted from the legitimate use of force, no constitutional violation is found.
The undisputed facts show that defendants did not use excessive force against plaintiff; they did not act maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Rather, they applied force in a good-faith effort to restore discipline and maintain security. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's excessive force claim is GRANTED as to defendants Castro, Cunningham, and Johnson.
D
Following the incident with plaintiff, a disciplinary report was drafted, charging plaintiff with "resisting staff" based upon his actions in resisting the defendants' attempts to escort him to his cell. After consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing, the senior hearing officer (SHO) reduced the disciplinary charge to the lesser charge of "creating a potential for violence." Plaintiff was found guilty of the charge. Based upon the guilty disposition plaintiff was "counseled, warned and reprimanded regarding future behavioral expectations." Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 15 § 3323, a credit forfeiture could not be assessed because the time constraints for bringing the disciplinary action had not been met. Plaintiff complains that he was denied due process at his hearing because he was denied the right to call certain witnesses. He brings this claim against defendant CJ Johnson (the SHO), and defendants Salazer, Mandeville, and Solis for refusing to overturn the disciplinary finding of guilt.
Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by the nature of the penal system. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Although prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply, where serious rules violations are alleged and the sanctions to be applied implicate state statutes or regulations which narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the sanctions and the sanctions are severe, the Due Process Clause requires certain minimum procedural protections. See id at 556-57, 571-72 n 19. The placement of a California prisoner in isolation or segregation, or the assessment of good-time credits against him, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, for example, is subject to certain procedural protections if (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995). Therefore, allegations by a prisoner that he was denied due process in conjunction with a disciplinary proceeding do not present a constitutionally cognizable claim unless the deprivation suffered is one of "real substance" as defined in Sandin.
Defendants maintain that because plaintiff was not punished for his rules violation but was only counseled, there has been no deprivation of "real substance" and thus the protections of Sandin do not apply. Plaintiff argues that the denial of certain witnesses at his disciplinary proceeding violated due process because the charge he was facing carried a possible term of disciplinary segregation and credit loss, and also because the finding of guilt might affect his parole eligibility. Absent an actual deprivation of real substance, however, this court finds no constitutionally cognizable claim. Neither the counseling/warning plaintiff received nor the possible collateral parole consequences amount to such a deprivation. Cf, e g, id at 485-86 (inmate's thirty-day placement in disciplinary segregation, where conditions mirrored conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody, did not result in type of a typical, significant deprivation for which state might create liberty interest; nor did situation present case where state's action would inevitably affect duration of sentence); Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 774 n. 3 (9th Cir 1999) (possibility that prisoner having escape conviction on record may result in denial of parole eligibility at some later date too attenuated to amount to denial of liberty interest under Sandin); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir 1995) (despite prior case law determining disciplinary regulations created liberty interest, underSandin no liberty interest when inmate placed in disciplinary segregation for days). Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim against defendants CJ Johnson, Salazer, Mandeville, and Solis.
Plaintiff's final claim is that MTA Jones acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when he failed to provide plaintiff with immediate medical care. Although the court ordered the US Marshal to serve Jones with the complaint in this matter (Doc # 8), the summons was returned unexecuted on October 26, 2000, for the reason that Jones has been reassigned from state service and moved out of state (Doc # 10). In a subsequent letter to the court, plaintiff asked the court to instruct the State Attorney General's Office to provide a current address for Jones. As Jones is no longer employed by the State of California, and indeed apparently no longer resides in California, the State is under no obligation to do so. The responsibility to provide the US Marshal with accurate information to effectuate service on Jones lies with plaintiff. Plaintiff has not shown good cause for his failure to do so. Accordingly, Jones is hereby DISMISSED as a defendant from this action pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FRCP 4(m); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (9th Cir 1994) (prisoner failed to show cause why prison official should not be dismissed under Rule 4(m) because prisoner did not prove that he provided marshal with sufficient information to serve official). Because Jones is the only defendant named with respect to plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, this claim is DISMISSED as well.
F
Plaintiff alleges in his opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment that defendants have failed to respond to his First Amendment and related "conspiracy" claims. No such claims were found cognizable by this court or ordered served on the defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff's objection is without merit, and his attempt to assert these claims at this late date is DENIED.
III
Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief against defendants Mandeville and Salazer, as well as several non-parties to this action, based on alleged retaliatory actions taken in response to his filing of administrative grievances at SVSP. Plaintiff asks that the court issue an order enjoining reprisals and ordering that plaintiff be transferred from SVSP to Mule Creek State Prison.
Defendants argue that plaintiff is seeking to expand his causes of action by using the request for preliminary injunctive relief as a means to litigate additional claims unrelated to those set forth in his complaint. They argue that he cannot seek relief related to events occurring after the filing of the instant lawsuit and which are not related to the incident at issue, nor can he seek relief against non-parties. This court agrees. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). The preliminary injunction is meant to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury and preserve the court's power to render a meaningful decision on the merits. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir 1980). Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief accomplishes neither of these goals with respect to the subject matter of this action. To the extent that he believes he may be in need of, and legally entitled to, such relief, plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies for these new claims and then, if appropriate, bring a new federal action. Accordingly, the request for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED.
After defendants' motion for summary judgment was filed in this matter, plaintiff moved for court permission to file an amended and supplemental pleading pursuant to Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc # 31). Defendants opposed this request (Doc # 33), and plaintiff subsequently moved to withdraw his request (Doc # 37). Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his request to file an amended and supplemental pleading is hereby GRANTED.
For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows:
1. The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims against defendants J Cunningham, M Castro, N Mendez, S Chavez, EA Johnson, W Garner, GJ Johnson, GR Salazer, P Mandeville, and A Solis (Doc # 24).
Because the court finds no constitutional violation and grants summary judgment on the merits of all claims, defendants' qualified immunity argument is not addressed.
2. Defendant Jones and plaintiff's claim against him for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs are DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief is DENIED (Doc # 28).
4. Plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file his opposition (Doc # 31) and his request to withdraw his motion to file a supplemental pleading (Doc ## 31, 37) are GRANTED.
5. Any and all other outstanding motions are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the file.